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SUMMARY

Innovation comprises the processes of invention and commercialization. While the
importance of innovation, especially commercialization, has been widely recognized,
existing studies have largely overlooked the commercialization process. By examining
the determinants of uses and nonuses of patented inventions from firms at the levels of
technology, organization, and project/invention, this study attempts to help fill a critical
gap in the literature. In doing so, it enriches theoretical understandings of innovation and,
in particular, builds on the evolutionary explanation of technology development, the
Teecian framework on profiting from innovation, Transaction Cost Economics (TCE),
the Knowledge-Based View (KBV), and open innovation and innovation network
perspectives. It also reveals an empirical reality of commercial use and strategic nonuse
of patents. The study is based on a novel dataset constructed from multiple sources:
inventor surveys, the United States Patent and Trademark Office online database, and
COMPUSTAT, among others.

After examining the factors affecting overall propensity to commercialize patented
inventions, this study explores the factors that affect the organizational paths of
commercialization. The empirical estimation indicates that technological uncertainty and
a strong internal position of complementary assets raise the propensity for internal
commercialization. The study argues that openness of innovation processes and network
relationships should affect the choice of commercialization paths. Consistent with the

xiv

hypotheses, empirical estimations show that external industrial knowledge increases the
propensity of internal commercialization. The study also indicates that collaboration has
diverging effects on the choice of commercialization paths. While collaboration with
firms in vertical relationships tends to favor internal commercialization, collaboration
with firms in horizontal relationships tends to favor external commercialization (licensing,
start-up).

Finally, the study reports findings on the strategic use of patents and then tests
hypotheses about the factors driving strategic nonuse. It concludes that a significant
portion of U.S. patents are indeed filed for strategic reasons. It also finds that
characteristics of technology and firms are significantly associated with different
strategies. In particular, firms are more likely to use a patent for strategic defensive
purposes when they have larger amounts of assets. The study concludes with discussing
managerial and policy implications.

xv

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

Innovation has played increasingly important roles in both national and industrial
competitiveness (Cantwell, 2005). Along with the global trend toward the knowledgebased economy and globalized competition, building up innovation capabilities is taking
the central place in the agendas of policy makers as well as firms. Technological
innovation is, by definition, a new technology (or a new combination of existing
technologies) put into (commercial) use (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988; Schumpeter, 1942).
Thus, innovation processes complete only when new ideas or a new combination of
existing technologies (“invention process”) are transformed into commercial applications
(“commercialization process”). In practice, two processes are often carried out in an
intermingled and iterative way. Nevertheless, they require distinctive focus, skills,
resources, and other capabilities to be successfully carried out (Roberts, 1988; Teece,
1986). Schumpeter (1942) clearly pointed out the distinctiveness between them by stating
that invention “does not necessarily induce innovation, but produces of itself … no
economically relevant effect at all.” Commercializing inventions is an important issue
both in practice and in theory. Economic and social impacts of innovation can be
identified only if the whole innovation processes are taken into consideration. Certainly,
inventions of no or little commercial use may generate value to the society by
contributing to the progress of science and technology. However, ultimate economic and
social benefits will be realized when they are linked to some real-world applications. For
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example, competitiveness crisis of the United States in the 70s and 80s was driven not by
the lack of generating new scientific and technological ideas but by ignoring
commercialization processes of them.

In studying innovation, patents are one of the most important sources for numerous
reasons. First, patentability requires novelty, non-obviousness, and, commercial
applicability which conforms to the meaning of innovation, especially the inventive part
of innovation. Second, by law in most countries, patentability is rigorously scrutinized by
professional examiners and the results are published for public access. This enhances
reliability of the data. Third, patent publications are well maintained and easily accessible.
In many countries, patent data are available as a form of online databases and regularly
updated and corrected by the patent authorities. Most of all, rapid increase of patenting
and patent propensity (or propensity for an invention to be filed for patents) (Kortum and
Lerner, 1999; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008) has enhanced the coverage and
comprehensiveness of patents data. While an invention being patented indicates that the
invention has a certain level of technological quality and commercial potential it does not,
however, indicate whether and how the invention is commercially exploited nor how
much commercial value it has, which is an essential information required to evaluate the
whole innovation processes.

Intellectual property policy, especially patent policy, is an important policy instrument
affecting innovation. Patent systems were designed to promote the progress of scientific
and technological knowledge. A core mechanism is to promote investment in new
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technology and its commercialization by allowing temporary monopoly over the
technology developed as such. However, patents in the contemporary world play much
diverse roles, some of which may not necessarily serve to the design goal of the patent
systems. For example, patents are used as a tool for hindering competitors’ technological
advancement as well as securing exclusive rights on own uses. Hence, the growth and
extended usage of patents have brought up new possibilities and threats to the systems of
innovation. While diversified ways of profiting from patents may promote investment in
research and development and division of innovative labors, increase of non-practiced
patents may work as an thicket or fence to ultimately retard innovation (Heller and
Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2000). Some would benefit from enlarged opportunities but
some others would suffer from additional investment required for developing alternative
technologies or from additional payment for licensing or infringing others’ patents. This
complex and diversified development of patent uses casts a fundamental question on the
effectiveness of the current patent systems and has ignited the debates about the patent
systems reform. In sum, studying uses and nonuses of patents is of crucial importance for
innovation policy.

While the importance of commercializing inventions (and especially commercial and
strategic uses of patented inventions) has been recognized for a long time, it has not been
reflected in empirical studies of the innovation literature. Most empirical literature has
focused on the invention process of innovation and, thus, overlooked the
commercialization process. More severely, many studies regard invention and innovation
as equivalent concept. Certainly, invention process must play a significant role in
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innovation but, as we argued above, it can provide only a partial picture. In inventions
being transformed into commercial application, technological superiority is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition. By examining commercialization process, this
dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the literature and provide empirical evidence to the
current discussion on innovation and patent policy.

This study examines the determinants of uses and nonuses of patented inventions from
firms. We focus on firms because firms account for the largest share of patented
inventions and play the protagonist’s role in the scene of commercialization. Patented
inventions are appropriated in various ways. First, they can be integrated in commercial
products. Enhanced or novel product functionality, more efficient manufacturing
processes, or enhanced product development processes driven by a new technology
rewards the integrator with enhanced product competitiveness and profitability. This is a
traditional use of appropriating patented inventions. We call this mode of uses as
“internal commercialization”. Second, patented inventions can generate direct revenue to
the inventor in the form of licensing royalties when they are traded in the market for
technology. In other cases like cross-licensing the rents are represented as an access to
the technology owned by others. This mode becomes more and more important because
all the technology components required for making a product tend to be hardly kept
within a single organization as product technology becomes more complex and patenting
becomes more pervasive. Because the first-hand benefits from the invention are
generated by external parties and then a part of them transferred to the inventor
organization, we call this mode as “external commercialization”. In some rare cases,
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patented inventions become an important instrument to start a joint venture or a new
company. This form of appropriation is also categorized as external commercialization.

Patent nonuse can be broken down into two classes: strategic nonuse and other nonuse.
Some patented inventions that are not integrated into products or sold in the market for
technology may generate strategic rents. In the discrete industry where products are built
on relatively small number of technologies, development of substitutable technology by
competitors will be a big threat to the owner of original technology. For example, in
pharmaceutical or polymer industries, profits from a particular chemical material of a
certain effect will not accrue to the original inventor if he fails to prevent alternative
methods of synthesis to lead to a material of the same effect. In this industry, the original
inventor often files for “fence” patents to prevent competitors from inventing-around the
own technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). In the complex industries where
large number of technologies is integrated into a final product, such as electronics or
semiconductors, patents are often filed to block competitors from further developing the
downstream complementary technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Either case
benefits the filer of fence or blocking patents with strategic rents as represented by
hindering entry to a certain product market or blocking or slowing down competitors’
innovation processes. Some blocking patents are used strategically for the advantageous
position in negotiation of future cross-licensing deals (called “bargaining chips” or
“player strategy”). The rest of nonuse patents are classified as “other nonuse”, albeit its
diversity. The classification of uses and nonuses of patented inventions are summarized
in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1 Uses of patented inventions
First-hand
benefits
Commercialization
generated by
Product/Process
Inventor’s own
Research tool
organization
External/ new
organization
None

Licensing and crosslicensing
New company
NA

Types of benefits
Strategic rents

Others/none

Preventing inventing
around (fencing)
Blocking
“bargaining chips” or
“player strategy”

Signaling to investors
Reduce potential
litigation risk
Spillovers/leakage

NA

Sleeping patents

The first part of this study examines the propensity of commercialization. According to
the classification shown in the above table, we examine the factors affecting the patents
between the first column (i.e. internal and external commercialization) and the right two
columns (i.e. all types of nonuses). In particular we submit novel arguments that the
evolutionary stages of technology development and the strength of alternative
appropriability would affect the commercializing patented inventions. We argue that the
patented inventions in mature technology are easier to find a path to commercial
applications because of incremental nature of innovation and lower uncertainty. Also, we
argue that the patented inventions from capital intensive firms are less likely to
commercialize because of the presence of alternative competitive advantage,
progressively increasing organizational rigidity with size, and larger protective value than
commercialization value of patents. We also argue and test how a characteristic of
product technology influences on this relationship. Our empirical results drawn from a
U.S. inventor survey support both hypotheses.
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The second part addresses the factors affecting internal and external commercialization
paths (the first and the second row of the first column of Table 1.1). Departing from
Teecian framework on the profitability of innovation (1986, 2006), we submit enriched
arguments incorporating Transaction Cost Economics, KBV, open innovation and
innovation network theories. This part pictures an empirical reality of the market for
technology and contributes to theoretical and empirical aspects of theories relevant to the
market for technology and organizational trajectories of innovation.

The last part takes a detail look on the nonuse patents. In particular, we focus on the
strategic nonuse patents (middle column of Table 1.1). Strategic nonuse patents had
attracted attention from both policy makers and academic researchers because of their
negative potential to innovation. We first show how the strategic nonuse patents are
associated with various firm- and industry-level characteristics in our sample. Then, we
submit and test the hypotheses about how financial and technological assets of a firm
affect the propensity of strategic nonuse. We also submit and test a hypothesis about the
impacts of bargaining failure and technological uncertainty on strategic nonuse.

This study takes advantage of both direct and indirect measures of innovative activities
using a data set constructed from multiple information sources including patents, a largescale inventor survey and financial information of firms. Our sample covers patenting
firms across multiple industries in the United States.
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Previous innovation surveys such as the Yale survey of 1983 (Levin, 1988; Levin, Cohen,
and Mowery, 1985; Levin et al., 1987), the Carnegie Mellon Survey of 1994 (Cohen et al.,
2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000, 2002), the recent PATVAL survey in Europe
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Giuri et al., 2007), and the Community Innovation
Surveys in Europe have provided many valuable insights on innovation. We use our
inventor survey to expand our understanding innovation on this tradition. This study will
also have the broader impact of contributing to current policy debates on patent reform,
which currently suffer from a lack of systematic data on the uses of patents.

Next chapter reviews the relevant previous works. Then, subsequent Parts follow. The
final chapter summarizes the findings from all Parts, draws overall policy and managerial
implications and then discusses some limitations and avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2. Literature Review

2.1. Invention, Patents, and Innovation

Innovation has played increasingly important roles in both national and industrial
competitiveness (Cantwell, 2005). Along with the global trend toward the knowledgebased economy and globalized competition, building up innovation capabilities is taking
the central place in the agendas of policy makers as well as firms. In order to understand
innovation, scholars widely depend on patent information—probably because of an
increasing number of patent filings, legal linkage of patentability to commercial
applicability, quality screening attributed to the well-established patent examination
procedures, and publicly accessible databases. Due to well-maintained and readily
accessible patent databases, various aspects of innovative activities are captured through
patent indicators, which are constructed from published patent documents. Ever since
Schmookler (1954) examined American inventive activity using patents, patent indicators
have contributed to our better understanding innovation.

Intellectual property policy, especially patent policy, is one of the most important policy
instruments affecting innovation. Patent laws in the United States were introduced more
than 200 years ago to promote the progress of scientific and technological knowledge.
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The U.S. Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power “to promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries” (U.S. Constitution, Article I
Section 8). However, the patent system in the contemporary economy does not stay
within this traditional role but expands its influence on innovation in various ways. As
patents move toward a more central position in innovation strategy, more versatile uses of
patents are discovered. Now, a patent is not only a tool for securing exclusive rights to
commercialize the invention covered by the patent, but also a tool for selling the
technology, inducing investment, and hindering competitors’ technological advancement.

The growth and extended usage of patents, thus, bring up both a new possibility and a
threat to innovation. Increasing investment in new technology and rapid growth of the
market for technology may promote innovation. However, an increase in the number of
patents, especially non-practiced patents, may retard innovation by fundamentally
preventing a new firm from participating in some product markets because they are
protected by a thicket of patents or because potential new competitors would incur
additional development costs . The role of patents in promoting innovation is indeed a
significant policy and legal issue. In eBay Inc. et al. v. MercExchange (2006), the
Supreme Court denied the categorical application of an injunction, admitting that some
patents are intended to be licensed or to be used for blocking competitors. In KSR
International v. Teleflex (2007), the Supreme Court emphasized a broader interpretation
of obviousness (as a way of invalidating a patent). These two legal cases implicitly admit
the potential negative impact of strong patent on competition and innovation, and the
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decisions can be seen as weakening the strength of patents. Similarly, Congress is
currently debating patent reform, including how to improve the patent system to promote
innovation rather than retard it. In sum, the study of patents in the context of their
commercial usage is a critical issue for contemporary science and technology policy.

Despite all the virtues of patent indicators, they are far from perfect in capturing
innovative activities. Two major weaknesses are especially prominent. First, only a
portion of all inventions that may contribute to economic and commercial application and
scientific and technological advancement is patented. The recent explosion of the number
of patents is not necessarily linked to an increased propensity for patenting. The existing
studies do not reach a unified explanation behind this phenomenon (Hall, 2004; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008; van Zeebroeck,
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, and Guellec, 2006). According to survey-based research,
many innovative companies adopt non-patent appropriability schemes, such as secrecy or
complementary capabilities (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). The
Carnegie Mellon survey in 1994 reported that only 20 to 30% of innovations are
protected by patents (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). So, do all these stories tell us
that patents are not appropriate in studying innovation? Our answer is that patents are still
a useful and powerful vehicle to lead us to understanding innovation. While there is no
confirmatory evidence that patent propensity has decreased over time, there is plenty of
evidence that firms utilize patent systems more heavily and more diversely. In this sense,
even without understanding entire invention activities, which look almost impossible to
capture, patents should explain an important subset of inventive activities. Thus, we
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conclude that the first point raised as a weakness of patents in understanding innovation
does not degrade the importance of patents in innovation studies.

Innovation is generally recognized as a coupling of invention with commercialization
(Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988). Schumpeter emphasizes this point by asserting that
invention “does not necessarily induce innovation, but produces of itself … no
economically relevant effect at all” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 84). The fact that an invention
is patented indicates that the invention is successful and commercializable because it
must have passed patentability tests (which include quality, novelty, non-obviousness,
and the potential for commercial application). However, patents per se do not tell
anything about how the patented invention is or will be commercially exploited. In order
for an inventor to commercialize his inventions, he needs to put an enormous amount of
effort, often composed of skill sets different from those required for invention, into
additional research to transfer the inventions into manufacturing (Roberts, 1988).
Therefore, patent indicators may be not only a bad proxy for innovation (Harhoff et al.,
1999; He and Deng, 2007; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Fogarty, 2000; Lanjouw, Pakes, and
Putnam, 1998) but also an indicator of something innovative that is not an innovation.
Most innovation research based on patent information has overlooked this critical last
step of innovation.

Survey methods overcome some of the weaknesses of patent indicators. By asking
directly to inventors or other persons knowledgeable in the innovation process, surveys
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can reveal detail information about motives, background, processes, outcomes, or
contexts of a particular invention or innovation.

However, patents are neither a perfect measure of innovation nor a technological change.
First they are only a subset of invention. And a patented invention is not necessarily
innovation in the sense that it is not commercialized. Although the patent propensity is
reportedly increasing recently in the U.S. and other countries, secrecy still is regarded as
an important means of appropriation. Moreover the usages of patents to contemporary
firms are much more diversified now than in the past. More seriously, patents of today
are utilized for a variety of purposes beyond their original role—a protective role for
commercialization. These include licensing, enhancing the position of negotiation,
blocking competitors’ technological advance, signaling technological competence to
employer or investors, or misleading competitors (Langinier, 2005).

2.2. Commercialization of Patented Inventions

Firms invest their valuable resources into inventive activities because they expect to
benefit from the results or process of invention. The benefits from innovation, however,
do not accrue automatically to the innovator. Intellectual property rights, especially
patents, traditionally have been recognized as the most important legal instrument to
enhance the appropriability of innovation. By excluding the rights of use of an invention,
patents enable an inventor to secure temporary monopoly status over the invented

13

technology. Other than patent, an inventor can use numerous mechanisms to appropriate
the profit from the invention.

2.2.1. Appropriability Mechanisms from Iinnovation

Schumpeter (1942) pointed out two such mechanisms that critically affect the
appropriability of innovation: scale economy of production and market power.1 When the
volume of a product is large, the unit cost for innovation invested for product
development spreads more thinly over products and, thus, the amount of profit for a given
investment will be large (Cohen and Klepper, 1996b). Appropriability will also enhance
if the product market is protected by an entry barrier or market power. Schumpeterian
arguments of appropriability have been massively tested, though indirectly, by studying
the relationship of the rate of innovation to the firm size or market structure. The
empirical results are largely inconclusive; These will be reviewed later in another section.
Although briefly referred to here, Schumpeterian appropriability focuses on the product’s
market conditions and competitive environment. And by focusing on them, Schumpeter
relatively ignores the firm-level mechanisms (such as lead time or secrecy) that can
enhance product market position or reduce the possibility of imitation by competitors
(Winter, 2006). However, several recent surveys consistently found that firm-level
mechanisms are indeed important appropriability mechanisms.

1

Schumpeter meant these two separate elements when referring to “large monopolistic firm.”
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Both the Yale survey (Levin et al., 1987) in 1983 and the Carnegie Mellon survey (CMS)
(Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) in 1994 asked R&D managers of
U.S. firms2 about the effectiveness of several appropriability mechanisms. Surprisingly,
both surveys found that non-patent mechanisms such as lead time, secrecy, and
complementary capabilities are at least as important as patents. Also, both surveys found
that the appropriability mechanism’s effectiveness varies significantly across industries.
Surveys conducted in Switzerland (Harabi, 1995), Japan (Cohen et al., 2002), and
Finland (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007) also resulted in a similar
conclusion. The Finnish survey claimed that appropriability of innovation should depend
on contractual and employee relationships as well as patents, secrecy, or lead time. By
examining the relationship between appropriability and imitativeness, the researchers
argued that human factors are important to appropriability because knowledge and
information can flow to competitors through communications and employee mobility.
This broad interpretation of appropriability implies that appropriability conditions are not
just subject to technology- or industry-specific factors but also to those factors at the firm
or invention level. The Finnish survey also found that the effectiveness of patents was
ranked only behind lead time, secrecy, learning curve, and contract strength. In sum, the
relative effectiveness of patents in appropriating benefits from invention and protecting
the competitive advantage is evaluated lower than secrecy or lead time across type of
innovation, time, and country, except for product innovation in the early period (Yale
survey) and in Japan. However, we cannot say that patents are not important in
appropriating innovation. Indeed, the perceived importance of patents has increased
2

Firms included in both surveys are limited to R&D-performing firms, and the samples are biased toward
large firms. The Yale survey collected responses from 130 publicly traded firms. The CMS collected
responses from 1,478 R&D labs.
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during the last few decades. In a survey conducted by the Business and Industry Advisory
Committee to the OECD (BIAC)3 in 2003, 67% of respondents answered that the average
value of patents had increased over the past ten years (Sheehan, Martinez, and Guellec,
2003). In the same survey, 89% of respondents reported that the risks of not patenting
had also increased over the past ten years. The recent surge in the number of patents and
patent propensity supports this observation (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner,
1999; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008). The rankings of the effectiveness of each
appropriability mechanism from these surveys are summarized in Table 2.1.
.

3

The respondents to the BIAC survey are 105 firms from Europe, North Americas, and Japan. About 80%
of responses came from firms with 1,000 or more employees or with R&D budgets above USD 10 million.
We could not find methodological descriptions of this survey, so we cannot say whether this survey is
representative or not. This survey is only indicative.
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Table 2.1 Effectiveness of appropriability mechanisms (rank)
CM
CM
Yale
Swiss
survey
survey
Finnish
survey in survey in CIS in
(U.S.) in (Japan) in survey in
1983
1988
1993
1994
1994
2004
Appropriability
Product, Product, Product, Product, Product,
mechanisms
process process process
process
process
Product
To prevent
duplication
4, 5
6, 6
To secure
license
Patents
4, 4
5, 5
2, 4
5 (IPR)
income
5, 6
4, 5
Secrecy
6, 4
4, 4
2, 3
2, 1
5, 2
2
Lead time
2, 1
2, 1
1, 1
1, 3
1, 3
1
Complementary
sales/svc
1, 3
1, 2
4, 4
4, 5
Complementary
manufacturing
3, 2
3, 1
3
Learning curve
3, 2
3, 3
(tacitness)
Complexity of
product design
3, 2
Contracts/ other legal
6, 6
4
HRM
7
Labor legislation
6
Yale survey (Levin et al., 1987): 650 responses from 130 lines of businesses
Swiss survey (Harabi, 1995): 358 responses from 127 lines of businesses from R&D
performing firms
CIS survey in 1993 (Arundel, 2001): 2849 R&D-performing firms in Norway, Germany,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland
CM survey (Cohen et al., 2002): 1478 U.S. firms. 643 Japanese firms
Finnish survey (Hurmelinna-Laukkanen and Puumalainen, 2007): 299 Finnish firms.
Patents include other IPRs. HRM includes restrictions on employee mobility and
communication. Labor legislation includes employment contracts and employee noncompetes.

Patents, although recognized generally as ineffective means of protecting invention
across all of these surveys, seem to be effective in some industries. Also, the protective
effectiveness of patents for product technology is different from process technology. In
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the Swiss survey, the process patents were rated low in protective effectiveness in all
industries. However, the product patents were rated higher than secrecy (but still lower
than lead time, complementary sales, and learning curve/cost advantage) in the
machinery and metal processing industry and the chemicals industry. According to the
Carnegie Mellon survey for the U.S. firms (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000), drugs,
electrical equipment, basic chemicals, and medical equipment industries are relatively
highly ranked in the effectiveness of patents. Industries in which patent is not an effective
means of appropriability include food, textiles, and printing.

In this section, we briefly reviewed various appropriability mechanisms identified in the
literature. In sum, the literature finds that appropriability of an invention depends not
only on the legal institution, but also on other factors such as competitive environments,
internal capability of a firm, and appropriability strategy.

2.2.2. Commercial use of patented inventions

According to the literature, about half or more patents are put into commercial use. One
study conducted during the late 1950s reports that the rate of use of the U.S. patents
issued in 1938, 1948 and 1952 was 49.3% at the time of the survey (Sanders, Rossman,
and Harris, 1958).4 However, this rate is much lower than that of recent European patents.
The PatVal-EU reports that about 63.9% of European patents filed between 1993 and
1997 inclusive had been used by the time of survey, 2002-2003 (Giuri et al., 2007).
4

The rate including expected use during the full lifetime of a patent calculated by Sanders, Rossman, and
Harris is about 57.2%.
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Recently, more detailed information about reasons to patent had been reported through
surveys conducted in the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and Germany. The rank order
of importance of each reason is summarized in Table 2.2. Two common findings across
the surveys are worth mentioning here. First, commercial exploitation is ranked in the
highest position across all surveys. Second, even the patents not intended for commercial
uses may generate value to the patentees. Such uses include blocking competitors,
reducing litigation risks, and enabling entry into new/foreign markets. The first two
reasons are highly ranked in the U.S. and Japan, while the entry motive is highly ranked
the German survey.

Licensing or cross-licensing is reportedly important in Swiss and OECD surveys but not
important in the U.S., Japan, and German surveys. Industry heterogeneity is also mixed.
Cohen et al. (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) found that there is a clear discrepancy in
motives for patenting between “complex” industry and “discrete” industry. In the German
survey, motives for patenting were not different across sectors except for exchange
motives between the biotech industry and other industries (Blind et al., 2006).
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Table 2.2 Reasons to patent (rank)
Swiss
OECD
CMS U.S. CMS Japan
German
(Harabi, (Sheehan,
in 1994
in 1994
survey in
1995)
Martinez, (Cohen et (Cohen et
2002*
and
al., 2002) al., 2002) (Blind et al.,
Guellec,
2006)
2003)
Product, Aggregate Product,
Product,
Aggregate
process
process
process
Commercial exploitation/
2, 1
1
1, 1
1, 2
1
preventing duplication
Licensing
1, 1
3
6, 6
5, 5
8
Cross-licensing/ to
2, 3
2
4, 4
4, 4
6
improve bargaining
positions
Blocking competitors
5, 5
NA
2, 2
2, 1
5
(w/o primary purpose for
own use)
Preventing inventingNA
NA
NA
NA
3
around other key patents
Preventing suits
NA
NA
3, 3
3, 3
3
Employee evaluation/
6, 6
NA
7, 7
6, 6
7
inventor reputation
For entry into
4, 4
4
NA
NA
2
foreign/new markets
Firm’s reputation
NA
5
5, 5
7, 7
4
German survey (Blind et al., 2006): 522 firms which had filed at least three patents at the
EPO in 1999. The German survey asked 15 detailed motives including all of the above
motives plus the motives related to securing regional markets and firm values. Then they
grouped them into 5 categories according to factor analysis. We only ranked the motives
listed in the above table and skipped those not listed here by aggregating them into
higher-ranked motive in the same cluster. Also, Blind et al. regard defensive blocking as
a concept covering both preventing inventing-around and preventing legal suits to
guarantee room for technological maneuvering.
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2.2.3. Market for Technology

The presence of a market for technology facilitates technology transfer and enhances the
division of innovation labor. Most empirical literature on the market for technology
examines the determinants of (cross-) licensing or determinants of particular features of
licensing agreements (e.g., exclusivity or involvement of knowledge transfer). Below, we
give a brief review of the empirical studies on the determinants of licensing. A detail
review on each study is provided in Appendix Table A. 1.

The effective protection of intellectual property rights are reported as an important
mechanism to promote licensing. Gans, Hsu and Stern (2006) found that projects
resulting in patent, especially granted patent, are more likely to reach to licensing
agreements. Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) found that patent-mediated cross-licensing deals
are more likely to occur in Japanese firm than deals involving only know-how transfer.
Patent effectiveness as being measured as either a perceived strength (Arora and
Ceccagnoli, 2006) or industry-level patent propensity (Kim and Vonortas, 2006) is also
reported as a strong driver of licensing.

There is robust industry heterogeneity in licensing propensity. Analyzing 1,612 licensing
contracts in the early 1990s, Anand and Khanna (2000) found that chemical, computer,
and electronics industries are prominent in licensing. They pointed out heterogeneity of
appropriability regime as a source of industry heterogeneity. Arora, Fosfuri, and
Gambardella (Arora, 1997; Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2002; Fosfuri, 2004)
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attempted to explain industry heterogeneity in a more stylized way. After conducting a
detailed historical case study of the chemical industry, they concluded that industry
structures (such as emergence of specialized engineering firms, market share of licensors,
and degree of product differentiation) had affected the licensing propensity. They pointed
out two fundamental factors driving this phenomenon: revenue earned from licensing and
rent dissipation caused by licensing. According to their arguments, the development of a
market for technology depends on the strategic behavior of industry participants as well
as on evolutionary paths of the industry

Various firm capabilities also influence licensing propensity. They include prior
experience (Kim and Vonortas, 2006), the size of the firm (Gambardella, Giuri, and
Luzzi, 2007; Nagaoka and Kwon, 2006), and the presence of alternative
commercialization channels, such as marketing and sales (Kollmer and Dowling, 2004)
or complementary assets (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002). One common finding is that firms
lacking some assets required for commercialization (e.g., small firms, start-ups, or
partially integrated or non-integrated firms) are more likely to license.

2.3. Schumpeterian Legacy on Innovation

A firm is an important social entity that transforms ideas into innovation. This section
reviews a portion of the literature dealing with questions about two important aspects
relating innovation. First, who innovates? This question has drawn continuous academic
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attention ever since Schumpeter’s emphasis on entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1939,
1942). The research frontier of this theme recently shifted from the simple small-large
dichotomy in firm size to a more complex characterization. These characteristics involve,
among others, the competitive environment to which a firm belongs, presence and
effectiveness of a market for innovative knowledge, technology and knowledge stock
available to the firm, and strategic intentions of the firm. Under the rational behavioral
assumption of a firm, the firm will respond differently to the innovation needs it has
determined depending on these factors. Hence, to better understand who innovates, we
have to understand why firms innovate. This comprises the second question of this
section. A natural question that may well follow those about who innovates and why
would be how do they innovate. The literature dealing with this question will be reviewed
in the next section of innovation processes.

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), Schumpeter emphasizes the role of
monopolization in innovation. A monopoly, more loosely defined as a large firm, has a
discriminating role in both the preconditions and aftermath of innovation. As a
precondition, Schumpeter points out the relative advantage of a large firm in “the sphere
of influence of the better [good]” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 101) and good financial
standings. As a result of innovation, a firm will enjoy a transient monopoly state caused
by imitation lag. Therefore, in this Schumpeterian world, “perfect competition is and
always has been suspended whenever anything new is being introduced” (p. 105). This
Schumpeterian hypothesis urged researchers to look at the relationship between market
structure (depending on firm size) and technological progress.
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The Schumpeterian hypothesis was extensively tested during the 1960s through the 1980s.
As neatly summarized by Cohen and Klepper (1996b), these studies consistently found
that R&D investments increase with firm size, although not disproportionately, but that
innovation output, mostly measured using patent counts, decreases disproportionately as
the level of R&D or firm size increases. The arguments underlying the assumption that a
large firm innovates more than a smaller one consider aspects of both demand and supply.
First, a larger firm has a smaller unit cost of R&D (“cost-spreading effect”) than its
smaller counterpart (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b). On the supply side, a larger firm
will have more lump-sum funds to invest in R&D. More R&D will diversify the research
portfolio and spread R&D risks into several parallel projects to raise the odds of success.
A larger investment in R&D constitutes a larger R&D team, which is composed of
supposedly better specialized personnel or which better divides the R&D labor force. As
a consequence of this scale economy of R&D investment, a firm investing more in R&D
will have advantages in its research portfolio, R&D risk-spreading, efficiency of R&D
teams, and absorptive capacity. Besides R&D diversity/specialization, a larger firm
enjoys an operational advantage through better vertical integration and specialization
(Teece, 1986). However, although the above arguments explain the increasing R&D
expenditure as the firm size grows, it does not explain why it grows disproportionately.
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Table 2.3 Literature about R&D expenditure, innovation, and firm size
Category
Relationship with Studies
Remark
firm size
R&D
Proportional
(Scherer, 1965) up to a certain
Fortune 500 firms
expenditure
level

R&D
productivity

Disproportionately
more
Disproportionately
less
negative
negative

U-type
Innovation

mixed

(Soete, 1979) in some
industries in the U.S.
(Mansfield, 1964) except for
chemicals
(Mansfield, 1964)
innovation/R&D
(Link and Rees, 1990) Total
Factor Productivity
(Tsai, 2005; Tsai and Wang,
2005) TFP
(Acs and Audretsch, 1987)
depending on industries

Firms with >25k

Major user
industry of univ
research
Taiwanese firms

Table 2.4 Literature on firm size and performance, governance mode and the nature
of innovation
Author
Industry
Data/
Variables of
Variable Examined
Effect
Technique interests
(Veugelers Manufact- Cross
A firm does
Small firms (<50
-***
and
uring
section:
innovation (=1) employees)
Cassiman, (Belgium) logit
Large firms (>500
+***
1999)
employees)
(Veugelers Manufact- Cross
make only,
Small firms (<50
+**
and
uring
section:
buy only,
employees)
+***
Cassiman, (Belgium) multimake and buy
-**
1999)
nomial
(of upstream
logit
innovation
Large firms (>500
-**
resources)
employees)
+**
(Tushman Cement,
Cross
CompetenceNew firms < Existing *
and
airlines,
section/
enhancing
firms
Anderson, and mini- Fisher’s
CompetenceNew firms > Existing *
1986)
computers exact test destroying
firms
Note: the signs denote the direction of effects of “variables examined” on the “variables
of interests.” Asterisks denote statistical significance of the effects (* denotes a 10%
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significance level, ** denotes a 5% significance level, *** denotes a 1% significance
level).

The Schumpeterian hypothesis, which was not articulated by Schumpeter himself but
named by his disciples, actually refers to two closely linked but different factors: firm
size and market structure. Schumpeter(1942, p. 101) explicitly claimed that the “mere
size [of a firm] is neither necessary nor sufficient.” Although he mentioned a supply
condition—advantageous financial standings of a larger firm—he seemed to “have
almost certainly appropriability mechanisms in mind” (Nelson and Winter, 1982), in
which oligopolistic market conditions play a key role. Empirical studies on the market
concentration and the rate of innovation followed. In British manufacturing firms
between 1972 and 1982, Blundell et al. (1999) found that a less concentrated industry
generated a higher level of aggregate innovation as measured with the direct count of
innovations. At the firm level, they found that high-market-share firms were more likely
to commercialize innovations within industries. Using the sample composed of firms
listed in the London Stock Exchange, Aghion et al. (2005) also found similar results. In
their analysis, market competition as measured in the price-cost margin averaged by
industry was significantly associated with citation-weighted patent counts and revealed
an inverted-U relationship. What they argued as the underlying force driving this
phenomenon was the balance between the incentives for incremental profit generation
through innovation under competition and the disincentives for laggards to conduct
innovative research when there is severe competition.
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2.4. Teecian Arguments on the Profitability of Innovation

The huge volume of literature that has tested the Schumpeterian hypotheses does not
converge on any undisputable conclusion. One reason for this inconclusiveness might be
that aggregate units, such as the firm or industry, could not effectively capture the
complex and heterogeneous activities of innovations carried out across firms and
industries. Firm size alone, for example, cannot appropriately capture the heterogeneous
innovation activities performed by two different firms of the same size. Moreover,
innovative capability and activities of contemporary firms are not necessarily bounded by
firm or industry boundary but are linked to outer capabilities by research collaboration,
strategic alliances, or technology licensing. Therefore, we need to unpack what is going
on within firms in order to better understand innovation.

Teece (1986), among others, developed a quite useful framework to analyze the
mechanisms by which firms commercialize their inventions. In order to explain why
many innovators fail to make a profit from innovation, he presents a simple model
composed of three actors—innovator, follower/imitator, and owners of co-specialized
assets5—and two alternative strategies of the innovator: integrate or contract out.6 In this
zero-sum type of game, he then argues that a choice of strategy conditioned on three key
factors should determine to whom (innovator or follower) the profit from innovation

5

He stated that “[i]f there are innovators who lose there must be followers/imitators who win” (Teece, 1986,
p. 286).
6
In a later revision (Teece, 2006), Teece partially addressed an intermediate strategy: strategic alliances.

27

accrues. The three conditioning factors are the dominant design paradigm of technology,
regimes of appropriability, and complementary assets. The latter two building blocks are
especially applied to lots of business strategy and innovation research and have proved
their explanatory power to some extent. The Teecian framework is especially relevant to
this work in that it directly attempts to explain the reasons why the innovator selects a
particular strategy between two alternatives—internal and external commercialization.
The Teecian framework was further refined by Gans and Stern (2003) and applied to the
context of new technology-based entrepreneurs. In this section, we briefly introduce the
three building blocks and decision frameworks and discuss their strengths and
weaknesses.

2.4.1. Dominant Design Paradigm

Seemingly affected by Kuhn’s explanation of scientific revolution (Kuhn, 1970) and
incorporating evolutionary explanations of technological progress (Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978; Dosi, 1982), Teece argued that the strategy of a firm facing a
technological innovation should differ by the degree of dominance of the technology in
the market. In the pre-paradigmatic stage, the strategic priority of an innovator is set to
aligning the new technology with the market needs and surviving through “considerable
trial and error in the marketplace” (p. 288). As the market selects a dominant design,
uncertainty in the validity of technology is removed, and competition shifts from product
innovation to process innovation (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). Therefore, strategic
importance shifts to the “scale and learning” by which a firm can build lower-unit-cost
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production and distribution capabilities. Complementary assets play a critical role in this
stage. In Teece’s original article, the design paradigm is recognized as exogenous, but in
a later article (Teece, 2006), Teece points out some endogenous elements contributing to
setting a standard as indicated by research about industry standards (Arthur, 1990; David,
1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1994). The Teecian framework does not intend to explain
technological evolution nor how an emerging technology becomes a dominant design.
Teece’s contribution is in linking managerial choices to a configuration of the regime of
appropriability and relative positions in complementary assets, given a paradigmatic
technology. He also argues that his framework gives an implication about the timing of
market entry depending on those two conditions (Teece, 2006). However, as shown in an
extensive review on the relevant literature by Murmann and Frenken (2006), dominant
design concept is not only valid and widely adopted, but also affects the nature of
competition and the innovative behavior of firms.

2.4.2. The Regime of Appropriability

According to Teece (1986), a regime of appropriability “refers to the environmental
factors, excluding firm and market structure, that govern an innovator’s ability to capture
the profits generated by an innovation” (p. 287). In Teecian terms, these factors are
related to the degree of ease with which an innovation can be imitated by the competitors.
What Teece points out as factors affecting the imitability of an innovation are the nature
of technology (especially the degree of tacit knowledge) and legal environment (such as
effectiveness of intellectual property protection) surrounding the technology. As
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summarized here, the Teecian appropriability condition is exogenous by definition. By
separating out environmental conditions from firm and market factors, Teece shows why
and how the ownership of, and a relative position in, complementary assets matters in
appropriating innovation. However, as increasingly observed, firms in some industries
take on appropriability conditions by exerting deliberate IP strategies.7 Therefore,
appropriability regime might be determined endogenously in some industries. In the later
part of this paper we will argue that, in some complex product industries where
technological components composing a final product are highly interdependent, a certain
coordinated patent strategy of a group of key technology players may change the
appropriability conditions of the industry.

2.4.3. Complementary Assets

Probably the most important contribution of Teece’s 1986 paper is to put the concept of
complementary assets, then a novel construct, out on the table of innovation discussions.
Complementary assets are “other capabilities or assets” that a “core technological knowhow in innovation” requires for its successful commercialization (p. 288). They include
various services, such as manufacturing, distribution channels, complementary
technologies, and so on. Teece classified complementary assets according to their
relationship with innovation. Generic assets have small mutual dependence with an
innovation. Some assets are specialized to an innovation with either unilateral or bilateral
7

See two examples discussed by Pisano (2006) in which strong downstream complementary asset owners,
one in pharmaceuticals and the other in computer hardware, took strategic actions toward loosening the
upstream appropriability regime by putting human gene sequence data in the public domain and by
supporting open source software, respectively.

30

dependence between them. What matters in commercialization decisions of a firm is
either specialized (unilateral dependence between assets and innovation) or cospecialized complementary assets, because the owners of the latter type of assets may
behave opportunistically and hold up the innovator to appropriate more from the
commercialization of innovation.

2.4.4. Channel Strategy: Integration vs. Contract

Given the configuration of three elements (i.e., the status of the invented technology in
the technology-market space, the regime of appropriability, and the structure of
complementary assets), the Teecian innovator chooses the more profitable strategy
between two organizational alternatives: internalize or contract.8 The basic decision rule
is, “if in doubt, outsource” (Teece, 2006, p. 1140). Under this decision rule, given a tight
appropriate regime, the Teecian innovator does not have any reason to integrate
complementary assets because he can reap the commercialization profit from a contract
regardless of its relative asset positions to the owners of complementary assets. Teece’s
decision framework sheds light on weak appropriability regimes. Simply put, the Teecian
innovator internalizes a commercialization process only if the following conditions are
met: 1) critical complementary assets are available in-house; 2) they are specialized; 3)
the cash position makes it feasible to build them in-house; 4) the innovator is not
disadvantageously positioned in commissioning complementary assets compared to
imitators or competitors; and, finally, 5) the innovator commands a weaker market power
8

The later update (Teece, 2006) adds an intermediate choice, strategic alliance, in between these two
extreme choices.
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than independent owners of complementary assets. The decision flow is shown in Figure
2.1.

Figure 2.1 Teecian market entry strategies under weak appropriability regimes (Fig.
3 in Teece, 2006)

32

2.4.5. Discussions

Teece’s framework sheds light on the relationships between firm strategy and innovation
and provides essential building blocks for its theoretical understanding. However,
progress in the theoretical and empirical research on firms and innovation during the last
two decades reveals some shortcomings and weaknesses of the framework. In this section
we briefly review the empirical research relevant to the Teecian framework and then
discuss several points for improving the framework.9

Empirical research on commercialization strategy and appropriability regime

One prominent mode of contracting for commercialization is licensing. Teecian decision
framework implies that licensing propensity should be higher in a tight appropriability
regime than in a loose one because licensing decision in a tight regime will be less
constrained by complementary asset conditions. Grindley and Teece (1997) claimed that
the U.S. policy shift toward strengthening IP and lifting up antitrust regulations that had
distorted the value of IP must force firms in electronics and semiconductor industries to
develop patentable technology or to license it. Anand and Khanna’s (2000) research on
strategic alliances of U.S. firms showed that the propensity of licensing deals (relative to
all the other forms of alliance agreements) is significantly different across industries
(higher propensity and stricter exclusivity in the drug and chemical industry and vice
versa in the computer and electronics industry). They argued that the heterogeneity of the

9

Some refining points are discussed by Teece himself in his recent reflection (Teece, 2006).
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strength of IP (strong IP in drug/chemical and weak IP in computer/electronics) explains
the heterogeneity in both propensity and features of licensing deals across industries.10
Kim and Vonortas (2006) also found similar results using the patent intensity (the
number of patents per R&D expenditure) of industry.

Commercialization strategy also depends on a firm’s appropriation strategy. Formal grant
of intellectual property rights increases the licensing propensity of start-up firms (Gans,
Hsu, and Stern, 2002, 2006). Gambardella et al. (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007)
argued that patent breadth (as measured either by the number of claims or the number of
different technology classes) may be a proxy for the strength of patents (broader patent,
harder to imitate) and found that both measures are positively associated with the
likelihood of willingness to license in European firms. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006)
found from a cross-industry survey answered by 757 R&D managers of U.S. firms that
the patent effectiveness perceived by an individual firm (as evaluated by R&D managers)
is positively associated with the licensing propensity, but only when the firm lacks the
complementary assets.

These empirical studies cast one important point about appropriability arguments. In the
Teecian explanation, appropriability is exogenously determined by the legal environment
of intellectual property rights and the nature of technology relevant to inherent imitability.
However, the licensing literature provides some evidence that appropriability strategy at
the firm level and patent level also affects the commercialization strategy of a firm.
10

Note that Anand and Khanna (2000) do not compare “integrate” with “contract” but “licensing contract”
with all the other types of identified alliances, such as joint venture, marketing agreements, or R&D
agreements.
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Furthermore, several large-scale industry surveys (Blind et al., 2006; Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987; OECD, 2003) consistently show that a variety of
appropriability mechanisms other than patents (such as lead time, secrecy, or
complementary technology) are widely adopted among firms. Gans and Stern (2003)
make the shrewd point that it is not the level but the type of appropriability that drives the
commercialization strategy of start-up firms. Therefore, in order for us to better
understand the commercialization of innovation, a simplified view of appropriability
regime as submitted by Teece needs to be revised to address a sub-regime variety and
different types of appropriability strategy exploited by firms. We will discuss this issue
below.

Empirical research on commercialization strategy and complementary assets

Two broad research streams—strategic alliances literature and licensing literature—test
the empirical validity of complementary assets in explaining a firm’s commercialization
strategy.

In conclusion, although the Teecian framework opens up a new avenue to research about
innovation and commercialization, it is far from comprehensive. Also, considering the
significant progress made in the discussions of the commercialization of innovation, the
patenting behavior of firms, and firm boundaries since 1986, efforts to integrate these
novel theoretical and empirical perspectives into the Teecian framework will further our
understanding of this matter as well as enrich the framework itself. We will discuss three
points of improvement.
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First, appropriability concept should address endogeneity of appropriability (Jacobides
and Winter, 2005; Pisano, 2006) and diverse appropriability mechanisms widely adopted
among contemporary firms. When this expanded conceptualization of appropriability
successfully fits into the Teecian framework, it will provide a useful starting point for us
to explain strategic non-use of patents. We approach this issue by synthesizing the
cumulative research results in transaction cost economics into the Teecian framework.

Secondly, the Teecian argument about complementary assets is based on two elements:
the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the owner of a specialized asset (the “holdup” problem) and the relative advantage of the innovator in commissioning
complementary assets. The former is a main point of TCE. The latter, albeit not
rigorously articulated in Teece’s framework, can be enriched through knowledge-based
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, Toyama, and Nagata,
2000) or capability-based (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997)
views of firms in which internal synergy is an important factor determining market or
hierarchy.

Thirdly, knowledge networks and open innovation perspectives should be integrated with
Teecian arguments. The knowledge network literature claims that contemporary
innovation activities dispense with the networked relationships with various external
entities (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). Also, the strategic alliance literature
observes that experiential relationships between firms importantly affect the forms and
types of alliances. We will argue that knowledge-flows and collaboration networks
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during the invention process should affect the commercialization strategy of the resultant
invention.

Finally, in some complex technologies, complementary technology works as a crucial
bottleneck (or enabler) for a firm to successfully introduce its innovation to the market.
Even an incremental innovation in the related technology area may become a life-anddeath matter for a firm in some complex technology or network goods industry (Kash and
Kingston, 2001) and, thus, an innovator’s strategy to enable timely sourcing of those
bottleneck technologies is critical. As technologies become more interdependent and
systemic, the importance of complementary technologies in the success of innovation
also increases (Somaya and Teece, 2001; Teece, 2006). Teece (2006) later admits that, in
his 1986 article, this important aspect was considered as a part of complementary assets
and relatively overlooked by focusing on the enterprise level value chains (p. 1,139). We
argue that the owner or innovator of complementary technology deserves to be the fourth
actor on the innovation commercialization playing field. By explicitly considering the
roles and strategies of innovators to deal with complementary technologies, we expect
that we can explain some important aspects of strategic uses of patents.

2.5. Economics of a Firm’s Make-Buy Decision

Although Teece did not cite any research from transaction cost economics in his 1986
article, his arguments resemble the discussions in economics of contracts, especially
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transaction cost economics and property rights theory. Both transaction cost economics
(henceforth “TCE”) and property rights theory (henceforth “PRT”) have their roots in
Ronald Coase’s conceptualization of transaction costs in his article The Nature of the
Firm, published in 1937. TCE and PRT both hinge on contractual incompleteness and
appropriable ex post quasi rents stemming from relation-specific investments. However,
as Williamson pointed out (Williamson, 1985, 2002), while the former focuses on the
opportunistic behavior that may occur in the implementation stage of a contract, the latter
focuses on ex ante incentive alignments. Although both TCE and PRT have evolved from
common antecedents, this difference makes sometimes divergent empirical predictions
(Lafontaine and Slade, 2007; Whinston, 2003). In this section, we will briefly review the
skeleton of each theory, bearing in mind how they can enrich or modify Teece’s
framework. Note that theoretical development and empirical tests for both theories have
been conducted mostly in the backward integration context11—e.g., cases such as when a
manufacturer decides whether to integrate supplier capacity (Lafontaine and Slade,
2007)—while the main focus of this study is the decision situation where the owner of
upstream assets (i.e. R&D and invention) decides whether to integrate necessary
downstream assets, such as manufacturing or marketing capacity. The applications of
TCE to the forward integration cases have been recently conducted by researchers
looking at the market for technology.

11

One branch of the economics of contracts looking at forward integration is Agency theory, which centers
around incentive matching between a principal and an agent and the moral hazard of the agent. Although
this stream of research may shed light on this study, we will not give much attention to this theory because
we do not have any empirical instruments to test the agent’s relation-specific behavior.
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In the original conceptualization by Ronald Coase, transaction cost is defined as “a cost
using the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937, p. 390). While this definition implies that
transaction costs arise from market transactions, some recent transaction-cost economists
such as Oliver Williamson use transaction costs broadly to refer to the governance costs
that arise either within firms or across markets. Kenneth Arrow views transaction costs as
costs “attached to any market and indeed to any mode of resource allocation” (emphasis
added; Arrow, 1969). Similarly, Williamson analogizes transaction costs to friction in the
physical world and regards them as the “costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task
completion under alternative governance structures” (emphasis added; Williamson, 1981,
pp. 552-553).

TCE assumes the bounded rationality of human beings and the impossibility of writing a
complete contract ex ante. In this incomplete world of contracts, contracting parties (e.g.,
manufacturer and supplier) have incentives to behave opportunistically to appropriate
more of the quasi-rents generated from the contract relationship but not fully specified ex
ante in the contract. A typical form of this ex post opportunistic behavior is “hold-up” as
emphasized in the TCE literature. Therefore, in the situation where the manufacturer
expects high chances of hold-up by suppliers, it would choose to integrate supplier
capacity under its authoritative control, which reduces opportunistic behavior and saves
transaction costs if production costs of alternative organizational forms are equal. TCE
literature contends that asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity should be closely
related with the ex post opportunistic behavior (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978;
Williamson, 1991). Asset specificity refers to “the degree to which an asset can be
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redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive
value” (Williamson, 1991, p. 281). Williamson identifies six types of asset specificity: 1)
site specificity, which refers to the advantage of two or more assets jointly located to each
other; 2) physical asset specificity, which refers to physical equipment customized to
each other; 3) human asset specificity, which refers to training and learning by doing; 4)
brand name capital; 5) dedicated assets, which are “discrete investments in general
purpose plant that are made at the behest of a particular customer”; and 6) temporal
specificity.

Empirical tests of TCE gravitated around the relationship between asset specificity and
the tendency of vertical integration in sourcing intermediate product markets. A recent
survey of the empirical literature by Lafontaine and Slade (2007) shows that the
propensity of vertical integration is indeed positively associated with various types of
asset specificity as predicted by TCE. In addition to the asset specificity, their survey
shows that complexity and uncertainty, which hinder contractors from writing a complete
contract ex ante, are also positively associated with the propensity of vertical integration.

In the innovation context, while a huge volume of literature in the strategic alliance tests
the impact of transaction costs on the governance structure of alliance agreements, only a
few studies examine how TCE predictions affect vertical integration of innovation
outputs. The licensing research examines the rate of licensing, a less hierarchical mode of
innovation commercialization, in relation with transaction cost variables such as the
strength of patents or the ownership of complementary assets. However, it does not
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directly test the market versus hierarchy because the counterpart of licensing tested in the
literature usually include non-licensed inventions, which may include non-used ones as
well as internally commercialized ones. Key studies are summarized in the following
tables. As predicted by TCE, as asset specificity, uncertainty, and complexity increase,
more hierarchical governance structure is chosen in alliance, R&D procurement, or
invention commercialization. In the innovation context, many studies test the effect of the
strength of appropriability regime on the governance structure instead of separately
testing the effect of elements comprising appropriability hazards. Aside from Oxley’s test
of geographic uncertainty, Veugelers and Cassiman’s test based on the Belgian
Community Innovation Survey show the opposite direction as predicted by TCE—i.e.,
the lower uncertainty or lower appropriability hazard is related to a more hierarchical
structure (“make” rather than “buy”). This observation is better explained using property
rights theory.

Table 2.5 Literature about effects of asset specificity on the choice of governance
structure
Author Industry
Data/
Governance
Variable
Effect
(Year)
Technique structure tested
Examined
on HI
Pisano
Pharmaceutical Cross
R&D contract vs. The number of
-*
(1990)
firms
section:
backward
R&D suppliers
Probit
integration (=1)
Gulati
Biopharma,
Pooled
Alliances
Types of
+*
and
new materials,
cross
(contractual ->
organizational
Singh
and automobile section:
minority equity
interdependence
(1998)
logit
investments ->
joint ventures)
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Table 2.6 Literature about effects of complexity on the choice of hierarchical
governance structure
Author Industry
Data/
Governance
Variable
Effect
(Year)
Technique structure tested
Examined
on HI
Gulati
biopharmaceu Pooled
Alliances
R&D alliances
+*
and
tical,
cross
(contractual ->
(vs. non-R&D)
Singh
new materials, section:
minority equity
(1998)
and
logit
investments ->
automobile
joint ventures)
Oxley
General
Cross
Alliances
Design activities
+*
(1997)
section:
(unilateral->
Mixed activities
+*
Ordered
bilateral ->
Multiple products +*
probit
equity-based)
or technologies
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Table 2.7 Literature about effect of uncertainty or appropriability regime on the
choice of hierarchical governance structure
Author
Industry
Data/
Governance structure
Variable
Effect
(Year)
Technique
tested
Examined
on HI
Oxley General
Cross
Alliances (unilateral- Wider
-*
(1997)
section:
> bilateral -> equity- geographic area +*
Ordered
based)
The number of
probit
firms
Gulati and BiopharmaPooled
Alliances
Weaker appr.
+*
Singh ceuticals,
cross
(contractual ->
Regime (new
(1998) new materials, section:
equity investments - materials and
and automobile logit
> joint ventures)
automobile)
Oxley General
Cross
Alliances
National
-***
(1999)
section:
(contractual ->
appropriability
logit
equity joint
regime of the
ventures )
host country
Veugelers Manufacturing Cross
Of upstream
Beliefs of the
and
section:
innovation resources, firm about any
Cassiman
multimake only
protective
(1999)
nomial logit buy only
mechanism
+
make and buy
(legal, secrecy, -***
lead time, etc.) +
Anand General
Cross
Licensing partners
Weaker appr.
+*
and
section: ML (unrelated -> related) Regime
Khanna
(computer/
(2000)
electronics vs.
bio)
Gans, General (SBIR Cross
Coop (cooperation -> # of patents
-*
Hsu, and funded start-up) section:
self comm.=0)
(binary)
Stern
probit/ logit
(2002)
Fontana, Food and
Cross
Propensity to
Use patents to
+**
Geuna, beverage,
section/
participate in R&D protect
and Matt Chemicals (w/o neg.
collaboration with
innovation
(2006) pharma), radio, binomial
universities or PROs
television and
communication
equipment and
apparatus,
Telecommunica
tion
services,
Computer and
related
activities
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2.6. Resources, Capabilities, and Complementary Assets

Teece’s arguments about complementary assets hinge on two dimensions of
complementary assets. The first dimension is whether an invented technology requires
complementary assets and, if so, how specialized they are. The implication for the choice
of governance structure stemming from this dimension is similar to the asset specificity
arguments in TCE. The second dimension is the competitive position of the inventor in
sourcing the complementary assets compared with, first, its competitor, and second, the
independent owner of the assets. Teece argued that an inventor who is weakly positioned
in commissioning (contracting) the complementary assets compared to an imitator (the
asset owner) should prefer integration to contract. About this dimension, TCE gives a
partial prediction consistent with Teece’s prediction. A weak position of the inventor in
commissioning the complementary assets will increase contractual uncertainty and, thus,
increase the transaction costs. Although the latter may be better explained in the incentive
theory, considering the way that different marginal returns on the investment affect the
choice of governance structure, Teece’s arguments are largely parallel to TCE arguments.

However, both arguments overlook one critical aspect. While both theories focus on
whether there will be positive transaction costs as a key element of decision-making, they
largely ignore the effects of potential synergy that may be additionally produced by
integration. As an example, think about tight internal collaboration between a technology
development group and a manufacturing division. Among others, assume that this
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relationship bears a higher degree of human asset specificity. A general prediction of
TCE is that internal procurement is preferred for the assets having a higher degree of
human asset specificity because authoritative control and internal monitoring are more
effective than a contractual relationship. Assuming zero internal transaction costs, the
innovator will choose integration when he forecasts positive transaction costs across
markets. But this is only a partial view. There is a case in which an innovator chooses
integration even under the zero transaction costs across markets and, thus, betrays a basic
assumption of Teece’s decision rule: “if in doubt, then outsource.” The preparation of
complementary assets required for commercializing an invention and collaboration
among internal organizational units are usually accompanied with employee training and
learning effects, which can lead to enhanced absorptive capacity of a firm. Therefore,
when an inventor expects such internal synergistic effects, he will integrate the
complementary assets even if market transaction costs are minimal. This point is the core
idea of a knowledge-based view of a firm (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander,
1992).

Based on the surveys of innovating firms in Sweden, Kogut and Zander (2003) found that
as the complexity of knowledge increases, the likelihood to integrate such knowledge
also increased. In the pharmaceutical industry, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) found that the
innovative performance of firms (as measured by sales ratios of innovative products) is
positively associated with firms’ technology capabilities (as measured by patent stocks)
in the same technology area but not with technology capabilities of distant areas (Table A.
2).
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2.7. Knowledge Flows, Networks, and Open Innovation

In the previous sections, we discussed two theoretical approaches relevant to the makeor-buy decision of commercializing innovation. While TCE focuses on comparisons of
the management cost with the contractual hazards in a dyadic relationship, KBV
emphasizes synergistic effects that would not be produced by contractual relationships
but would be possible by integrating complementary activities internally. The innovation
network and organizational learning perspectives agree with KBV in that consideration of
the transaction costs should be only a partial explanation of the choice of governance
structure in commercializing an innovation and that some complementary combinations
not attainable through market relationships should be an important dimension in
determining the choice of governance structure. A critical difference from KBV, however,
is found in the stretch of the boundary within which such synergistic effects happen.
While KBV confines the boundary of complementary combination within a firm, the
innovation network perspectives extend it over the networks of firms. Both TCE and the
network perspectives focus on the relationships with external entities. However, while
TCE focuses on how the attributes of the relationship work as a potential risk, the
network perspectives focus on how the relationship can generate some positive benefits
otherwise impossible. In this sense, we basically agree with Jacobides and Winter’s
contention that “TCE focuses on the conditions of exchange, to the neglect of the
conditions of production” (Jacobides and Winter, 2005, p. 398). However, there is a more
fundamental argument about the roles of the networks in innovation and economic
behavior beyond the problem of avoidance of negatives or production of positives.
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2.7.1. Embeddedness and network forms of organizations

The attacks were initiated by sociologists whose main concerns are placed in how social
relations affect individual behavior. Mark Granovetter (1985) criticizes economic
arguments for ignoring the social context and history of interpersonal relationships
outside of which human actions cannot be formed. As a consequence, he contends that
economic arguments, whether they are neoclassical or new institutional, are either oversocialized or under-socialized. In his view, networks are omnipresent (they exist even in
hierarchy as well as in markets) and human actions are “embedded in concrete, ongoing
systems of social relations” (p. 487).

Powell (1990) basically agrees with Granovetter on the importance of social structural
embeddedness in determining economic exchanges and on the limitation of arraying
economic exchanges on the market-hierarchy continuum. Nevertheless, he argues that
“certain forms of exchanges are more social” (p. 300) and submits that there is empirical
merit to distinguish the network form as a distinct governance structure from either
market or hierarchy. Powell identifies several key distinct characteristics of each of three
governance forms. The network structure is dominated by a norm of reciprocity and
reputational concerns, while hierarchy (market) is dominated by administrative fiat or
supervision (haggling or court enforcement). Also, information communicated over
networks is richer than information obtained in the market and “freer” than that circulated
in a hierarchy. Therefore, Powell contends that “[n]etworks, then, are especially useful
for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured” (p. 304).
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According to this line of argument, a network form of organization is defined as “any
collection of actors (N ≥ 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one
another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and
resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange” (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 59).
This definition includes joint ventures, strategic alliances, franchises, research consortia,
relational contracts, and outsourcing agreements.

Powell further argues that know-how, the demand for speed, and trust are critical to
forming networks. The exchange of know-how, which, according to Powell, is
characterized by tacitness and embodied in a highly mobile skilled labor force, is more
suitable for network forms because of the lateral structure of communication and mutual
obligation of networks. Dynamic adaptability of network structure, which is mostly based
on the ability to disseminate and interpret information, is more suitable for the
competition based on fast innovation capability. Finally, the common backgrounds that
may stimulate trust among actors contribute to forming networks. In addition to these
factors, needs for legitimacy and status that may be derived from network affiliation are
listed as a factor affecting network formation (Podolny and Page, 1998; Stuart, Hoang,
and Hybels, 1999). The key testable implications of embeddedness, therefore, are that
network forms of organizations are preferred when the above-listed factors are prominent
ceteris paribus and, consequently, that network forms of organizations result in unique
opportunities and constraints not predicted by standard economic explanations (Uzzi,
1996). A review of empirical research testing these implications is given below.
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Williamson (1991) also attempts to explain the network forms of organization (“hybrid
governance structure,” in his terminology) within the TCE framework. A
phenomenological basis of Williamson’s hybrid organizations seems to be linked to longterm contracts in which “bilateral dependency conditions are supported by a variety of
specialized governance features (hostages, arbitration, take-or-pay procurement clauses,
tied sales, reciprocity, regulation, etc.)” (p. 269). What is common between Williamson’s
hybrid organization and Powell’s networks is mutual dependency, although Powell’s
networks are not necessarily bilateral as Williamson’s hybrids are. Williamson, then,
suggests five dimensions (i.e., incentive intensity, administrative controls, market
adaptation, cooperative adaptation, and contract law features) that discriminate
organizational forms and locates the hybrid organization around the middle of all five
dimensions between two polar forms: market and hierarchy. A fundamental difference is
found between Powell and Williamson. While network forms of organization are
something independent from either market or hierarchy in Powell’s view, hybrids are
something intermediate and transient between market and hierarchy in Williamson’s view.
Therefore, while Powell views that network forms are suitable for fast-changing,
uncertain situations based on non-price competition, Williamson claims that hybrids are
not to be chosen for highly uncertain situations. In Williamson’s view, equilibrium under
high uncertainty can be attained through either market or hierarchy.

Empirical literature
In the section above, we show that empirical tests of embeddedness have two different
focuses: 1) relationship between network forms of organizations and their outcomes and
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2) effects of learning, characteristics of knowledge required for a product, the speed of
demand, environmental factors for trust-building, and needs for legitimacy and status on
the formation of network forms of organization. In this sense the innovation network
perspectives argue that the synergistic effects should be produced over the interorganizational knowledge networks as well as within the boundary of a firm. Powell,
Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) claim that in high-tech industries, where knowledge is
critical for a competitive advantage but broadly distributed, knowledge creation occurs
not in a tightly bound and static organizational form but in a fluid and evolving
community of knowledge. They state that “[a] network serves as a locus of innovation
because it provides timely access to knowledge and resources that are otherwise
unavailable, while also testing internal expertise and learning capabilities” (Powell,
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996, p. 119).

The locus of innovation, however, is not always found over the network. They cautiously
confine the conditions to such industries in which knowledge is important for a
competitive advantage and broadly distributed. The prominent example that satisfies
these conditions is the biopharmaceutical industry; therefore, strategic alliances of the
biopharmaceutical industry have been intensely studied recently.

Uzzi’s study (1996) reveals interesting performance implications of network structure.
While the strong ties (embedded ties rather than arm’s-length ties) in the first-order
network coupling have positive effects on firm survival, mixed ties in the second-order
network coupling are associated with a higher survival rate. This implies the important
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roles of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and bridges or structural holes in network
performance.
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Table 2.8 Literature about effects of networks on outcomes/performance
Author
Industry
Data/
Measure of
Variable Examined
(Year)
Technique
outcomes
(Uzzi,
Apparel
Cross
Firm
Intensities of embedded
1996)
section/
(contractor)
ties
Logit
failure
Business group
affiliation (social capital)
Intensities of embedded
ties of partners
(Powell,
Biotech
Longitudinal/ Firm growth Degree centrality
Koput, and
panel
Non-R&D network
Smithregression
experiences
Doerr,
1996)
Going public Degree centrality
Non-R&D network
experiences
Collaborative R&D
experience
(Stuart,
Biotech
Longitudinal/ The rate of
Technologically
Hoang, and
hazard
and valuation prominent exchange
Hybels,
regression
at IPO
partners
1999)
and selection
Commercially prominent
OLS
exchange partners
(Afuah,
MicroCross
Log(Dollar
Supplier of a new
2000)
processor section/ OLS market share) technology (RISC) was a
(RISC)
supplier of old
technology (CISC )
(supplier capabilities
obsolescence)

(Dyer and
Nobeoka,
2000)

Automobile Qualitative
(Toyota)

(Gulati and Biotech
Higgins,
2003)

Firm success
Knowledge
generation,
transfer, and
sharing
Pooled cross IPO success
section/
Heckman
selection
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Effect
-***
-**
U**
+**
+**

+**
+**
+**

-***

Customer capabilities
obsolescence (new OS)

-***

Backward vertical
integration
Supplier network

-***

VC partner
Underwriter prestige
Prominent downstream
strategic alliances

+**
+***
n.s.

NA

Table 2.8 (continued)
Author
Industry
(Year)
(Rothaermel Biotech
and Deeds,
2004)

Data/
Technique
Pooled cross
section/
structural
equation

(Gulati and Automobile Cross
Sytch,
section/
2007)
3SLS

Measure of
Variable Examined
outcomes
New products Alliances for R&D
in
development

Effect

Products on
market
Index of
manufacturer’s
performance
in the
procurement

+**
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Alliances for comercialization
Joint dependence
Manufacturer’s
dependence advantage
Supplier’s dependence
advantage
The degree of supplier’s
involvement of
cooperation
Quality of information
exchange

+**

+*
+
+**
+***

Table 2.9 Literature about factors affecting networks formation
Author
Industry
Data/
Measures Variable Examined
(Year)
Technique of
networks
(Uzzi,
Apparel
Ethnography
Third-party referral
1996)
networks
Previous personal ties
(Gulati,
new
Panel/
Alliance
Centrality: the number of
1999)
materials, randomformation cliques to which a firm
industrial effects panel
belongs
automation, probit
Centrality: how closely
and
connected a firm is to the
automotive
rest of the firms in the
products
interfirm network, both
directly and indirectly
The number of past
alliance
(Gulati and Automobile Cross
Joint
Technological complexity
Sytch,
section/
dependence Performance in the
2007)
3SLS
procurement
(Rothaermel Bio and
Cross
Alliance
Complementarity: the sum
and Boeker, pharma
section/
formation of the centered ratios of the
2008)
logit and
Alliance
biotech firm’s drugs in
negative
intensity
development and the
binomial
pharmaceutical firm’s
regression
SM&A expenses

Effect

+**

+**

+**
+***
+**
+**

Similarities 1: patent cross- +*
citations
Similarities 2: patent
-*
common citations
Similarities 3: proximity of +*
patenting propensity
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Table 2.10 Literature about explorative and exploitative learning effects on
networks formation
Author
Industry Data/
Measures of
Variable
Effect
(Year)
Technique
exploitative
Examined
networks
Powell,
Biotech Longitudinal/
Non-R&D ties
R&D ties
+**
Koput, and
panel
Smithregression
Doerr
(1996)
Rothaermel Biotech Pooled cross
Alliances for
Alliances for
+**
and Deeds
section/
commercialization R&D
(2004)
structural
equation

2.7.2. Open innovations and the external sources of knowledge
Open innovation arguments (Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 1988) emphasize the
importance of external ideas and external paths to market innovation. This “new breed of
innovation” (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007, p. 57) depends on various sources of
knowledge, including universities, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. In the
open innovation era, a firm puts more weight on knowledge brokerage than knowledge
creation (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Also, due to the risk as well as
opportunity involved in open innovation strategy, the roles of intellectual property rights
have increased.

Empirical studies in this stream of research are clustered into three groups. The first
group examines the factors affecting external sourcing of knowledge. This group includes
broad literature about university-industry collaboration. The second group examines how
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the depth and breadth of external knowledge during the innovation process affects
performance. The third group examines the factors affecting external paths to market.
Licensing literature, for example, falls into this group. A summary of the relevant
literature is presented in Table A. 3 and Table A. 4 of the Appendix.

Based on the Carnegie Mellon Survey, Cohen et al. (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2002)
found that start-up firms, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, and larger firms are
more likely to utilize external knowledge from public organizations in their R&D projects.
The higher propensity of start-up firms and biopharmaceutical firms using university
knowledge is consistently reported in other studies (Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002;
Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998). This finding shows that the use of external knowledge
depends on firm and industry characteristics.

Indeed, external public knowledge seems to have positive impacts on firms’ innovative
performance. A study based on a Yale survey (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 1990) reports
that the more important the university knowledge, the higher the R&D intensity of firms.
Cohen and Levinthal interpret this as the importance of absorptive capacity of internal
R&D. Another study also reports that using external scientific knowledge increases the
innovative performance of firms as measured by the fraction of sales attributable to
innovative products (Caloghirou, Kastelli, and Tsakanikas, 2004). Besides the particular
source of knowledge, the breadth and depth of external knowledge have an inverted-U
relationship with a firm’s innovative performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and
Salter, 2006).
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There are only a few studies on the relationship between the sources of external
knowledge and the governance choice of upstream or downstream innovative activities.
However, external public knowledge seems to drive external downstream innovative
activities, such as collaboration with public organizations (Fontana, Geuna, and Matt,
2006) or licensing (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). As for upstream innovation
resources, Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) found that in Belgian firms the likelihood of
external sourcing increased when information from competitors was important.
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PART I. COMMERCIALIZATION OF PATENTED INVENTIONS
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CHAPTER 3. Commercialization: Theoretical Motivation

Technological innovation is, by definition, a new technology (or a new combination of
existing technologies) put into (commercial) use (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988;
Schumpeter, 1942). The efforts required for generating new ideas or combining existing
technologies in a new way (or “inventions”) is often so distinct from the efforts required
for transforming those new ideas or technologies into commercial use (Roberts, 1988;
Teece, 1986) that, as Schumpeter (1942) asserted, the former “does not necessarily
induce innovation, but produces of itself … no economically relevant effect at all.”
Commercialization is an important issue both in practice and in theory. The
competitiveness crisis of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s was not a crisis in
generating new scientific and technological ideas but a crisis in transforming them into
commercial applications. Inventions of no or little commercial use can be beneficial to
the inventor or a society but not as much as the inventions successfully commercialized.
Also, in this era of an exploding number of patent filings (Kortum and Lerner, 1999),
nonused patents are not only costly for the owner to maintain (Rivette and Kline, 2000)
but also detrimental to the competitiveness and technological progress of a society
(Shapiro, 2000).

While the importance of commercialization in innovation has been recognized for a long
time, it has not been reflected in empirical studies in innovation literature. Most empirical
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literature has focused on the inventive part of innovation and, thus, severely overlooked
the commercialization part. Moreover, many studies regard inventions as a proxy for
innovation, which is, indeed, distinct from invention. A probable contributor to this
research trend is a wider and easier availability of data measuring the efforts and
outcomes of the inventive part of innovation than similar data measuring
commercialization. Patent data is one of the most widely used data sources for this
purpose.

Patents are one of the most important sources of innovation studies for numerous reasons.
First, patentability requires novelty, non-obviousness, and commercial applicability that
conforms to the definition of innovation, especially the inventive part of innovation.
Second, by law in most countries, patentability is rigorously scrutinized by professional
examiners, and the results are published for public access. Third, patent publications are
well-maintained, regularly updated and corrected, and accessible easily at small cost. In
summary, patent databases are the largest databases for innovative ideas. Patent data also
have several weaknesses. First of all, patented inventions do not cover all inventive
activities. Lots of inventions are kept secret (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). However,
some recent trends such as the increasing propensity to patent (Hall, 2004; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001; Kortum and Lerner, 1999) and the growth of patentable inventions
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999) mitigate this problem. Secondly, they can reveal only a partial
picture of innovation because they do not provide information about whether or how the
innovative activities are commercialized. To complement this weakness, some direct
measures of innovation, such as expert assessment of new products and processes (see,
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for example, Acs, 2002; Pavitt, Robson, and Townsend, 1987), are suggested. However,
this method requires enormous effort collecting and validating the data.

This study takes advantage of direct and indirect measures of innovative activities by
constructing a comprehensive data set from multiple information sources, including
patent bibliometrics and a large-scale inventor survey. Based on this novel data set, we
aim to answer an important policy and management question about how and what
patented inventions are transformed into innovation. In particular, this study examines
what determines the commercial uses of patents. Pioneering studies by Teece (1986,
2006) suggest that the profit from innovation is not necessarily appropriated by the
innovator but may accrue to the imitator or the owner of complementary assets depending
on the maturity of technology, regimes of appropriability, and the characteristics and
position of complementary assets. Recent literature about licensing endorses a part of
Teece’s arguments by empirically showing that the strength of patents (Arora and
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2006;
Kim and Vonortas, 2006) and the ownership of complementary assets (Gambardella,
Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007) are important predictors for licensing propensity.

We regard a patented invention as commercialized when it is used for any of the
following purposes: integration into products or processes, licensing and cross-licensing,
and establishing a new company to exploit the invention. Patented inventions that are not
commercialized are those that are simply not used (i.e., “sleeping patents”) or are not
used but indeed strategically exploited (i.e., “strategic nonuse patents”). Naturally,
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patents of higher technological or economic significance will have higher chances of
commercialization. Other factors at the organizational and invention levels should also
predict the propensity to commercialize a patented invention. This part examines the
effects of evolutionary stages of technology development and firm assets on the
commercial uses of patented inventions. We theorize the relationships of particular types
of use and the factors at organizational and invention levels in the later part of this study.
Most factors affecting the mode of use, in particular different modes of
commercialization, we theorize, have offsetting effects on commercialization. Two
factors examined in this part, we contend, have a larger unilateral effect on
commercialization than the offsetting effects and are, therefore, empirically identifiable.
Also, while evolutionary explanation of technological development has been widely
accepted, empirical evidence on it in the innovation context is scarce. Although some
studies point out firm assets as a driver of non-practicing strategic patents, their impact
on commercialization is not well-known. Considering that strategic nonuse accounts for a
large share of nonuse patents (38% in our sample), studying the effects of firm assets on
commercialization may look like almost a mirror of the study that examines its effects on
strategic nonuse. However, there is a subtle difference in interpretation and more explicit
difference in policy implications. The above reasons motivate us to examine the effects of
two factors on commercialization.

We argue that the patented inventions in mature technology are more likely to find a path
to commercial applications because of the incremental nature of innovation and the lower
degree of uncertainty. Also, we argue that the patented inventions from capital-intensive
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firms are less likely to be commercialized because of the resistance to cannibalizing the
existing competitive advantage, progressively increasing organizational rigidity with size,
and a larger protective value than the commercialization value of patents.

3.1. Maturity of Technology and Emergence of Dominant Design

Similar to Kuhnian notions of scientific progress (Kuhn, 1970), technological
development is known to take a staged trajectory. A new technology, by definition,
implies a radical departure from past practice (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Therefore, in
its early stages of development, the economic prospects and utility of a new technology
are not fully revealed to the industry players. Before a dominant design appears,
investment in the manufacturing process is suppressed because of uncertainty and risk in
commercialization, and firms compete for design and industry standards. Once a
dominant design emerges, the field of technology is populated with a myriad of
incremental innovations that address small technical problems. In this stage, competition
shifts from design to manufacturing efficiency. This picture is repeatedly supported by
the advocates of technology evolution (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Dosi, 1982;
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). A common
prediction from this lineage of theoretical explanations is that, as a dominant design
appears in a technology field, technological uncertainty decreases, the field is populated
with many incremental innovations, utility and demands for the technology are widely
recognized among firms, and manufacturing processes and facilities are standardized.
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We argue that the overall characteristics of technologies in their post-dominant design era
constitute a selection environment in which the odds of commercializing a particular
technology are higher. Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed four elements that affect the
selection environment of technological advancement: 1) the nature of the benefits and
costs that are weighed by the organizations that will decide to adopt or not to adopt a new
innovation; 2) consumer preferences and institutional environments that affect
profitability from innovation; 3) prospects of profit growth; and 4) the difficulty of
imitation and learning effects. These elements should vary, more or less, by industry
sectors and individual firm characteristics. However, apart from sectoral heterogeneity,
increased levels of familiarity with technology and well-established demands and
supplies of complementary technologies, which are a defining characteristic of the postdominant design stage of technology evolution, would constitute a favorable selection
environment for a member technology. This argument is particularly related to the first
and the last element of Nelson and Winter’s selection environment. First, if there is a
well-populated group of users or developers for a technology, an innovator in that
technology area benefits from monitoring others about which innovations perform well or
poorly (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The learning effects occur both at technological
(Wade, 1995) and organizational dimensions (Abrahamson, 1991; Hannan and Freeman,
1977). Second, a large population of components in a technology will reduce the costs of
implementing a similar technology. If adoption of a technology goes beyond a certain
point, complementary factors required for adopting it will be readily available to the
innovator. The complementary factors include organizational routines, skills,
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complementary technologies, manufacturing processes, and others. Third, the wellpopulated technology area will have positive impacts on the innovators’ aspirations for
the benefits. Albeit too simplistic, we argue that at least an established level of demands
will favor adopting a technology.12 In his recent reflection on the original 1986 article,
“Profiting from technological innovation,” Teece (2006) provides a refined view of the
relationship of the emergence of dominant design with the profitability and
commercialization of innovation. Teece’s remedy for profiting from innovation in
technologies where a dominant design has not emerged is to wait until a dominant design
emerges, unless the innovator has the capability to promote one. Our argument elaborates
on Teece’s framework.

Besides the macroevolutionary aspects of technological development, emergence of a
dominant design (or mature technology) influences the propensity to commercialize in a
more nuanced way. According to transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981), market
transaction of technology will be suppressed when it involves more technological
uncertainty (Arrow, 1969; Oxley, 1997). When market transactions are either risky or
costly, the innovator will face two options available for his existing patented inventions:
1) to integrate them into his own commercial applications or 2) if the first option is not
appropriate, then to seek another option which includes just putting them on the shelf or
using them for strategic purposes such as bargaining chips in cross-licensing negotiations
or blocking competitors (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). The first
option is a choice between two different modes of commercialization (or “within12

However, this argument is incomplete unless the following aspects regarding firm-specific and inventionspecific factors are not considered together: competitive environment, the amount of the benefits from
innovation, and the uncertainty/risk involved in realizing the benefits.
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effects”), which, resultantly, would not affect the overall propensity to commercialize.
The second option is a choice between commercialization and non-commercialization (or
“between-effects”). In a regime where technological uncertainty is high, the propensity to
commercialize will decrease because of the between-effects. The between-effects are
composed of, among others, plain nonuse (or “sleeping”) patents and strategic nonuse
patents. All else equal, we postulate that otherwise commercializable (or licensable)
patents are strategically exploited rather than put on the shelf. This is consistent with
Merges’ views (1994) that technological uncertainty induces bargaining failure and
results in blocking patents. The arguments developed here are first explored in this part
and further examined with particular focus on strategic nonuse in Part III.

Some technology-based products are built on complex integration of technology
components, while some other products are built on a relatively simple composition of
technologies. Semiconductor or electronics goods typically integrate several hundreds to
several thousands of technological components, many of which are complementary and
cumulative. On the other hand, pharmaceuticals or agricultural goods are built on a
relatively small number of technological components (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).
In complex industry, utility and commercialization of a new technological component is
determined in the relationship with other technological components and fitness with the
final system. Introduction of a new technology cannot be instantly integrated into a
commercial product because developing and optimizing with interfacing and
complementary technologies will require a certain level of familiarity with that
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technology. Therefore, familiarity with a technological component among the system
builders will be more influential on commercialization in complex industry.

3.2. Capital Intensity

One superior technology does not ensure commercial success. Successful commercial
transformation of an invention generally requires investment in downstream
complementary assets such as manufacturing facilities, distribution channels, or
marketing capabilities. Indeed, surveys of R&D managers of U.S. firms showed that
appropriability of innovation depended crucially on non-technological firm capabilities
such as lead-time advantage, complementary assets, or scale economy of manufacturing
processes (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). While firms already
equipped with such capabilities are advantageous in product market competition probably
due to faster time to market and a learning curve advantage, they tend to be resistant to
incorporating new technologies into the existing facilities for the following two reasons:
First, innovation requires adaptation of existing complementary assets. A firm will
upgrade or replace the existing facilities to accommodate new technologies if it believes
that the investment is financially justified (i.e., when benefits from integrating the new
technologies surpass the investment). The costs for changing existing plants and facilities
to integrate a new technology will be generally larger for a large plant or facility. Hence,
in more capital-intensive firms, even the same invention would incur more costs of
integration and be subject to stricter cost justification. The higher switching costs in
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capital-intensive firms, therefore, will have effects to suppress integrating new
incremental technologies. However, the switching costs effects do not necessarily lower
the probability of commercialization because the owner of technologies will have another
commercialization option: external commercialization (e.g., licensing). Therefore, we
need to take a closer look at the mode of commercialization. This will be the topic of Part
II.

Second, capital-intensive firms have alternative means of appropriability that can exceed
the benefits from commercializing an invention. In other words, capital-intensive firms
would worry that new technologies would cannibalize the existing competitive
advantage.13 To illustrate the arguments, let us take an example of liquid crystal display
(or LCD) manufacturers. In the LCD industry, production efficiency crucially depends on
how big the manufacturers can make a glass substrate (from which LCD panels are cut)
and, therefore, LCD manufacturers race for technology development to enlarge the size
of the glass substrates. In 2003 Samsung Electronics, then the world’s largest provider of
TFT-LCD display panels, announced that it would skip the sixth generation and move
directly to the seventh generation (Business Wire, 2003). It also announced an additional
investment in the existing fifth-generation production line. Definitely, Samsung had a
sufficient level of technology to build a sixth-generation production line, but it did not
because the huge investment in the sixth generation would not be justified given the
competitive advantage in the existing fifth generation and more efficiency gains from the

13

A study on 192 business units in three highly competitive and turbulent industries shows that the
willingness to cannibalize is indeed negatively associated with specialized investments (Chandy and Tellis,
1998). In this study, we assume that high capital intensity would involve a high level of specialized
investment.
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seventh generation. The arguments made here are in line with Schumpeter’s “creative
destruction” concept (Schumpeter, 1942) and also with Christensen’s reasoning on why
the incumbent often fails in radical innovation (Christensen, 2003). The “cannibalization”
effects will suppress the external mode of commercialization as well as internal
commercialization because either one will weaken the already-existing competitive
advantage stemming from the assets. The cannibalization effects of the capital assts on
commercialization will be first examined in this part and then in more detail using a
direct measure (i.e., whether or not an invention is competence-destroying) in Part II.

In addition, when a firm has expensive and crucial capital assets based on technologies,
they would file for patents on some peripheral technologies not directly transformed into
commercialization but related to protecting the assets (Ceccagnoli, 2009). In other words,
capital-intensive firms will be more attracted to having preemptive patents. The larger
incentives to protect at a firm with high capital intensity will also suppress licensing. The
risk for dissipation of capital advantage will increase through a competitor’s access to the
key technology and potential leakage of knowledge used for building the firm’s
production facility. Turning again to the Samsung case: While Samsung did not build the
sixth-generation lines, they kept patenting for technologies used for the sixth generation.
Some of these patents would have been filed for in the prospect of jumping into the sixth
generation before the decision to skip it, and then filed for strategic reasons such as
avoiding potential litigation and blocking or slowing down competitors’ technology
development. From the interviews with managers in the semiconductor industry, Hall and
Ziedonis (2001) found that firms that had sunk large costs into manufacturing facilities
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had large incentives to use patents for a safeguard against the threat of costly litigation as
well as “bargaining chips” in licensing negotiation. In summary, patented inventions
from capital-intensive firms will be less likely to commercialize because the patents may
have a larger value in preemption. This argument will be examined in more detail in Part
III.
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CHAPTER 4. Data and Measures

4.1. Data
In order to address the research questions and hypotheses in this study, we need detailed
information about both the outcome of an invention (i.e., its value and use) and the
invention activities, including the resources invested, the sources of knowledge, and
others. The estimation was based on a novel data set constructed from multiple sources:
an inventor survey, the United States Patent and Trademark Office online database, the
EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (henceforth, PATSTAT) provided by the
European Patent Office, and COMPUSTAT for firm financial information. A key
element is the inventor survey (GT/RIETI Survey 2007) that was administered by a
research team at Georgia Tech in cooperation with the Research Institute of Economy,
Trade and Industry of Japan (RIETI) between June and November 2007.

The GT/RIETI Survey is sampled from the granted U.S. patents filed between 2000 and
2003 (in terms of the first priority application date) and included in the OECD’s Triadic
Patent Families (TPF) (OECD, 2006). The TPF includes only those patents whose
applications are filed with both the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) and the European Patent
Office (EPO) and granted in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
We used TPF as a sampling basis for several reasons. First, the inventor survey was part
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of the project for the U.S.-Japan comparative studies. TPF has an advantage in reducing
home-country bias that might stem from a single patent office (Criscuolo, 2006). Second,
we could identify inventor addresses easily from multiple patent databases, especially
from matching patents filed with EPO. Third, the value of patents is known to be highly
skewed. By using TPF we focus on important inventions. One caveat here is that this
characteristic of TPF may favor large and multinational firms and also commercializable
inventions because the additional costs for filing and maintaining patents in multiple
jurisdictions may work as a threshold for low-valued (ex ante) or less-promising patents.

We randomly sampled 28% (or 9,060) of patents stratified by NBER (National Bureau of
Economic Research) technology class (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001). Then, for the
first U.S. inventor of each patent, we collected U.S. street addresses mostly from the EPO
database and from other supplementary sources such as the USPTO application database
or phone directories. If no address was available, we took the next U.S. inventor. After
removing 18 patents that were either withdrawn or for which we could not find any U.S.
inventor address we had 9,042 patents for mailing out. Taking the first available U.S.
inventor as a representative inventor of each patent, we had 7,933 unique inventors. We
took the strategy of not sending multiple surveys to the same inventor, believing this
strategy would increase the response rate. In order to select one patent per inventor, we
randomly drew one patent out of multiple patents belonging to the same inventor. Then
the number of patents belonging to each unique inventor was recorded to use as a weight.
Inventor weights range from 1 to 7 as shown in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1 Number of patents per inventor
# Patents per inventor (weight) Frequency
1
7124
2
624
3
115
4
43
5
13
6
10
7
4
Total
7933

Percent
89.8
7.9
1.4
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.1
100.0

The first round of the survey questionnaires was mailed to 7,933 unique U.S. inventors in
June 2008 and the second round to almost 5,000 inventors in July 2008. Between the two
rounds, we sent a reminder/thank note to all inventors in the sample. We had received
1,919 surveys via mail and web with a response rate of 24.2% (when adjusted for the
undeliverable addresses and the deceased, the response rate increased to 31.9%). Then we
tested response bias, mail vs. web bias, and good vs. bad address bias using the patent
indicators for all patents in the sample. The test results did not show significant
differences between any two groups compared. In particular, there were no significant
differences in average values of patent indicators between two compared groups. This
also indicates that the sample is not significantly biased due to inventor attrition (indeed,
we received 20 or so responses from a family member of the deceased or seriously ill
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inventors). Because our survey was directed toward the inventors rather than managers of
firms, the sample should not be seriously affected by firm attrition.14

In our survey, 1,806 responses are from inventors affiliated with firms (either public or
private).15 We identified firm patents from the survey but also from assignees of patents
for those responses missing on the survey question. In the survey, inventions from large
firms (employees > 500) account for 81.1% of all inventions affiliated with firms, midsized firms for 7.7%, and very small firms (employees < 100) for 11.2%.16 The figures go
a little bit upward for large firms and downward for small and medium firms when they
are weighted (see the rightmost bar of Figure 4.1). In order to draw a comparative picture
of the distribution by firm size of the survey, we compared it with the distribution of the
total sales amount of firms in 2002 by their sizes17 (i.e., “very small” if the number of
employees is less than 100; “large” if the number of employees is greater than or equal to
500; “medium” for firms with the number of employees in between). The baseline
benchmark is the 2002 U.S. economic census data (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).
Compared with the leftmost bar of Figure 4.1, which is directly calculated from the
census data, our survey seems to overrepresent large firms (61.9% v. 82.5% weighted for
large firms) and underrepresent small and medium firms (26.5% v. 10.5% weighted for

14

However, attrition of firms may have affected some questions in the survey. For example, "no
commercialization" or "don't know" answers in patent use questions may have been inflated from
inventions assigned to a firm that went out of business because of the following reasons: First, they might
have been disadvantageously positioned in commercialization; second, their use might not be properly
tracked by inventors. Nevertheless, this may not be a serious source of bias because the legal status of an
inventor of a patent is not tempered by a change of assignee firm.
15
This figure does not count independent inventors.
16
Note that the number of employees asked in the survey is not for a single establishment but for a group of
related firms. When the firm is a subsidiary of a larger organization, the survey question asks the
respondent to report the number of total employees of its parent firm and other subsidiaries.
17
The distribution of the total number of employees by firm size is also similar with the sales distribution.
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very small firms). However, note that the survey counts the number of patents while the
census calculates sales amount. Because innovativeness and patent propensity are known
to differ by firm size, we calculated two adjusted distributions. The second bar of Figure
4.1 reflects the different innovativeness between large and small firms. Using the
innovation data from the Small Business Administration, Acs and Audretsch (1988)
found that, in highly innovative sectors, large firms generated, on average, 1.272 times
more innovative products than small firms. The second distribution is calculated by
multiplying large firm sales by 1.272. The gap between the distribution of this and our
survey now becomes closer than the non-weighted one. However, this figure is still not
about patent distribution and may not be directly comparable with the patent distribution
of our survey. The third bar shows the distribution of sales amount by firm size adjusted
for the patent propensity.18 Our survey results show a slightly lower proportion for large
firms and slightly higher proportion for very small firms but more or less show similar
distribution with the “innovative sales” calculated from the census and the patent
propensity provided in the literature. In summary, our sample distribution is consistent
with the overall distribution of innovative firms as the patent data would be but not with
the distribution of all firms.

18

To calculate the patent propensity, we first calculated deflated R&D expenditure by firm size. We
applied a uniform R&D intensity of 2.9% as provided by the Carnegie Mellon survey. We also tested other
values of R&D intensity to find no notable changes in the overall pattern. Then we calculated “innovative
sales” by applying the probability function of firms’ having non-zero patent conditional on the R&D
expenditure (or simply call it patent propensity function). We used Scherer’s (1983) Weibull distribution
with the estimated deflated R&D expenditure tapped in. Based on the descriptive statistics provided by
Scherer we corrected small R&D part as follows: Pr(# patent>0) = 1 - e
-0.0104*R & D 0.647

-0.0104*R & D 0.647

for large firms and

1- e
+ 0.126 for small and medium firms. Caveat: The estimation here is only a rough
benchmark because it is based on the old data and because industry heterogeneity is not fully considered.
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The proportion of start-up firms is much higher for very small firms (26.2%) than for
large firms (2.6%) and statistically significant at 0.01 level (Pearson Chi-square =187.7;
Pr = 0.000).

100%

80%
61.9%

67.4%

60%

84.5%

81.1%

82.5%

40%
11.5%

9.9%

20%
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0%
Sales and
Receipts, U.S.
Census 2002

Innovativeness
Patent propensity
adjusted sales (Acs adjusted sales
& Audretsch
(Scherer 1983)
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Medium

7.7%

7.0%

11.2%

10.5%

GT/RIETI
Unweighted

GT/RIETI
Weighted

Large (emp≥500)

Figure 4.1 Distribution of sales and patents by firm size
Data sources: (Calculations from U.S. Census Bureau, 2006)

Among these, 107 responses did not provide any information about how they used
patents, which is our dependent variable. Further, 460 observations have missing or
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unreliable values on one of our independent or control variables.19 After a listwise
deletion of observations having a missing value on any variable, we have 1,239 complete
cases. Because this drop is huge, we examined whether this listwise deletion of missing
values causes bias. For the most of our patent-level variables (e.g., commercialization,
technology class, firm size, number of inventors, and others) there is no statistically
significant difference in means between the complete cases sample and the full sample.
Significant biases are caused by the variable of technological value of patents. Therefore,
we test our models both with and without this variable. Furthermore, we test the selfselection effects of the respondents’ opting-out from answering this question on our
model specification using the Heckman selection model. Further details will be discussed
in analysis.

4.2. Variables and Measures
4.2.1. Dependent Variables
The GT/RIETI survey asks respondents whether the patented invention was
commercially used and, if not, why it was not. The modes of commercial use asked
include 1) commercialized in a product/process/service by the applicant/owner, 2)
“licensed by (one of) the patent-holder(s) to an independent party,” 3) if the patent is
licensed whether it is a part of a cross-license, and 4) whether the patent was
commercially exploited by the respondent or any of respondent’s co-inventors for starting
a new company. First, we constructed a variable “any use” by coding it 1 for the patented

19

For example, the sum of all types of R&D efforts should be 100%. We removed those observation whose
sum of R&D efforts are not either 99% or 100%.
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invention falling in any of these three categories. We coded 0 for those observations who
explicitly reported that the patented invention was not used for all three commercial
modes. Some answered to only some of these three questions. This affects identifying
nonuse. In the survey, then, we asked for the reasons a patent was not used. Thus, we
regard those observations who answered to the reasons for nonuse but only partially
reported nonuse in the three use questions as nonuse. Out of 1,239 complete cases, 657
(53.0%) patents are reported to be used. There will be some gap between the time when
an invention was completed and the time when it was put into actual use. Also that gap
may vary by industry- or technology-specific factors. All patents in the sample were first
filed20 between 2000 and 2003 inclusive, but the granted date spans from 2000 to 2006.
Therefore, we tested whether the rate of actual use of patents differs by the year filed or
issued. Unequal variance t-test shows that there are no significant differences between the
two groups in terms of issue year and filed year.21

4.2.2. Explanatory Variables
We operationalize technological maturity using the familiarity index of technological
components devised by Fleming (2001). The component familiarity captures the degree
to which a patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his
patent. The basic assumption is that as a technology matures (therefore, the population of
technological artifacts increases), technological trajectories based on this technology
20

Indeed, the first priority patent in the triadic family.
The chi-square test results show significant differences in issue year by used2 (chi-sq statistic=11.84 with
d.f.=5, prob=.0371). However, the trends are not clearly monotonic, although year 2001 had the highest
ratio (67.44%) and 2006 the lowest (48.21%). The second highest ratio of commercialization was shown in
year 2005 (56.41%). Therefore, we could not confirm that commercialization should be right truncated in
the sample.
21
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become more foreseeable (Dosi, 1982). Component familiarity, as suggested by Fleming,
averages the number of patents previously assigned to the same technology classes as the
focal patent and applies a knowledge attenuation factor by temporal distance between the
focal patent and the referred patents. He has empirically shown that component
familiarity had an inverted-U relationship with the uncertainty of utility of the patent as
measured by the variation of forward citation counts.

In order to construct this variable, first we count the number of U.S. patents filed from
1976 to 1999 in each technology class.

Component familiarity for patent i =

1
N Ci

å

å1{ patent k assigned to subclass c } ´ kattenuation
j

c j Î C i all patents k filed
from 1976 to 1999

Where Ci = { patent subclass assigned to patent i } ,
c j = patent subclass identifier,
N Ci = number of different patent subclasses assigned to patent i.

And knowledge attenuation factor, kattenuationk =
exp(

temporal distance of patent k
),
time constant of knowledge loss

Where temporal distance of patent k=
4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999
9.5 if patent k was filed from 1990 to 1994
16.5 if patent k was filed from 1976 to 1989
Time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 following Fleming (2001). We rescaled
component familiarity by dividing it by 1,000.
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Complex technology areas are identified using the survey. The GT/RIETI survey asks the
inventors “how many domestic patents are jointly used in the commercial application of
the invention.” It provided eight categories: 1, 2 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 50, 51 to 100, 101 to
500, 501 to 1,000, and more than 1,000 patents. We averaged the median values over 30
subgroups of technologies and constructed a variable, “technological complexity.” Then,
a dichotomous variable, complexity of product technology, is coded 1 if the technological
complexity of the subclass to which the focal patent belonged was higher than the median
value of technology complexity. The complex technologies classified in this way include
information technology, semiconductors, telecommunication, electronics, biotechnology,
and chemical engineering. The non-complex (or discrete) technologies include textile,
pharmaceuticals, agriculture and food, construction, and transportation. This
classification is consistent with the previous literature (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000;
Kusunoki, Nonaka, and Nagata, 1998; Reitzig, 2004) but, we believe, more evidencebased.

Following Hall & Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004), we measure capital intensity
using the deflated book value (constant U.S. dollars in 2000) of property, plant, and
equipment divided by number of employees. In order to mitigate yearly fluctuation and
reduce missing values, we use a three-year running average centered on the filed year of a
focal patent. Main data sources are COMPUSTAT North America–Fundamentals Annual
and COMPUSTAT Global–Fundamentals Annual.22 For a few firms, we directly found

22

We use consolidated financial reports. Therefore, many subsidiaries in our sample are regarded as a
parent company whose financial information is available.
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the data from their web sites. In the sample, about a quarter of the firms are either private
or foreign whose financial information is not available in either the COMPUSTAT or
alternative sources mentioned above. They are coded as a dummy variable named
“dummy for missing capital intensity.”

4.2.3. Controls
We control the area of technology, the technological value of the focal patent, the nature
of invention (product vs. process), initial purpose of the research that led to the patented
invention, the proportion of R&D efforts devoted to the basic research, technological
breadth of patents as measured by the number of different technological classes
belonging to the focal patent, number of inventors registered in the patent document, the
number of independent claims contained in the patent documents, and the logarithm of
age of the invention at the time of survey as measured by the incipient date of completed
survey subtracted by the filed date of the patent in the months.

Technological assets
We use patent stock as a proxy for technological assets of a firm. Patent stock is
calculated as the number of granted U.S. patents assigned to the first assignee in the focal
patent and filed before the filed year of the focal patent. Patent stock of firm i for a focal
patent filed in year t is:

PSit=PSi (t-1)(1-d)
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where d represents the constant depreciation of knowledge, which is set to 15% following
the previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; Hall, 1990).

Similar to the way we construct the capital intensity, subsidiary firms are consolidated
into their ultimate parents. Patent stock of merged and acquired firms is also consolidated
into the merger. We use the PATSTAT database (April 2008 version) compiled by the
EPO. There are two advantages using the PATSTAT for this purpose. First, the
PATSTAT provides relational tables and an SQL interface for the bibliometric
information of the U.S. patents, which make data extraction much easier than other
available data sources. Second, PATSTAT provides standard ID numbers of assignees,
which corrected many small differences in spellings. We further cleaned the data by
manually searching and correcting the list of assignees in our sample.

External knowledge flows
The GT/RIETI survey asks how important the various knowledge sources were in either
suggesting or completing the research that led to the patented invention. The measure is a
six-point Likert scale with 0 for “did not use,” 1 for “not important,” and 5 for “very
important.” The sources listed are scientific and technical literature, patent literature, fair
or exhibition, technical conferences and workshops, standard documents, universities,
government research organizations, customers or product users, suppliers, competitors,
and others. Responses in the others category include consultant, education, or experience.
Then we identified six items (patent literature, fair or exhibition, standard documents,
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customers or product users, suppliers, and competitors) as “industrial knowledge” and the
remaining four items (scientific literature, technical conferences and workshops,
universities, and government research organization) as “public knowledge.”

External collaboration
It is well known that networks affect the outcomes of innovation (Afuah, 2000; Dyer and
Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Powell, Koput, and
Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Shan, Walker, and Kogut, 1994). The
network literature consistently finds that firm performance is positively associated with
R&D collaboration (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds,
2004), networking with suppliers (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Sytch, 2007), or
quality of networks (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Uzzi, 1996). The GT/RIETI
Survey asks whether the focal patent was developed with inventors who belong to
various external organizations and whether the focal patent was developed through
formal or informal collaboration with external organizations. The survey presents 8
distinct categories for external organizations including suppliers, customers and product
users, competitors, non-competitors within the same industry, other firms, universities,
government research organizations, hospitals, and other. We construct a collaboration
dummy variable by coding 1 for the inventions with any external collaborators.

Inventor in manufacturing unit
In Teecian arguments, the complementary assets interfere with mode choice of
innovation in three different points. If the invention does not require complementary
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assets, it is immediately commercialized by the inventor. When the invention requires
complementary assets for commercialization, the degree of specialization and the
ownership of those assets play a role. Empirically, it is hard to assess whether a particular
invention requires complementary assets for its commercialization and how specialized
those assets should be. Therefore, we assume that every invention requires a certain type
of downstream assets, such as manufacturing facility, and that those assets are somewhat
co-specialized. An invention from a manufacturing unit is already, or ready to be,
coupled with downstream co-specialized assets. The GT/RIETI survey asks which
organizational unit the inventor belongs to. A variable “Inventor in manufacturing unit”
is coded 1 if the inventor belongs to the manufacturing unit and 0 for the R&D unit
(either independent or sub-unit attached to non-R&D function), software development,
sales and marketing, and others.

R&D for base technology
This variable discriminates the business needs of the invention. Using our survey, we
code 1 for this variable if the reported purpose of research is “enhancing the technology
base of the firm or the long-term cultivation of technology seeds.”

Proportion of basic R&D
This variable is a proxy measuring the position of the invention on a basic-applied
spectrum. In the survey, we asked the inventor how much effort (in percentage) he put
into basic research. The other categories presented are “applied research,” “design and/or
development,” and “technical services.”
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Technological value of patents
In our survey, we ask the inventor to assess the technical significance of the invention
relative to other technical developments in the field during the year the focal patent was
applied for. We code 4 for the top 10%, 3 for the top 25% (but not top 10%), 2 for the top
50% (but not top 25%), and 1 for the bottom half.

Number of inventors
We control the number of inventors as registered in the U.S. patent publication.

Type of innovation
Product innovation is observed to differ in some aspects from process innovation (Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Therefore, we controlled for the type of innovation. A variable
“product innovation” is constructed from the survey. The reference category is composed
of process innovation or mixed innovation in which product and process innovation are
mixed.

Number of claims
We control the scope of patent by including the number of independent claims. Each
claim may be regarded as an independent patent (Tong and Frame, 1994)23 and, thus, the
number of claims is known to measure the breadth of utility or applicability of the patent.
In U.S. patent law, there are two types of claims: independent and dependent or multiple

23

In judging patent infringement in the U.S., infringing any single claim in a patent is regarded as
infringement on the patent.
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dependent. While an independent claim stands alone, a dependent claim refers to a claim
previously set forth and specifies a particular embodiment or limitation of the invention
(35 U.S.C. 112). Because of this distinction, counting dependent claims may not (or in a
fractional way) properly reflect the technological scope of inventions. Therefore, we
count only the independent claims. We regard any claim that contains a reference to
another claim as a dependent claim and subtract them from the total number of claims.
We take a natural logarithm of it, assuming marginally decreasing nonlinear effects.

Age of invention
The mode of use may vary by the length for which an invention has come out and been
publicized. The variable “age of invention” measures how many months have elapsed at
the time of the survey since the invention was filed.

Industry dummies
We distinguish six different industries using OST/INPI/ISI nomenclature24 based on
International Patent Class.

24

This is a widely used nomenclature, especially among European researchers, focusing on industry
characteristics. This system was developed and updated by three European research institutes: the
Observatoire Science et Technology, the INPI (Institute Nationale Proprieté Industrielle), and Fraunhofer
Institute for Systems of Innovation Research.
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Table 4.2 Variables and descriptions (N=1239)
Std.
Variable
Mean
Dev.
Any commercialization
0.530
0.499
Explanatory variables

Min

Max

Data source

0

1

Survey

Component familiarity (/1000)

0.087

0.159

0

2.489

USPTO

Capital intensity (M$/employee)
Dummy for missing capital
intensity
Controls
Large firm (employees > 500)
Ln(patent stock)
Inventor in manufacturing unit
Industrial knowledge
Public knowledge
Dummy for collaboration
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D (/100)
Product invention
Man-month (normalized)
Number of inventors
Complexity of technology (#
USPC)
Number of claims
Age of invention (months)
Electrical engineering
Instruments
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals
Process eng., special equipment
Mechanical eng., machinery
Consumer goods & Construction

0.073

0.118

0

1.086

COMPUSTAT

0.262

0.440

0

1

COMPUSTAT

0.859
5.466
0.084
0.268
0.266
0.293
2.211
0.224
0.082
0.513
0.182
2.796

0.348
2.753
0.277
0.189
0.208
0.455
1.069
0.417
0.176
0.500
0.229
1.911

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1

4.431

3.535

1

30

Patent

22.826
68.873
0.256
0.209
0.237
0.136
0.134
0.027

15.689
12.029
0.437
0.407
0.426
0.343
0.341
0.163

1
37
0
0
0
0
0
0

181
92
1
1
1
1
1
1

Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
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1
Survey & Patent
9.865
PATSTAT
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey & Patent
4
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
16
Patent

CHAPTER 5. Analysis and Results

5.1. Sample Characteristics
In the sample, 53.0% of patents are commercialized in any of the following three modes:
internal, licensing out or cross-licensing, or using for establishing a new firm.
Surprisingly, despite the recent surge of patent filing in the United States, the rate of
commercialization is quite similar to that of about a half century ago. One study
conducted during the late 1950s reports that the rate of use of the U.S. patents issued in
1938, 1948, and 1952 was 49.3% at the time of the survey25 (Sanders, Rossman, and
Harris, 1958). However, this rate is much lower than that of European patents. The
PatVal-EU reports that about 63.9% of European patents filed between 1993 and 1997
inclusive are used by the time of survey, 2002 to 2003 (Giuri et al., 2007). When
restricted to the corporate patents only, this rate will go up further because the reported
rate of use for the non-corporate patents is a little bit lower than corporate patents.
However, it is worth reminding readers here that these two references are not directly
comparable to our survey for two reasons. First, the GT/RIETI survey asks about more
recent patents than the Sanders, Rossman, and Harris survey and the PatVal-EU survey
did. Assuming that there should be a time premium of actual use of patents, the rate of
use reported in our survey may be underestimated compared to both surveys mentioned.
25

The rate including expected use during the full lifetime of patents calculated by Sanders, Rossman, and
Harris is about 57.2%.
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The second reason, on the other hand, contributes to overestimating actual use.
Considering that sampled patents of our survey are triadic patents, we can speculate that
the overall rate of use for the patents filed with the USPTO may be lower. The further
comparative discussion of the rate of use goes beyond the scope of this study. The
dominant mode of commercialization is internal, which accounts for 39.1% of total
patents. Licensing and “using for establishing a new firm” account for 9.9% and 5.3%,
respectively.

In our sample, 1,064 patents (or 85.9%) are affiliated with large firms. In order to figure
out whether our sample overrepresents large firms, we compare it with the PatVal-EU
inventor survey (Giuri et al., 2007). The PatVal-EU survey defines a large firm as having
more than 250 employees and a small firm less than 100 employees. For comparability,
we use the same categories. Certainly, the proportion of large firms in the U.S. patents
may not be necessarily similar to that in European patents. However, given that we do not
have the statistics of the United States, we use European data for one reference. We may
have a slight upward bias for large firms. However, remember that our sampling frame is
the triadic patent families, which means that patents should have been filed with at least
three offices: USPTO, EPO, and JPO. Additional filing and maintenance costs involved
in triadic patent families may have imposed a threshold to hinder a marginal firm from
filing in all the three national/regional offices and, consequently, resulting in a higher
proportion of large firms than the set of patents filed in a single jurisdiction.
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Table 5.1 Proportion of inventions from large firms: comparison with PatVal-EU
PatVal-EU
GT/RIETI
GT/RIETI
(unweighted) (weighted)*
Large firm (> 250 employees)
75.8%
84.7%
85.4%
* We weight by the number of patents assigned to the same inventor in our sample. Note
that we did not send multiple surveys to those inventors having more than one patent in
the sample. Also note that the number used in this table is different from the estimation
sample. In the estimation, we supplemented the firm size information from the GT/RIETI
survey with the secondary sources of data.

The rate of commercialization also varies by technology areas. Table 5.2 shows the crosstabulation of the actual commercialization by the OST/INPI/ISI technology classes. The
general trends are the higher commercialization rate for discrete type of technologies,
such as mechanical engineering or consumer goods, and the lower rate of
commercialization for the complex type of technologies, such as electronics and
chemicals. The difference of the rate of commercialization is statistically significant by
30 leaf level of technology areas (P=0.006) and by 6 aggregate level also (p=0.053). The
correlation matrix of the variables is reported in Appendix A, with the asterisk denoting
the conventional level of significance at alpha < 0.05.
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Table 5.2 Commercialization by technology area
Not
commercial
% commercial
OST/INPI/ISI technology area
exploited
use
Total
use
MedicalTechn
49
47
96
49.0%
Telecom
48
43
91
47.3%
Electr/Energy
32
51
83
61.4%
Optical
49
30
79
38.0%
Analysis/Measurement/ ControlTechn
30
47
77
61.0%
IT
31
41
72
56.9%
Handl/Printing
30
38
68
55.9%
Polymers
32
34
66
51.5%
OrganicChem
39
25
64
39.1%
Motors
26
27
53
50.9%
Matprocessing/Textiles/Paper
20
27
47
57.4%
Semiconductors
23
19
42
45.2%
ChemEngineering
23
19
42
45.2%
SurfaceTechn
22
18
40
45.0%
Materials
13
26
39
66.7%
MechElements
14
25
39
64.1%
Audiovisual
22
16
38
42.1%
Transportation
19
17
36
47.2%
Pharmaceuticals/Cosmetics
18
16
34
47.1%
MachineTools
13
20
33
60.6%
PetrolChem/materialsChem
19
11
30
36.7%
ConsGoods
7
16
23
69.6%
Biotechnology
5
7
12
58.3%
Environment
5
7
12
58.3%
Agric&Foods
2
8
10
80.0%
ConstrTechn ;
1
9
10
90.0%
Others*
7
13
20
65.0%
Total
599
657 1256
52.3%
* Aggregated “Agric&FoodProcess-Machines,” “NuclearTechn,” “ThermProcesses,”
and “SpaceTech/Weapons”

5.2. Probit Regression Results
Column 1 of Table 5.3 presents the main results of probit regressions in the full sample.
Columns 2 and 3 show the results of probit regressions in the complex technologies
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sample and in the discrete technologies sample, respectively. All models are statistically
significant and robust against several outliers.26 To test multicollinearity, we calculated
the variance inflation factor (VIF) from OLS regression of the full model. We found no
serious multicollinearity as indicated by small VIFs (Cohen et al., 2003). For robustness
checks, we also estimated the model with the complete cases for the variable capital
intensity (column 4, N=914) and the Heckman selection model with a non-missing
dummy as a dependent variable of selection equation (column 5 and 6, N=1795). We
found no notable discrepancy between the main results and either the restricted sample
model or Heckman selection model.27

26

We identified outliers using Cook’s D and Leverage. There is no significant difference in the result when
we ran the regressions after removing some identified outliers.
27
Heckman probit selection model (Dubin and Rivers, 1989; Heckman, 1979) corrects self-selection bias
by using the Inverse Mills Ratio estimated by the selection equation in the outcome equation. The selection
equation is composed of a non-missing dummy (coded 1 if an observation has full information on all the
variables and 0 otherwise) as a dependent variable and three independent variables: 1) normalized rank
order of the number of citations received, 2) a dummy indicating collaboration, and 3) a dummy indicating
whether the invention is related to an immediate demand. We included forward citations count as a proxy
of technology value because we suspect that large missing values on the variable of technological value
may be systematic. For example, the inventor having low-valued patents may have hidden an honest
assessment behind “don’t know.” The latter two variables are included because means of them between the
full sample and the non-missing subset are significantly different. The outcome equation is a binary probit
model with “any commercial use” regressed on the covariates and the Inverse Mills ratio calculated from
the selection equation. We used Heckman probit function of STATA 10. In the selection equations of
Heckman probit estimations, the coefficients on collaboration (positive) and dummy for no immediate
demands (negative) are significant. This tells us that, in our survey, the respondents are more likely to give
us fuller information when their patents had been developed in a more collaborative way and their initial
purpose of R&D project for the patented inventions had been more commercially oriented. However,
potential bias that may stem from the self-selection of item non-responses should not affect the overall
relationships of our interests. The correlations between error terms (Heckman’s rho) are statistically
insignificant. This indicates that self selection effects would not result in biased estimates. We also ran
probit regressions for the fully constrained sample and the sample having a dummy-adjusted technology
value variable, respectively. The regression coefficients of both models are strikingly similar with each
other and with the Heckman selection model. There is no change in sign and significance of the coefficients
on our independent variables. As for control variables, no change in sign is observed.

92

Table 5.3 Results of regressions (DV=any commercial use)
Main results (probit)
Variables

Component familiarity
(/1000)
Capital intensity
(M$/employee)
Dummy for missing
capital intensity
Large firm (employees >
500)
Ln(patent stock)
Inventor in manufacturing
unit
Industrial knowledge
Public knowledge
Dummy for collaboration
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D (/100)
Product invention
Man-month (normalized)
Number of inventors
Complexity of technology
(# USPC)
Number of claims
Age of invention (months)

(1)
Full
0.395*
(0.227)
-1.027***
(0.382)
0.051
(0.125)
0.093
(0.142)
-0.054***
(0.020)
0.337**
(0.145)
0.997***
(0.233)
-1.077***
(0.219)
0.194**
(0.087)
0.288***
(0.038)
-0.248***
(0.091)
-0.581**
(0.235)
0.093
(0.077)
0.118
(0.180)
0.045**
(0.021)
-0.013
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)

(2)
complex
technology
0.595**
(0.270)
-1.721**
(0.706)
-0.130
(0.180)
0.085
(0.194)
-0.048*
(0.026)
0.436**
(0.205)
0.838***
(0.307)
-1.117***
(0.284)
0.225*
(0.117)
0.291***
(0.050)
-0.227*
(0.119)
-0.667**
(0.300)
0.150
(0.101)
0.116
(0.237)
0.054*
(0.028)
-0.024
(0.017)
-0.004
(0.003)
0.005
(0.004)

93

(3)
discrete
technology
-0.786
(0.753)
-0.472
(0.447)
0.194
(0.183)
-0.015
(0.221)
-0.063*
(0.034)
0.232
(0.209)
1.148***
(0.365)
-0.946***
(0.362)
0.137
(0.135)
0.302***
(0.059)
-0.306**
(0.149)
-0.414
(0.402)
0.039
(0.127)
0.228
(0.290)
0.044
(0.034)
-0.011
(0.016)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.006
(0.005)

Robustness checks
Heckman probit
(4)
(5) Main
(6)
Removed eq. (any Selection
missing commercial eq. (not
capint
use)
missing)
0.435*
0.395*
(0.257)
(0.227)
-0.871** -1.027***
(0.387)
(0.383)
0.051
(0.125)
0.317
0.093
(0.282)
(0.142)
-0.081*** -0.054***
(0.023)
(0.020)
0.135
0.337**
(0.183)
(0.145)
1.206*** 0.997***
(0.274)
(0.239)
-1.114*** -1.077***
(0.261)
(0.225)
0.094
0.198
0.281***
(0.106)
(0.378)
(0.072)
0.319*** 0.288***
(0.046)
(0.038)
-0.288*** -0.251
-0.192***
(0.107)
(0.278)
(0.071)
-0.669** -0.581**
(0.277)
(0.237)
0.080
0.093
(0.091)
(0.077)
0.342
0.118
(0.208)
(0.180)
0.043*
0.045**
(0.025)
(0.021)
-0.020
-0.013
(0.013)
(0.011)
-0.004
-0.002
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.007**
0.005
(0.004)
(0.003)

Table 5.3 (continued)
Electrical engineering
Chemistry,
pharmaceuticals
Process eng, special
equipment
Mechanical eng,
machinery
Consumer goods &
Construction

0.194*
(0.111)
0.055
(0.121)
0.087
(0.135)
0.103
(0.133)
0.259
(0.270)

0.131
(0.126)
-0.131
(0.213)
0.034
(0.167)
0.120
(0.246)
0.072
(0.320)

0.200
(0.174)
0.278
(0.229)
0.263
(0.186)
0.919
(0.592)

0.256**
(0.127)
-0.042
(0.144)
0.208
(0.156)
0.204
(0.153)
0.374
(0.378)

0.194*
(0.111)
0.055
(0.122)
0.087
(0.136)
0.103
(0.133)
0.259
(0.269)

Normalized rank order of
forward citations count
Constant
Heckman’s Rho (Arctanhtransformed)
Observations (censored)
Log Likelihood
Wald chi2
Pseudo R2

-0.764**
(0.316)

-0.612
(0.428)

-0.973**
(0.491)

-1.053**
(0.411)

1239
-761.19
180.27
0.111

722
-445.17
98.56
0.110

517
-307.34
91.28
0.136

914
-558.10
140.42
0.119

0.057*
(0.032)
0.358***
(0.076)

-0.778
(1.468)
0.026
(2.712)
1795 (556)
-1859.26
162.12
.

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As expected, the patents of higher technological value are more likely to be commercially
exploited. The coefficients on technological value in all models are statistically
significant at 1% level and positive. As the R&D project leading to the invention had
focused more on basic research or the initial purpose of R&D project was long-term
cultivation of base technology rather than current business purpose (“No immediate
demand”), the resultant patents are less likely to be commercialized even after controlling
for the age of invention. This result implies that commercializing the outcome from basic
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R&D is not just a matter of time but there should be a fundamental discrepancy in
commercialization between basic R&D and applied R&D.

As the number of inventors increase, the probability of commercialization increases, but
resources invested in the invention project as measured by man-month is not significantly
associated with the propensity to commercialize. The number of inventors may represent
both the amount of resources invested in the invention and, to some extent, the degree of
complexity of the invention project. The probability of commercialization is not
significantly associated with other patent strength measures (number of claims and
number of different technology classes).

Patents from firms with large patent stock are less likely to commercialize. As patent
stock increases by 1 percent around its mean, the probability of commercialization
decreases by 2.1 percentage points, holding others at their means or modes. After
controlling for the size of patent stock, firm size does not affect the propensity to
commercialize.

A patent developed by an inventor belonging to the manufacturing unit is more likely to
be commercialized. The coefficient of the variable “inventor in manufacturing unit” is
statistically significant and positive. Holding other variables at their means or modes, the
probability of commercialization for a patent from manufacturing units is lower by 0.141
than a counterpart patent from specialized R&D units or other non-manufacturing units,
such as sales and marketing departments.
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The probability of commercialization is likely to be higher for collaborative inventions
than non-collaborative inventions, holding others constant. The coefficients for
knowledge sources are also highly significant. However, the impact of external
knowledge on the propensity to commercialize diverges depending on the characteristics
of sources. While the industrial sources of knowledge that originated from customers,
suppliers, competitors, fair or exhibition, standard documents, or patent literature are
likely to increase the propensity to commercialize, the public sources of knowledge, such
as published scientific literature, conferences, universities, or government research
organizations, are likely to reduce the propensity of commercialization. These effects are
statistically significant at 0.01 level and hold even after controlling for collaborations.

Turning to the variables of our interests, adding component familiarity marginally
improves the fit and explanatory power of the model compared to the base model with
only controls (not reported). The coefficient is also marginally significant at 10% level
but the sign is positive as expected. This estimation suggests that patents in familiar
technology areas (one standard deviation around its mean) will be commercialized more
by 2.5 percentage points, even after controlling for value of technology, demands, and
others.28 The impact of component familiarity is stronger in complex technologies
(columns 2 and 3). In fact, to our surprise, the regression coefficient on component
familiarity in discrete technologies (column 3) not only loses significance but also

28

We tested whether there is a curvilinear relationship between the propensity to commercialize and
component familiarity by adding a square term in the regression. We found no evidence of that.
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changes its sign to negative. This finding indicates that technology evolution may have a
different impact on innovation depending on the nature of underlying technology.

In discrete technology, utility and commercial potential of a new technology may be
relatively easily foreseeable and work independently from the overall development stage
of the field. When nylon was invented, its usage was instantly recognized. Then, to
protect profits from nylon, Du Pont scrutinized the possibility of substitutable
petrochemical synthesis methods that can be used to make an equivalent of nylon and
patented those substitutable technologies. On the other hand, competitors who may have
developed substitutable technologies would not want to commercialize them unless their
technologies were proved safe from infringement and would result in better performance
to compensate the late start. The field was populated with fence patents to prevent rivals’
inventing-around the core technology.

The coefficients on capital intensity are significant and negative as expected. The
estimation (full model in column 1) suggests that patented inventions from capitalintensive firms ($500,000 per employee above average firm) will commercialize the
invention less by 19 percentage points, holding others constant at their means or modes.
Also, the impact is stronger for complex technologies. The regression coefficient is 1.721 and significant at 0.05 level for complex technologies but -0.472 and not
significant in discrete technologies. Disappearance of significance in discrete
technologies may be caused by the small sample size. We cannot explain the reasons
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underlying this discrepancy because we do not know exactly how capital assets are
differently utilized between complex and discrete technologies.

5.3. Concluding Remarks

We examined the effects of evolutionary stages of technology development and firm
capabilities on the commercial uses of patented inventions. We found supporting
evidence on the arguments that the patented inventions in mature technology are more
likely to find a path to commercial applications because of a favorable selection
environment of technology and lower uncertainty linked to the general characteristics of
mature technology. Our analysis is consistent with the evolutionary explanation of
technology development as claimed by many scholars of innovation studies (Abernathy
and Clark, 1985; Dosi, 1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Utterback, 1994). However, the effects of the selection environment are not clearly
delineated from the effects of uncertainty on a choice between the external use and
nonuse as predicted by transaction cost economics. This is because we deal with
commercialization as a homogeneous category. Resultantly, we cannot see clearly the
different mechanisms working on different modes of use (and nonuse) in this analysis. In
the following parts, this study breaks down the use and nonuse into a more detailed
category and addresses this issue again. Regardless of the internal mechanisms, this
finding implies that thickets of nonuse patents may reach a natural equilibrium as the
field of technology becomes more populated with component technologies. Of course,
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whether patents are commercialized or not may not affect the costs of innovation for nonpatent holders and the entry conditions into the technology markets or product markets
based on the technology. Nevertheless, from a social point of view, thickets composed of
used patents may be better than the thickets composed of nonuse patents.

Regime of appropriability is not exogenous. In addition, the study shows that the impact
of component familiarity on commercialization is stronger for complex technologies.

We also argued that the patented inventions from capital-intensive firms are less likely to
commercialize because of the presence of alternative competitive advantage,
progressively increasing organizational rigidity with size, and larger protective value of
patents than the benefits from commercialization. Our empirical results drawn from a U.S.
inventor survey support these hypotheses. However, this result should be cautiously
interpreted because we cannot clearly see just from this analysis whether the underlying
mechanisms are related to switching costs, threat of cannibalization, or more filing of
asset-protective patents. The mechanisms will be clearer in the following analyses of this
study in which we look at the impacts of this construct on different modes of use and
nonuse.
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PART II. DETERMINANTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL PATHS OF
COMMERCIALIZATION PROCESSES
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CHAPTER 6. Introduction to Part II

Technological innovation combines inventive processes with commercialization
processes (Afuah, 2003; Roberts, 1988). While they are often perceived as equivalent,
they are, indeed, very different (Schumpeter, 1942). Numerous new elements not
considered during the inventive processes (such as profitability, manufacturing efficiency,
marketing strategy, and competitive environment) now emerge when the inventor thinks
about commercialization. For example, profitability, manufacturing efficiency, ease of
integration with exisiting facilities and skills, marketing strategy, and competitive
environment become probably more important than technological superiority itself in the
commercialization stage. To complete innovation, commercialization is essential. The
innovator can choose different commercialization strategies. One of them is to decide
whether to integrate downstream commercialization processes into internal capabilities or
to seek alternative paths across firm boundaries. The most prominent external
commercialization path is to license inventions and collect royalties. In this era of patent
explosion and increasing importance of technology for firms’ competitiveness, the
external paths of commercialization have important implications for firms’
competitiveness and economy as a whole. Also, studying factors affecting the choice
between organizational paths has implications on the profitability of innovation and the
technology strategy of firms.
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Teece (1986) suggested that the profit from innovation was not necessarily appropriated
by the innovator but may accrue to the imitator or the owner of complementary assets
depending on the maturity of technology, regimes of appropriability, and the need,
ownership, and characteristics of complementary assets. Recent literature about licensing
endorses a part of Teece’s arguments by empirically showing that the strength of patents
(Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Gans, Hsu, and Stern,
2006; Kim and Vonortas, 2006) and the ownership of complementary assets
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007) are important predictors for licensing propensity.
The above-mentioned empirical studies (especially licensing studies) heavily depend on
TCE and partly build on the resource-based (or dynamic capabilities) view of a firm. In
this study, we build on and further these two theories in the context of innovation
commercialization. In addition, we attempt to illuminate different organizational
trajectories of commercializing patented inventions through the theoretical lens of the
knowledge network and open innovation.

In the context of firm innovation, TCE argues that firms tend to internalize innovation
rather than externalize it through the market mechanism when the appropriability hazard
(Oxley, 1997, 1999) of market transaction increases. One key policy instrument to reduce
the appropriability hazard in transacting patented inventions is to strengthen the patent
protection. The strength of patent protection is usually regarded as working at the
national or industry level but also arguably can be used at the patent (Gambardella, Giuri,
and Luzzi, 2007) or firm (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006) level. Teece (1986) argues that
the rent from innovation accrues to the holder of complementary assets such as
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manufacturing, sales, and/or distribution capability when an invention requires such
assets for commercialization. Therefore, this argument predicts that if a firm is already
equipped with complementary assets, the firm prefers internal to external exploitation of
the invention. This study re-examines these arguments using multi-level and detailed data.

In the KBV of a firm (Barney, 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander,
1992; Peteraf, 1993), when the firm rather than the market can provide the more valuable
and “opportunism-independent knowledge,” firms should prefer to produce knowledge
internally rather than procure it in the market independent of transaction costs. This study
tests this argument in the context of innovation commercialization. Particularly we argue
that as an invention fits more tightly with the firm’s existing technological strength, the
invention is exploited either internally or for pure defense rather than licensed.

Finally, this study attempts to test theoretical implications from the open innovation and
innovation network perspectives against commercialization decision. Particularly, we
argue that the sources and strength of knowledge during the invention process predicts its
use. Building on network embeddedness arguments (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr,
1996; Uzzi, 1997) and the exploration-exploitation arguments (March, 1991; Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004), we develop hypotheses linking the knowledge and collaboration
during the invention process to the use of its outputs.

Previous innovation surveys such as the Yale survey of 1983 (Levin, 1988; Levin, Cohen,
and Mowery, 1985; Levin et al., 1987), the Carnegie Mellon survey of 1994 (Cohen et al.,
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2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000, 2002), the recent PatVal-EU survey in Europe
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Giuri et al., 2007), and the Community Innovation
surveys in Europe have provided lots of valuable insights on the innovation. We plan to
use our inventor survey to expand on this tradition.
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CHAPTER 7. Theory and Hypotheses

The main research question of this study is to examine how and why patented inventions
are put into different uses. There is very little research that comprehensively examines the
different modes of use of patented inventions. Most innovation research regards the
patents themselves as the proxy for the innovation. The licensing literature (Arora and
Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007; Kim and Vonortas, 2006)
focuses on the rate and propensity of licensing without considering the other modes of
use. The limited literature about the strategic uses of patents either heavily depends on a
single-industry perspective (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004) or provides a
limited explanation about the mechanisms (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh,
2000).

In this study, we depart from Teecian framework on innovation strategy of firms but
enrich and articulate it with the recent development of innovation studies. In particular,
we attempt to incorporate TCE, knowledge-based view, open innovation, and network
perspectives into a coherent and comprehensive theory on commercializing patented
inventions.
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7.1. Schumpeter and Teece

In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter emphasized the role of
monopolization in the innovation. A monopoly (or a large firm in more loosely defined
terms) in the world of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy has a discriminating role in
both precondition and aftermath of innovation. As a precondition, he pointed out as the
relative advantage of a large firm “the sphere of influence of the better [good]”
(Schumpeter, 1942, p. 101) and good financial standings. As a result of innovation, a firm
will enjoy a transient monopoly state caused by imitation lag. Therefore, in this
Schumpeterian world, “perfect competition is and always has been suspended whenever
anything new is being introduced” (p. 105). Of course, these capability and
appropriability advantages of large firms in innovation can be offset by organizational
rigidity stemming from bureaucratic control structures (Nelson and Winter, 1982;
Schumpeter, 1942). Indeed, in his earlier work, The Theory of Economic Development,
Schumpeter himself argued that innovation was driven by entrepreneurs (Schumpeter,
1934). Some scholars call this early emphasis of Schumpeter on small firms as
Schumpeter Mark I and the later emphasis on large firms (or monopoly) as Schumpeter
Mark II (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Nelson and Winter,
1982). The Schumpeterian hypotheses urged lots of researchers to look at the relationship
between market structure (or firm size) and technological progress (see the following
reviews and references therein: Kamien and Schwartz, 1975; Scherer and Ross, 1990).
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The Schumpeterian hypothesis had been extensively tested during the 1960s through the
1980s. As neatly summarized by Cohen and Klepper (1996b), the consistent findings in
these early studies support that R&D investment increases with firm size, although not
disproportionately, but innovation output, mostly measured using patent counts,
decreases disproportionately as the level of R&D or firm size increases. The underlying
arguments that a large firm does more innovation consider both demand and supply
aspects. To summarize these arguments, first, a larger firm, which is defined as a firm
producing a larger amount of output, has less unit cost of R&D (“cost-spreading effect”)
than a smaller counterpart (Cohen and Klepper, 1996a, 1996b). On the supply side, a
larger firm will have more lump-sum funds to invest in R&D. More R&D will diversify
the research portfolio and spread R&D risks into several parallel projects to raise the odds
of success. A larger investment in R&D constitutes a larger R&D team that is composed
of supposedly better specialized personnel or better divides the R&D labor force to raise
its capability. As a consequence of this scale economy of R&D investment, a firm
investing more in R&D will have an advantage in research portfolio, R&D risk spreading,
efficiency of R&D teams, and absorptive capacity. Besides R&D diversity/specialization,
a larger firm enjoys an operational advantage through better vertical integration and
specialization (Teece, 1986).

A huge volume of literature that has tested the Schumpeterian hypotheses does not
converge to an undisputable conclusion. One reason for this inconclusiveness is probably
because aggregate units such as firm or industry could not effectively capture the
complex and heterogeneous activities of innovations carried out under and across firms
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and industries. Firm size alone, for example, cannot appropriately capture the
heterogeneous innovation activities performed by two different firms of the same size.
Moreover, innovative capability and activities of the contemporary firms are not
necessarily bounded by firm or industry boundary, but interlinked to outer capabilities by
research collaboration, strategic alliances, or technology licensing. Therefore, we need to
unpack what is going on under firms in order to better understand innovation.

Teece (1986), among others, developed a quite useful framework to analyze the
mechanisms by which firms commercialize their inventions. In order to explain why
many innovators fail to make a profit from innovation, he presents a simple model
composed of three actors (innovator, follower/imitator, and the owners of co-specialized
assets29) and two alternative strategies of the innovator (integrate or contract out30). In
this zero-sum type game, he then argued that a choice of strategy (integrate or contract
out) should determine to whom between innovator and follower the profit from
innovation accrues. A choice of strategy is conditioned on three key factors: dominant
design paradigm of technology, regimes of appropriability, and complementary assets.
The latter two factors have been examined recently in lots of business strategy and
innovation studies that show that they are indeed valid constructs affecting outcomes and
processes of innovation. Teecian framework is especially relevant to this work in that it
directly attempts to explain the reasons the innovator selects a particular strategy between
two alternatives: internal and external commercialization. Teecian framework was further

29

He stated that “[i]f there are innovators who lose there must be followers/imitators who win” (Teece,
1986, p. 286).
30
In a later revision (Teece, 2006), Teece partially addressed an intermediate strategy: strategic alliances.
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refined by Gans and Stern (2003) and applied to the context of new technology-based
entrepreneurs.

7.2. Technology Uncertainty and the Costs of Market Transactions of Technology

TCE assumes a bounded rationality of economic agents and the impossibility of writing a
complete contract ex ante. In this incomplete world of contracts, it is almost impossible to
fully specify, ex ante, all the activities of the contracting parties that can affect the
distribution or level of outcomes. Therefore, the contracting parties (e.g., manufacturer
and supplier) will have incentives to behave opportunistically to take a larger share of the
quasi-rents resulting from the contract. A typical form of opportunistic behavior is “holdup,” as emphasized in the TCE literature. TCE suggests that, in the situation where the
manufacturer expects high chances of hold-up by suppliers, it would choose to integrate
supplier capacity under its authoritative control because the authoritative control reduces
opportunistic behavior and saves transaction costs if production costs of alternative
organizational forms are equal. TCE literature contends that asset specificity, uncertainty,
and complexity should be closely related with the ex post opportunistic behavior (Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1991). When manufacturing assets are
specific to a certain firm, the alternative uses of those assets are limited and the impacts
of hold-up will increase. Other than asset specificity, two attributes regarding an asset or
a contract affect the risk of opportunistic behavior. When an asset or a contract includes
more uncertain or complex components, there will be more chances that a contracting
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party exploits this uncertainty or complexity for his own benefits (Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1991). TCE predicts that the contracting hazards stemming
from uncertainty or complexity would suppress the transaction and promote more
authoritative control. The elevated contracting hazards can be avoided in two ways: 1) ex
ante by stipulating the contract for every possible contingency or 2) ex post by increasing
the level of vigilance in monitoring contract misbehavior. However, because of bounded
rationality and asymmetric information, both measures increase the transaction costs
(Arrow, 1969; Williamson, 1979). Furthermore, uncertainty or complexity makes it
harder for contracting parties to reach an agreement in negotiation. Therefore, a firm
would need more authoritative controls and choose to integrate rather than contract when
a contract involves a higher degree of uncertainty or complexity. Empirical studies
consistently support TCE prediction in that the higher level of asset specificity,
complexity, or uncertainty the more authoritative a governance structure would be (see a
review by Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 and references therein).

In the innovation context, while a huge volume of literature about the strategic alliance
tests the impact of transaction costs on the governance structure of alliance agreements,
only a few studies examine how TCE predictions affect vertical integration of innovation
outputs. The licensing research examines the rate of licensing, a less hierarchical mode of
innovation commercialization, in relation with transaction cost variables such as the
strength of patents or the ownership of complementary assets. However, it does not
directly test the market versus hierarchy because the counterpart of licensing tested in the
literature usually includes non-licensed inventions that may include nonused ones as well
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as internally commercialized ones. As predicted by TCE, as asset specificity, uncertainty,
and complexity increase, more hierarchical governance structure is chosen in alliance,
R&D procurement, or invention commercialization. In the innovation context, many
studies test the effect of the strength of appropriability regime on the governance
structure instead of separately testing the effect of elements comprising appropriability
hazards. Aside from Oxley’s test of geographic uncertainty, Veugelers and Cassiman’s
test based on the Belgian Community Innovation Survey shows the opposite direction as
predicted by TCE, i.e., the lower uncertainty or lower appropriability hazard is related
with more hierarchical structure (“make” rather than “buy”).

In the context of commercializing patented inventions, asset uncertainty and contractual
complexity come from several different sources. We will discuss two of them:
characteristics of technology and the strength of intellectual property rights.31 The
existing literature has almost exclusively focused on the effectiveness of patent protection
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Fontana, Geuna, and Matt,
2006; Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2002, 2006; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Nagaoka and Kwon,
2006; Oxley, 1999; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). The literature argues that strong
patent protection should reduce a buyer’s post-contract haggling and lower the chances of
a seller’s unexpected losses from the market contracts. Therefore, there will be a higher
chance of market transaction of technology when patent protection is stronger. Gans, Hsu,

31

Another source of contractual uncertainty and complexity will be related to the relative positions of firms
in the product market or industry structure. Also, the history of dyadic relationship (including trust)
between the contracting parties will affect the level of the contracting hazard. We recognize that these
factors may be important in determining the contracting hazard. However, we do not consider them in this
study because they are much more complex to analyze and require a data set of very different nature from
what is available to us.
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and Stern (2006) found that licensing propensity significantly increases with the granting
of formal intellectual property rights. In cross-licensing agreements among Japanese
firms, Nagaoka and Kwon (2006) found that licensing agreements for transferring
patented inventions are more likely to occur than licensing agreements for transferring
only know-how. Some other studies use a strong protection regime at the national level
(Oxley, 1999), the industry level (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Gulati and Singh, 1998), or
at the firm level (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). All of
these studies consistently found that weaker protection regimes were associated with
more authoritative control of either upstream or downstream assets.

At last, we reach our main arguments: What are the meanings of technological
uncertainty and complexity and how they are related with contracting hazards in the
context of commercializing patented inventions? Technological uncertainty refers to the
variability of its applicability and utility. Analogizing technological progress to Kuhnian
explanation of scientific progress, Dosi (1982) argues that, once a technological paradigm
is established, most technological progress will take a similar pattern, or, according to his
words, follow a prescribed trajectory set by the paradigm. Therefore, technological
change in a paradigmatic (or “normal”) stage in the technology development cycle will
be incremental and, hence, less uncertain. Despite some differences in nuance and
language, linkage between the evolutionary path of technology and uncertainty is firmly
established in the literature (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Anderson and Tushman, 1990;
Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). Fleming (2001) and Fleming and
Sorenson (2001) empirically show that variability of utility of technologies indeed
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decreases (to a certain degree in Fleming (2001)) with the size of recombinant search
space of technological components. When applicability or utility of a technology is not
clearly known to the potential buyer of that technology, he would worry about
overpaying for that technology. On the other hand, the owner of the technology would
worry about the underestimation of the value of technology. Either underestimation or
overestimation would make it harder for contracting parties to reach an agreement.
Certainly, contracting parties can reduce this uncertainty if they can appraise the future
value of technology correctly. However, the appraisal process itself will also incur
additional costs of information processing or in building a proper level of capacity
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Combining TCE with the evolutionary explanation of
technology, we finally reach the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis M1. As technological components become more familiar, the propensity to
externally commercialize a patented invention will increase.

7.3. Strong Internal Position for Complementary Assets and the Prospect of
Internal Synergy

Teece (1986) asserts that specific assets complementing core technological know-how
(e.g., patented inventions) are a critical element determining profitability of innovation.
In particular, he argues that, in a weak appropriability regime, profit from an innovation
accrues to the innovator, imitator, or holder of complementary assets depending on two
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conditions: 1) the level of specialization of complementary assets that is required for
commercialization, given the first condition, and 2) how strong each player holds a
position in the complementary assets relative to each other. Simply put, the Teecian
innovator would internalize downstream assets for commercialization (rather than
procure them in market) in the following cases: 1) where the critical complementary
assets are available in-house; 2) if they are not available in-house and the complementary
assets are specialized, where a) cash position is OK for building them in-house and b) the
innovator is disadvantageously positioned in commissioning complementary assets
compared to imitators or competitors. Therefore, if we assume that most inventions
would require a certain degree of specialized complementary assets (including
manufacturing, service, distribution, or complementary technology) for
commercialization (Roberts, 1988), a strong position of the innovator for the
complementary assets would predict in-house integration of these assets (Case 1). The
second case addresses such inventions where the innovator has a weak internal position
of the complementary assets. Inventions in this case will be either vertically integrated or
contracted out for their necessary downstream assets for commercialization depending on
financing capability and the assets position of the innovator relative to imitators or
competitors. This case is not a main focus of the current study.

Teece’s prediction about strong internal complementary assets position and vertical
integration is supported also by TCE and KBV. In TCE, when the downstream assets are
difficult to redeploy to other uses or other users, the provider of such assets will be easily
attracted to using this tight bonding toward his own benefits by, for example, holding-up

114

or threatening the manufacturer (Williamson, 1991). According to TCE, the manufacturer
would respond to this potential loss by increasing authoritative control over the assets and,
therefore, would choose vertical integration rather than market contract. In KBV, the
focus is placed on internal synergy between activities. If a firm expects more synergistic
effects by combining activities internally, then it will integrate those activities. KBV
argues that fitness among different activities, complexity, tacitness, and learning effects
increase internal synergy (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 2003).
This is similar with a resource-based view in that it regards organizational routine, which
contains most elements mentioned above, as one of valuable, non-imitable, and rare
resources (Barney, 1991).

To clarify this point in the context of technological invention and its commercialization,
consider the following examples. When an invention is an improvement on the existing
products or processes, it would be more likely than an invention for new products or
processes to link to the existing manufacturing facility, skills, or the site of factory. In
TCE terms, the improvement invention will contain more site specificity, physical
specificity, and human-asset specificity (Williamson, 1981, 1991) and, therefore, will be
more likely to be internally commercialized. Similarly, in KBV terms, a firm would
expect more internal synergy by integrating its downstream commercialization efforts for
the improvement invention because of the fitness of this invention with the existing skills
and facilities. Tushman and Anderson (1986) dichotomize types of innovation by the
degree to which an innovation makes the existing competences obsolete. When an
innovation creates a new product or process, such innovation will require a new set of
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skills, processes, and assets. On the other hand, when a technological invention results in
improvement in the existing product or process, firms may be able to use existing
competence (or complementary assets required to commercialize that invention). Thus
they define technological discontinuities (or innovations) that create or substitute for an
existing product or process as “competence-destroying” and technological discontinuities
that improve an existing product or process a “competence-enhancing” innovation.
Indeed, they found that competence-enhancing innovations were made more in the
existing firms. Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella (2002) found that about a third of all
chemical licensing was made by specialized chemical engineering firms that lacked
manufacturing facilities. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006) also found that firms lacking
specialized complementary assets were more likely to license their invention and less
likely to internally commercialize it.

For another example, consider the inventions made by manufacturing units. On the same
line of argument as the previous example, this kind of invention would be more tightly
coupled with asset specificity and the prospect of internal synergy. Hence, we predict that
the inventions made by manufacturing units will be more likely than, for example,
inventions made by independent R&D units, to internally commercialize. The argument
presented here is summarized into the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis M2. A patented invention having a strong internal complementary assets
position will be more likely to be internally commercialized.
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7.4. Collaboration, network embeddedness, and technological opportunity

In the previous sections, we discussed two theoretical approaches relevant to the makeor-buy decision of commercializing patented inventions. While TCE focuses on
comparisons of the management costs with the contractual hazards in a dyadic
relationship, KBV emphasizes synergistic effects that would not be produced by
contractual relationships but would be possible by integrating complementary activities
internally. The innovation network and organizational learning perspectives agree with
KBV in that the transaction costs should be only a partial explanation of the choice of
governance structure and that some complementary combinations not attainable through
market relationships should be an important dimension to determine the choice of
governance structure. A critical difference from KBV, however, is found in the stretch of
organizational boundary over which such synergistic effects happen. While KBV
confines the boundary of complementary combination within a firm, the innovation
network perspectives extend it over the networks of firms. Both TCE and the network
perspectives focus on the relationships with external entities. However, while TCE
focuses on how the attributes of the relationship work as a potential risk, the network
perspectives focus on how the relationship can generate some positive benefits otherwise
impossible. In this sense, we basically agree with Jacobides and Winter’s contention that
“TCE focuses on the conditions of exchange, to the neglect of the conditions of
production” (Jacobides and Winter, 2005, p. 398). However, there is a more fundamental
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aspect about the roles of the networks in innovation and economic behavior beyond the
problem of avoidance of negatives or production of positives.

The attacks were initiated by sociologists whose main concerns are placed in
understanding how social relations affect individual behavior. Granovetter (1985)
criticizes that economic arguments ignore the social context and the history of
interpersonal relationships outside of which human actions cannot be formed. As a
consequence, he contends that economic arguments, whether they are neoclassical or new
institutional, are either over-socialized or under-socialized. In his view, networks are
omnipresent (they exist even in hierarchy as well as in markets) and human actions are
“embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (p.487).

Powell (1990) basically agrees with Granovetter on the importance of social structural
embeddedness in determining economic exchanges and on the limitation of arraying
economic exchanges on the market-hierarchy continuum. Nevertheless, he argues that
“certain forms of exchanges are more social” (p.300) and submits that there is an
empirical merit to distinguish the network form as a distinct governance structure from
either market or hierarchy. Powell identifies several key distinct characteristics of each of
three governance forms. The network structure is dominated by a norm of reciprocity and
reputational concerns while hierarchy (market) is dominated by administrative fiat or
supervision (haggling or court enforcement). Also, information communicated over
networks is richer than information obtained in the market and “freer” than information
circulated in a hierarchy. Therefore, Powell contends that “[n]etworks, then, are

118

especially useful for the exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured”
(p.304). On this line of argument, a network form of organization is defined as “any
collection of actors (N ≥ 2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one
another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and
resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange” (Podolny and Page, 1998, p. 59).
This definition includes formalized relations such as joint ventures, strategic alliances,
franchises, research consortia, relational contracts, and outsourcing agreements, but also
research collaborations, informal information exchange (von Hippel, 1994), repeated
supplier-customer transactions, and other non-codified forms of regularized interactions
with external organizations.

Powell further argues that know-how, the demand for speed, and trust are critical to
forming networks. The exchange of know-how, which, according to Powell, is
characterized by tacitness and embodied in a highly mobile skilled labor force, is more
suitable for network forms because of the lateral structure of communication and mutual
obligation of networks. Dynamic adaptability of a network structure that is mostly based
on the ability of information dissemination and interpretation is more suitable for the
competition based on fast innovation capability. Finally, the common backgrounds that
may stimulate trust among actors contribute to forming networks. In addition to these
factors, needs for legitimacy and status that may be derived from network affiliation is
listed as a factor affecting network formation (Podolny and Page, 1998; Stuart, Hoang,
and Hybels, 1999). The key testable implications of embeddedness, therefore, are that
network forms of organizations are more preferred when the above-listed factors are
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prominent ceteris paribus and, consequently, that network forms of organizations result in
unique opportunities and constraints not predicted by standard economic explanations
(Uzzi, 1996).

It is well known in the literature that networks affect the outcomes of innovation (Afuah,
2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Gulati and Sytch, 2007;
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004, 2006; Shan,
Walker, and Kogut, 1994). Furthering these arguments, here we discuss how the types of
networks formed during the explorative stage of innovation (i.e., invention stage) affect
the organizational trajectory of the later stage of innovation (i.e., commercialization
stage).

Network forms are known to be conducive to exchange of commodities of uncertain
value or know-how that is tacit and embodied in a mobile labor force (Powell, 1990). As
discussed below for external sources of knowledge, networks established during the
invention process would provide more technological opportunities that can be
commercially exploited. This technological advantage from networks, therefore, would
raise a chance for commercial exploitation, either internally or externally of the invention.
Additionally, networks would benefit firms by providing more market opportunities. For
example, a participant joining the network relationships can either be a potential buyer of
the invented technology or signal the competency of the technology to the markets
(Podolny and Page, 1998; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). Also, a possible trust
relationship formed through earlier explorative ties may be maintained through the ties in
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the later stage of commercialization. Empirical studies on alliance and organizational
learning found that networks formed during the explorative stage of innovation would
indeed induce the exploitative networks (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996;
Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004).

Then we give attention to qualitative differences among the collaborations according to
different characteristics of partner types. Below, we extensively discuss the
characteristics of external knowledge by its sources and its impact on commercialization.
Similar to this discussion, collaboration with industrial partners would favor the internal
commercialization path if only knowledge and technological aspects are considered.
However, we claimed above that demand opportunity in markets for technology and
embeddedness structure should affect the commercialization path. To clarify this effect,
we divide industrial collaboration into two types based on the relationship of partner
firms with the focal firm. The vertical collaboration includes partners in vertical
relationships, such as suppliers or customers. The horizontal collaboration includes
partners in horizontal relationships with the focal firm, such as competitors, a firm in the
same industry, or an unrelated firm in other industry.

Partner firms in vertical relationship are assumed to be mutually dependent on the focal
firm and have a relatively clearer division of labor. Several studies, indeed, report that
collaboration with suppliers, competitors, or customers is critical in the success of
innovation (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Rothwell et al., 1974; von
Hippel, 1988). The same arguments we made for external industrial knowledge can be
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applied to this type of collaboration. Additionally, mutual gains in learning and
technological fitness achieved through inventive collaboration will be better exploited
through internal commercialization. In other words, the closely aligned capabilities
extended over dependent firms would not be properly evaluated nor transferred in the
market for technology. This argument leads to the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis M3a. A patented invention developed through collaboration with firms in
vertical relationships will be more likely to take internal commercialization paths.

On the other hand, firms in horizontal relationships are assumed to have competing, but
possibly complementary, technologies. Collaboration among these firms will bring forth
higher chances of demands for the technology in the markets for technology. Also, as the
network embeddedness arguments say, firms will receive mutual benefit by maintaining
ongoing trust relationships that can be attained through, in our case, licensing the
invention. In addition, because know-how flows in both directions over the collaboration
network, the collaborating partner, who may be a potential competitor in the product
market, would have achieved a similar level of technological knowledge. Therefore,
attempts to block such potential competitors from accessing the technology would not be
effective. This effect will be particularly prominent in cross-licensing but also in
unidirectional licensing. As Arora and Fosfuri (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora, Fosfuri,
and Gambardella, 2002) argued, while the rent dissipation effects will be minimal in this
case because knowledge transfer would have already occurred during the inventive
collaboration, the revenue effects would be totally lost unless the patent is provided for
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(cross-)licensing. In summary, based on all these reasons, we predict that horizontal
collaboration will incentivize a firm to take an external commercialization path.

Hypothesis M3b. A patented invention developed through collaboration with firms in
horizontal relationships will be more likely to take external commercialization paths.

Furthermore, network embeddedness arguments suggest that social relations can mitigate
high transaction costs. For example, a collaboration network during the invention process
encourages the network members to exchange formal and informal knowledge and,
moreover, provides them opportunities to develop trust in each other through repeated
interaction. When technology is highly uncertain, better understanding of the technology
through knowledge exchange will lower the uncertainty. Furthermore, trust relationships
will ameliorate the opportunistic behavior problem. This suggests a testable hypothesis:
that transaction cost problems should have less of an impact in the presence of relational
contracting or networks. In combination with the previous arguments about impacts of
horizontal collaboration on external commercialization paths, we formulate the following
hypothesis:

Hypothesis M3c. The effect of horizontal collaboration on the propensity to take external
paths of commercialization will be stronger for the inventions whose technological
uncertainty is higher.
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7.5. Nature of External Knowledge

Open innovation arguments (Chesbrough, 2003; von Hippel, 1988) emphasize the
importance of external ideas and external paths to market in innovation. This “new breed
of innovation” (Chesbrough and Appleyard, 2007, p. 57) depends on various sources of
knowledge including universities, suppliers, customers, and even competitors. In the open
innovation era, a firm puts more weight on knowledge brokerage than knowledge
creation (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Also, due to the risk as well as
the opportunity involved in open innovation strategy, the roles of intellectual property
rights have increased, although the use of intellectual property in these cases may be less
about exclusive in-house use and more as a means of exploiting external opportunities
and of facilitating the (compensated) dissemination of the technology to others (including
potential competitors).

The ability to evaluate and assimilate external knowledge is a critical component of
innovative capabilities of contemporary firms (Chesbrough, 2003; Cohen and Levinthal,
1989, 1990; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Rigby and Zook, 2002; von Hippel, 1988). Cohen
and Levinthal (1989, 1990) argue that extra-industry knowledge provides technological
opportunities that a firm can absorb and transform into commercial ends by investing in
internal R&D. Organizational learning literature claims that exploiting external
knowledge (or distant search or explorative search) would lead to better innovative
performance because it provides a larger pool of recombinant technology components
and the possibility of larger variations (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006;
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March, 1991). Katila and Ahuja (2002) and Laursen and Salter (2006) empirically show
that the scope of external search, either measured by the ratio of new citation in firm
patents (Katila and Ahuja) or the number of external knowledge channels exploited by a
firm (Laursen and Salter), predicts better innovation performance of firms.

According to Katila and Ahuja (2002), external channels of knowledge may enlarge the
pool of technological knowledge by adding new distinctive variations (or “variation
effects”). As the pool of knowledge gets more diverse, the chances to solve existing
technological problems increase (up to a certain point, though). On the other hand,
external knowledge will simply add technological elements that can be exploited in the
recombinant search process (or “size effects”) (Fleming, 2001; Katila and Ahuja, 2002).
Either variation effect or the size effect, however, would have a saturation point (beyond
which the quality of outcomes of innovative activities would decrease) because an
economic agent would have a limited information processing ability. Fleming and
Sorenson (2001) provide empirical evidence that the performance of an invention (as
measured by the forward citation counts) increases at a decreasing rate and then
decreases at an increasing rate as the number of technological components (as measured
by the number of technology sub-classes) increases.

Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) argue that the amount of effort for a firm to exert to
absorb external knowledge should be ordered by the degree to which the knowledge is
“targeted.” According to them, absorbing less targeted knowledge, which is typically
associated with a university or a government, would require more internal R&D than
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targeted knowledge, which is typically associated with industry partners, such as
suppliers. Here we focus on the difference of nature between two types of external
knowledge: 1) knowledge originating from suppliers or, more broadly, industrial sources,
including users and competitors and 2) knowledge originating from public domains. As
Cohen and Levinthal assumed, industrial knowledge is not only targeted to commercial
application but also likely to have more local, contextual, or industry-specific elements,
such as organizational routines, informal know-how, or product ideas (von Hippel, 1988).
Here we define industrial knowledge more broadly including knowledge from
competitors and users as well as suppliers. On the other hand, public sources of
knowledge are closer to basic science in nature, characteristics of which are more global,
general, or broadly applicable. They will be less targeted to a particular commercial
application and tend to be detached from a particular industry practice. As a consequence,
public sources of knowledge will take longer or require absorptive capacity (which can
be built by an additional investment on top of the ordinary product development process)
to absorb and transform into commercial application. An empirical study of the robotics
industry by Katila (2002) shows that extra-industry knowledge sources (such as
universities, government labs, or different industry) takes more time to be transformed
into new product development than intra-industry knowledge sources. Fleming and
Sorenson (2001) find that the higher the level of interdependency of technological
components included in a patent, the more people use the patent as measured by the
forward citations count.32

32

Indeed, they find that the level of technological interdependency is in inverted-U relationship with the
forward citations count.
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In summary, external industrial knowledge would have different attributes from external
public knowledge and, therefore, their impacts on commercialization would diverge. An
invention that has exploited more external industrial knowledge would be more suitable
for internal commercialization strategy for the following reasons: First, knowledge
required for the downstream commercializing process after developing core inventions
would fit better with industrial sources of knowledge. A new product development
process incorporates lots of problem-solving efforts localized around a specific problem
and, in most cases, routinized through the past trial-and-error experience (Carlile, 2002).
For example, developing peripheral technologies, modifying existing facilities to
accommodate a new invention, and training workers for new skills to run the modified
facilities/process follow the invention process. The characteristics of industrial sources of
knowledge, as described above, fit better with this process and, therefore, save the
innovator efforts for downstream commercialization. In addition, on a similar line of
arguments we made for the complementary assets and asset specificity, a firm that has
already internalized these valuable and hardly imitable capabilities for commercialization
during the invention process would benefit more by taking an internal path to
commercialization.

Second, while internal gains from learning will be greater for industrial sources, the
losses that may accompany an external commercialization strategy will be smaller for
public sources. This will incentivize a firm to choose an internal commercialization path
for an invention depending more on industrial sources and an external path for an
invention depending more on public sources. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) found that gains
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in inter-organizational learning increase when there are similarities in the knowledge base,
governance structure, and dominant logic among teaching and learning organizations. In
Cohen and Levinthal’s (1990) studies, additional exploitation of knowledge from
suppliers actually results in a lower level of internal R&D. Based on their findings, we
postulate that a firm would have gained more in learning from industrial partners because
of a greater level of similarity between them. This argument reinforces the first argument.
This characteristic also makes it more difficult and more expensive for the gained
knowledge to be transferred to others, which makes an external path to
commercialization harder to adopt.

Third, an invention depending more on public sources will take an external
commercialization path. Knowledge from public domains tends to carry less immediate
commercial value and be generally disclosed to a wider community and less embedded in
a particular practice than industrial knowledge (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; Owen-Smith,
2003). This characteristic reduces transaction costs of trading the technology in the
markets. Also, the negative impacts of spillovers on the other technologies owned by a
firm that might be caused by market transactions of the technology will be lower than
transferring a technology based on only internal knowledge. Therefore, more dependence
on external public knowledge will lower the barrier and risk for an external
commercialization path. In other cases in which knowledge has been transferred directly
from a governmental organization, often the government organization forces the recipient
firm to license the patented technology to other parties in need of the technology. This
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practice will also increase the chances of inventions dependent more on public
knowledge taking an external commercialization path.

Finally, similar to the first two arguments but in more prospective nuance, we argue that
an invention dependent more on external industrial knowledge would be prone to take an
internal path to commercialization because of the prospect for a greater level of internal
synergy. This argument builds on and extends the KBV of a firm. KBV identifies a firm
as having a “knowledge creation function” (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Nonaka, Toyama,
and Nagata, 2000) and claims that a firm decides to internalize technology development
when the technology is assessed to create internal synergy, regardless of the level of the
appropriability hazard (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Then which type of knowledge
would generate, as a firm expects, more internal synergy? As we described above,
industrial knowledge generally contains more contextual and industry-specific elements.
Also, it would be well-aligned to the firm’s existing practice but still include novel
elements to the firm (otherwise the firm would not need to use external knowledge). A
firm would expect internal synergy by integrating this knowledge further into
downstream assets (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Conner and Prahalad (1996) point out
knowledge-substitution effects. Simply put, when there is a need for combining
knowledge sufficiently complex and tacit, authoritative control by several experts will be
much more efficient than negotiation and voluntary coordination among less-informed
agents. Thus, a firm would receive more gains in efficiency by integrating complex and
tacit knowledge, which is characteristic of industrial knowledge.
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Hypothesis M4a. The higher the contribution of external industrial knowledge to an
invention, the higher will be the propensity to internally commercialize the invention.

Hypothesis M4b. The higher the contribution of external public knowledge to an
invention, the higher will be the propensity to externally commercialize the invention.
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CHAPTER 8. Data and Measures

8.1. Data
The estimation sample is based on the GT/RIETI survey and supplementary data sources
including the PATSTAT, USPTO database, and COMPUSTAT as described in
CHAPTER 5. Out of 1,919 valid responses, 1,807 cases are from firms. After deleting
listwisely the cases that have missing values on our covariates, we have 1,226 complete
cases for estimation.

8.2. Variables and Measures
8.2.1. Dependent Variables
The GT/RIETI survey asks inventors how they are commercially using their patented
inventions and, if not used, the reasons why they do not use them. We identify a patented
invention as commercially exploited (“any use”) if it is 1) commercialized in a
product/process/service by the applicant or owner of the patent, 2) licensed out or put in a
cross-license deal by (one of) the patent-holder(s) to an independent party, or 3)
commercially exploited by the respondent or any co-inventor for starting a new company.
First, we construct a variable “any use” by coding 1 for the patented inventions falling in
any of these three categories. We coded 0 for those observations who explicitly reported
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that the patented invention was not used for all three commercial modes. Some answered
to only some of these three questions. This affects identifying nonuse. In survey, then, we
asked the reasons why a patent was not used. We regard those cases that provided valid
answer to the reasons for nonuse question but only partially reported nonuse in three use
questions as nonuse. Out of 1226 complete cases, 651 (53.1%) patents are reported to be
used (Table 8.1).

Internal and external commercialization
The variable “internal commercialization” is coded 1 for those observations reporting that
a patent is “commercialized in a product/process/service by the applicant or owner of the
patent” but not licensed (including cross-license) nor commercially exploited by the
respondent or any co-inventor for starting a new company.33 Among the used patents,
74% were purely internally used. The rest of used patents are regarded as “external
commercialization.”34

33

We excluded start-ups from university, hospitals, private and government research organizations, and
individual inventors by limiting our sample to the inventor belonging to firms at the time of invention.
34
Out of 172 patents thus identified as “external,” 113 patents were also used internally. We classified
them into “external” for the following reasons. First, although our question framing for internal use
explicitly stated whether a patent had been used by “the applicant/owner,” this may have been broadly
interpreted by the respondents as including external uses. So, we guess that the proportion of actual dual
use patents should be less than two-thirds. Second, even if some dual-use patents are included in external
use, this will give us conservative estimates for our independent variables. So to speak, considering that we
hypothesized opposite effects of our independent variables on the mode choice, if we had excluded those
dual-use patents from external use, we would have had even stronger effects of these variables on external
use. Finally, we may have overestimated the effects on “internal use” by excluding dual-use. However, this
may not cause a problem because we hypothesized indeed for purely internal use.
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Table 8.1 Modes of commercial use and nonuse (N=1226)
Mode
Cases percent
Any use
651
53.1
Internal commercialization
482
39.3
External commercialization
169
13.8
- Licensed
122
10.0
o cross-license
30
2.4
- New firm
63
5.1
o license & new firm
16
1.3

8.2.2. Explanatory Variables

Measures for complementary assets
We capture complementary assets position using two survey measures: 1) whether an
inventor belongs to manufacturing unit and 2) whether the type of the invention is
competence-enhancing rather than competence-destroying.

Dummy for manufacturing unit
In Teecian arguments, the complementary assets interfere with mode choice of
innovation in three different points. If the invention does not require complementary
assets, it is immediately commercialized by the inventor. When the invention requires
complementary assets for commercialization, the degree of specialization and the
ownership of those assets play a role. Empirically, it is hard to assess whether a particular
invention requires complementary assets for its commercialization and how specialized
those assets should be. Therefore, we assume that every invention requires a certain type
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of downstream assets such as manufacturing facility and that those assets are somewhat
co-specialized. An invention from a manufacturing unit is already or ready-to-be coupled
with downstream co-specialized assets. The GT/RIETI Survey asks which organizational
unit the inventor belongs to. Unit-manu is marked 1 if the inventor belongs to
manufacturing unit and 0 for R&D unit (either independent or sub-unit attached to nonR&D function), software development, sales & marketing, and others.

Competence-destroying invention
Tushman and Anderson (1986) characterize competence-enhancing innovation as “orderof-magnitude improvements in price/performance that build on existing know-how
within a product-class” and competence-destroying innovation as such innovation that
“either creates a new product class … or substitutes for an existing product” (p.442). In
survey, we asked a similar question whether the type of innovation was to create a new
process or product or to improve an existing process or product. Using this survey
question we create “competence-destroying invention” dummy variable by coding the
former 1 and the latter 0. This measure does not exactly correspond to Tushman &
Anderson’s characterization. For example, if some new products or processes actually
may build on existing competence, then the invention linked to this sort of products or
processes cannot be competence-destroying. However, without further information by
which we can assess whether and to what extent a particular invention substantially
recycles existing skills, processes, or assets, this measure is the best proxy of
competence-enhancing invention available to us. We guess that a part of competence-
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enhancing invention might have been falsely classified into competence-destroying
invention.

Measures for technology uncertainty
We operationalize technological uncertainty using the familiarity index of technological
components following Fleming (2001).35 The component familiarity captures the degree
to which a patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his
patent. The basic assumption is that as a technology matures (therefore, the population of
technological artifacts increases), technological trajectories based on this technology
become more foreseeable (Dosi, 1982). Component familiarity, as suggested by Fleming,
averages the number of patents previously assigned to the same technology classes of the
focal patent and applies a knowledge attenuation factor by temporal distance between the
focal patent and the referred patents. He has empirically shown that component
familiarity had inverted-U relationship with the uncertainty of utility of the patent as
measured by the variation of forward citation counts.

In order to construct this variable, first we count the number of U.S. patents filed from
1976 to 1999 in each technology class.

35

In this study, we focus on uncertainty and complexity stemming from the nature of technology. Whereas
the strength of patents has been widely used, it is often vague in both concepts and measurement. Moreover,
crucial elements that make patent protection effective are, we argue, inherited from the nature of
encapsulated technology. In one sense, strong patents may refer to those patents linked to a technology in
large demands. However, if such technology can be easily invented around (or there exists a viable
alternative technology), then the effectiveness of patents in protecting inventor’s interests should be
weakened. Also, crucial parts of most cases of patent appeals or infringement law suits are related to the
aspects of encapsulated technologies. Therefore, we conclude that patent effectiveness is crucially
dependent on the uncertainty and complexity of encapsulated technology and that the latter is more
fundamental and suitable for measuring contracting hazards in market for technology than measuring the
perceived effectiveness of patent protection at aggregated levels.
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Component familiarity for patent i =

1
N Ci

å

å1{ patent k assigned to subclass c } ´ kattenuation
j

k

c j Î C i all patents k filed
from 1976 to 1999

Where Ci = { patent subclass assigned to patent i } ,
c j = patent subclass identifier,
N Ci = number of different patent subclasses assigned to patent i.

Knowledge attenuation factor is calculated as follows,
kattenuationk = exp(

temporal distance of patent k
),
time constant of knowledge loss

where temporal distance of patent k=
4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999
9.5 if patent k was filed from 1990 to 1994
16.5 if patent k was filed from 1976 to 1989

Time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 years following Fleming (2001). We rescaled
component familiarity by dividing it by 1000.

Knowledge flow measures
The GT/RIETI survey asks how importantly the various knowledge sources have
contributed to the invention in 1) suggesting stage and 2) completing stage. The measure
is 6-point Likert scale with 0 for “did not use,” 1 for “not important,” and 5 for “very
important”. We asked about 11 knowledge sources: scientific and technical literature,
patent literature, fair or exhibition, technical conferences and workshops, standard
documents, your firm (excluding co-inventors), universities, government research
organizations, customers or product users, suppliers, and competitors. We take a
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maximum value of answers from suggestion and completion questions and construct the
following four variables.

Industry and public knowledge
We summed up importance scores of 4 external knowledge sources: scientific literature,
technical conferences, universities, and government research organizations. Then, we
divide the sum by 20 and construct the variable industrial knowledge which ranges from
0 for not using any external public knowledge and to 1 for fully using external public
knowledge (Cronbach’s alpha=0.69). The variable industrial knowledge is similarly
constructed from the rest of external knowledge sources: patent literature, fair or
exhibition, standard documents, customers and product users, suppliers, and competitors
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.66). In order to verify the structure of these two common factors we
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. The results of the analysis confirms the
hypothesized latent structure as indicated by the most of the goodness of fit statistics (e.g.
Chi-square pr.> 0.1511; NFI=0.9914; GFI=0.9965). A detailed description of factor
analysis is provided in Appendix B.

Collaboration measures
The GT/RIETI Survey asks whether the focal patent was developed with inventors who
belong to various external organizations and whether the focal patent was developed
through formal or informal collaboration with external organizations. The survey presents
8 distinct categories for external organizations including suppliers, customers and product
users, competitors, non-competitors within the same industry, other firms, universities,
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government research organizations, hospitals, and other. In order to test hypothesis 4a
and 4b, we classified the type of collaboration into three groups according to the nature
and relationship of the collaboration partners with the focal firm. They are collaboration
with 1) public organizations, 2) firms in vertical relationship, and 3) firms in horizontal
relationship. Based on this classification, then, we construct three collaboration dummies.
The variable “collaboration –public” is coded 1 if all reported collaboration partners fall
in any type of public organizations including universities, government research
organizations, and hospitals. The variable “vertical collaboration” is coded 1 if the
inventor organization had co-invented or collaborated with either suppliers or customers.
The variable “horizontal collaboration” is coded 1 if the inventor organization had coinvented or collaborated with competitors or other firms (i.e. non-supplier, non-customer,
and non-competitor).36

8.2.3. Controls
Firm size
Size of firms is known be an important factor determining firms’ propensity to license
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). The variable, “Large firm,” is coded 1 if the
inventor belonged to a large firm (defined as having more than 500 employees) at the
time of invention. We used the survey responses for those observations having valid
36

This categorization is theory-driven but also conforms to the latent factor structure. We conducted an
exploratory factor analysis using tetrachoric correlations. We obtained a three-factor solution with similar
structure as we described above except for one small difference. According to the factor analysis, it seems
that “other firms” may better be classified into public collaboration rather than horizontal collaboration.
However, this does not conform to our theoretical explanation so that we keep “other firms” in horizontal
collaboration. The reliability coefficients, Cronbach’s alpha, for each group range from 0.39 to 0.51, which
are below the conventional cut-off, 0.7. However, this does not tell our grouping is bad because we have
only two or three items in each group and, in our survey, collaboration with multiple partners are only in a
rare occasion (less than 10% of cases) which result in low correlations among variables.
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responses (1739 cases). For the remaining 108 cases on which there were no responses
from the survey, we assessed whether an assignee firm is large or not using
complementary data sources such as COMPUSTAT firm database, Patent Fee
Maintenance Database of the USPTO, and company websites.

Technological capabilities of firms
We use patent stock as a proxy for technological assets of a firm. Patent stock is
calculated as the number of granted U.S. patents assigned to the first assignee in the focal
patent and filed before the filed year of the focal patent. Patent stock of firm i for a focal
patent filed in year t is:

PSit=PSi (t-1)(1-d)

where d represents the constant depreciation of knowledge which is set to 15% following
the previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; Hall, 1990).

Similar to the way we construct the capital intensity, subsidiary firms are consolidated
into their ultimate parents. Patent stock of merged and acquired firms is also consolidated
into the merger. We use the PATSTAT database (April 2008 version) compiled by the
European Patent Office. There are two advantages using the PATSTAT for this purpose.
First, the PATSTAT provides relational tables and SQL interface for the bibliometric
information of the U.S. patents which make data extraction much easier than other
available data sources. Second, PATSTAT provides standard ID numbers of assignees
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which corrected many small differences of spells. We further cleaned the data by
manually searching and correcting the list of assignees in our sample.

R&D for base technology
This variable discriminates the business needs of the invention. Using our survey, we
code 1 for this variable if the reported purpose of research is “enhancing the technology
base of the firm or the long-term cultivation of technology seeds.”

Proportion of basic R&D
This variable is a proxy measuring the position of the invention on basic-applied
spectrum. In the survey, we asked the inventor how much effort (in percentage) he put in
basic research. The other categories presented are “applied research,” “design and/or
development,” and “technical services.”

Technological value of patents
In our survey, we ask the inventor assess technical significance of her invention relative
to other technical developments in her field during the year the focal patent was applied
for. We code 4 for top 10%, 3 for top 25% (but not top 10%), 2 for top 50% (but not top
25%), and 1 for bottom half.

Man-month and number of inventors
We control the resources invested in the invention using two different measures. The
variable “man-month” is an ordinal variable constructed from the survey question asking
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“[a]pproximately how many man-months did the research leading to the focal patent
require”. The answer categories are 9 levels from “less than one man-month” to “more
than 97 man-months.” We take median values of each category and divide it by the
maximum value to make it ranged between 0 and 1. In addition, we control the number of
inventors as registered in the U.S. patent publication.

Type of innovation
Product innovation is observed to differ in some aspects from process innovation (Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). We identified product innovation using our survey. which
referenced to process innovation or mixed innovation whether or not an invention is for
product innovation.

Strength of patents
We control two measures of patent strength: the number of different technology
subclasses, and the number of claims. These variables are used in the previous studies as
a measure of patent strength (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007).

The number of different technology classes are regarded as strength of patents
(Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007), complexity of technology, or scope of invention
(Nerkar and Shane, 2007). Nerkar and Shane found a positive association of this variable
with the propensity to commercialize academic inventions. The U.S. patent office assigns
each issued patent to at least one relevant technology class which comprises
approximately 100,000 subclasses. It periodically reorganizes the classes and updates all
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the issued U.S. patents accordingly. This classification reflects a cognitive boundary by
which patent administrators and possibly technology developers recognize and delineate
contemporary technologies. For example, when a new technology emerges, it may not be
classified into a single class in the current classification that exactly matches with its
technological characteristics. Also, any new combination of existing technology may well
be consisted of multiple technology classes. Therefore, a patent referring to multiple
technology subclasses may well impose additional difficulty in understanding the
underlying technology and be technologically more complex. We control the number of
different technology subclasses assigned to the patent under the U.S. Patent Classification
system.37

We control the scope of patent by including the number of claims. Each claim may be
regarded as an independent patent (Tong and Frame, 1994)38 and, thus, the number of
claims is known to measure the breadth of utility or applicability of the patent.39 Number
of claims are more and more used as a standard control for patent strength in the literature
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).

37

We use the U.S. patent class (USPC) instead of International Patent Class (IPC) for the proxy of
technological complexity for the following reasons. In the USPTO, USPC is periodically updated and
overwritten for the previous patents. This maintains data integrity between the current patent and the past
patents. Moreover, this updated class reflects current, rather than past, views on the cognitive blocks of
technology.
38
In judging patent infringement in the U.S., infringing any single claim in a patent is regarded as
infringement on the patent.
39
In the United States patent law, there are two types of claims: independent and dependent or multiple
dependent. While an independent claim stands alone, a dependent claim refers to a claim previously set
forth and specifies a particular embodiment or limitation of the invention (35 U.S.C. 112). Because of this
distinction, counting dependent claims may not (or in a fractional way) properly reflect the technological
scope of inventions. Therefore, we count only the independent claims. We regard any claim that contains a
reference to another claim as a dependent claim and subtract them from the total number of claims. We take
a natural logarithm of it assuming marginally decreasing nonlinear effects. However, we could not find any
notable difference between them and used number of claims in the main estimations.
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Age of invention
The mode of use may vary by the length for which an invention has come out and been
publicized. The variable “age of invention” measures how many months have elapsed at
the time of survey since the invention was filed.

Technology dummies
We distinguish 6 different technology areas using OST/INPI/ISI nomenclature40 based on
International Patent Class.

Description and summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 8.2.

40

This is a widely used nomenclature, especially among European researchers, focusing on industry
characteristics. This system was developed and updated by three European research institutes: the
Observatoire Science et Technology, the INPI (Institute Nationale Proprieté Industrielle), and Fraunhofer
Institute for Systems of Innovation Research.
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Table 8.2 Sample statistics (restricted sample, in use only, N=651)
Std.
Dev.
0.440

Variable
Internal commercialization
Explanatory variables
Inventor in manufacturing unit
Competence-destroying invention
Component familiarity (/1000)
Industrial knowledge
Public knowledge
Collaboration - vertical
Collaboration - horizontal
Collaboration - public
Controls

Mean
0.737
0.108
0.573
0.087
0.293
0.255
0.272
0.075
0.070

0.311
0
1
0.495
0
1
0.151 0.000 2.081
0.196
0
1
0.209
0
0.9
0.445
0
1
0.263
0
1
0.256
0
1

Large firm (employees >500)
Capital intensity (M$/employee)
Dummy for missing capital
intensity
Ln(patent stock)
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D (/100)
Product invention
Man-month (normalized)
Number of inventors
Complexity of technology (#
USPC)
Number of claims
Age of invention (months)
Electrical engineering
Instruments
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals
Process eng, special equipment
Mechanical eng, machinery
Consumer goods & Construction

0.824
0.058

0.381
0.088

0.321
5.014
2.427
0.186
0.067
0.536
0.193
2.899

0.467
0
1 COMPUSTAT
2.800
0 9.865
PATSTAT
1.087
1
4
Survey
0.390
0
1
Survey
0.153
0
1
Survey
0.499
0
1
Survey
0.229 0.005
1
Survey
1.983
1
16
Patent

4.310
22.823
69.276
0.258
0.198
0.220
0.144
0.142
0.038
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3.305
16.997
12.002
0.438
0.399
0.414
0.351
0.349
0.192

Min
0

Max
1

Data source
Survey
Survey
Survey
USPTO
Survey
Survey
Survey
Survey
Survey

Survey &
0
1
Patent
0 0.823 COMPUSTAT

1
1
38
0
0
0
0
0
0

23
181
92
1
1
1
1
1
1

Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent

CHAPTER 9. Results

In this section we present the results from a series of regression analyses. We start from
simple binary probit regressions with dichotomous dependent variables indicating one
type of use (internal or external) regressed on the covariates in the complete-cases
(N=1226). Here 0 of the dependent variable indicates all others including nonuse. These
results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9.1.

The remaining models are presented to contrast the differences between internal and
external use. Columns 3 and 4 are estimated using binary probit regression in the sample
restricted to any commercially used patents (N=651). We use the same dependent
variable, internal commercialization path, as in column 1, but 0 indicates only the
external commercialization path. Here we removed the nonuse patents and compare
internal commercialization directly with external commercialization. The coefficients on
variables in these models, thus, will clearly contrast the effects of variables on two
polemic uses, internal v. external. Despite the advantage of this model that it can clearly
show distinguishing effects between two modes of use, this specification may result in
biased estimates of the coefficients if they are subject to two circumstances: 1) when the
presence of the third alternative of outcomes (nonuse in this case) affects the choice
between two outcomes of our interests (internal and external use in this case) or 2) when
factors affecting the censoring procedure (in this case, by nonuse) is not independent
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from factors affecting outcomes (“selection effects”). For robustness checks, we
estimated the model using two alternative specifications, multinomial logistic regression
and the Heckman probit selection model. This will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Table 9.1 Results of regression analysis
Main results: Binary probit
Unrestricted sample

Inventor in manufacturing
unit
Competence-destroying
invention
Component familiarity

Restricted sample

Internal
0.424***
(0.139)
-0.165**
(0.079)
0.010
(0.240)

External
-0.250
(0.191)
0.166*
(0.100)
0.498**
(0.249)

Internal
0.484**
(0.213)
-0.273**
(0.119)
-0.667*
(0.341)

1.145***
(0.237)
-1.303***
(0.236)
0.247**
(0.098)
-0.164
(0.161)
-0.005
(0.172)

-0.197
(0.294)
0.415
(0.278)
-0.034
(0.124)
0.532***
(0.177)
0.025
(0.189)

0.999***
(0.358)
-1.351***
(0.346)
0.223
(0.148)
-0.601***
(0.201)
0.104
(0.236)

0.492*** -0.605***
(0.140)
(0.157)

0.781***
(0.184)

Component familiarity *
horizontal collaboration
Industrial knowledge
Public knowledge
Collaboration - vertical
Collaboration - horizontal
Collaboration - public

Robustness checks
Multinomial logit
(reference=internal)
Heckman probit

Internal:
adding
interaction
term
Nonuse
0.484** -0.683***
(0.213)
(0.253)
-0.272**
0.245*
(0.119)
(0.137)
-0.658*
-0.351
(0.342)
(0.446)
-0.604
(2.618)
0.998*** -1.986***
(0.358)
(0.425)
-1.350*** 2.185***
(0.346)
(0.421)
0.224 -0.414**
(0.148)
(0.174)
-0.559**
-0.082
(0.265)
(0.300)
0.102
0.028
(0.236)
(0.310)

External
-0.759**
(0.370)
0.380*
(0.206)
0.706
(0.461)

Internal
0.469**
(0.210)
-0.267**
(0.117)
-0.660*
(0.339)

-1.385** 0.971***
(0.595)
(0.371)
1.897*** -1.313***
(0.568)
(0.371)
-0.301
0.194
(0.244)
(0.157)
0.930*** -0.626***
(0.334)
(0.197)
0.055
0.070
(0.383)
(0.241)

Controls
Large firm

0.780***
(0.184)
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-0.475* -1.295***
(0.259)
(0.314)

0.786***
(0.182)

Selection
(any
commercial
use)

0.091
(0.225)

Table 9.1 (continued)
Ln(patent stock)
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D
Product invention
Man-month
Number of inventors
Complexity of technology
Number of claims
Age of invention
Electrical engineering
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals
Process eng, special
equipment

-0.055***
(0.017)
0.178***
(0.038)
-0.134
(0.093)
-0.531**
(0.250)
0.145*
(0.078)
0.054
(0.179)
0.048**
(0.021)
-0.010
(0.011)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.180
(0.114)
0.029
(0.121)
0.018
(0.136)

-0.020
(0.022)
0.196***
(0.049)
-0.212*
(0.123)
-0.133
(0.313)
-0.048
(0.097)
0.109
(0.218)
-0.010
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.013)
0.002
(0.003)
0.006
(0.004)
0.067
(0.136)
0.000
(0.146)
0.079
(0.169)

-0.002
(0.027)
-0.102*
(0.058)
0.108
(0.151)
-0.027
(0.405)
0.091
(0.116)
-0.263
(0.266)
0.040
(0.035)
0.014
(0.018)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.024
(0.169)
-0.046
(0.179)
-0.139
(0.202)

-0.002 0.108***
(0.027)
(0.031)
-0.102* -0.442***
(0.058)
(0.067)
0.107
0.341**
(0.151)
(0.163)
-0.031
1.090**
(0.405)
(0.451)
0.091
-0.246*
(0.116)
(0.137)
-0.265
-0.178
(0.266)
(0.319)
0.040 -0.082**
(0.035)
(0.037)
0.014
0.023
(0.018)
(0.019)
-0.004
0.005
(0.003)
(0.005)
-0.005
-0.007
(0.005)
(0.005)
0.024
-0.369*
(0.169)
(0.199)
-0.045
-0.055
(0.179)
(0.213)
-0.140
-0.098
(0.202)
(0.243)
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0.022
(0.045)
0.151
(0.103)
-0.238
(0.251)
0.419
(0.689)
-0.193
(0.197)
0.103
(0.421)
-0.069
(0.059)
-0.007
(0.027)
0.006
(0.006)
0.008
(0.009)
-0.071
(0.273)
-0.026
(0.294)
0.071
(0.341)

0.002
(0.026)
-0.140
(0.088)
0.158
(0.176)
-0.030
(0.394)
0.083
(0.115)
-0.257
(0.263)
0.034
(0.037)
0.014
(0.018)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.021
(0.165)
-0.044
(0.174)
-0.136
(0.197)

0.250***
(0.036)
-0.333***
(0.089)

0.032
(0.020)

0.005*
(0.003)

Table 9.1 (continued)
Mechanical eng, machinery
Consumer goods &
Construction

0.249*
(0.134)
0.202
(0.245)

-0.437**
(0.193)
0.003
(0.287)

0.557**
(0.224)
0.129
(0.310)

0.555**
(0.224)
0.126
(0.310)

-0.316
(0.230)
-0.508
(0.483)

-0.956**
(0.391)
-0.105
(0.529)

Capital intensity
(M$/employee)
Dummy for missing capital
intensity
Diversity index of
collaboration
Constant

-1.052*** -1.490***
(0.299)
(0.384)

0.770*
(0.453)

0.771*
(0.453)

651
-318.69
100.98
0.145

651
-318.68
101.12
0.145

1.615***
(0.520)

-1.131
(0.779)

Heckman's Rho (Arctanhtransformed)
Observations (censored)
Log Likelihood
Wald chi2
Pseudo R2

1226
-745.54
149.74
0.093

1226
-436.97
103.21
0.111

1226
-1080.34
247.44
0.115

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% significance level, *** denotes 1% significance level.
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0.544**
(0.225)
0.122
(0.304)
-1.209***
(0.400)
0.217**
(0.101)
0.133***
(0.050)
-0.873***
(0.248)

1.100
(0.735)
-0.308
(0.622)
1226 (575)
-1108.43
110.13
.

9.1. Main Results
9.1.1. Main variables

Technology uncertainty
We hypothesized that technology uncertainty will increase the costs of technology
transaction in markets and, resultantly, suppress the contracts for technology in markets
such as licensing. We operationalized technological uncertainty using the familiarity
index of technological components following Fleming (2001).41 Our interpretation is that
the higher the technological familiarity index, the lower the technological uncertainty and,
therefore, the higher propensity of external commercialization. Conforming to our
hypothesis (M1), component familiarity is significant and positively associated with the
probability of external commercialization in the main estimations (column 3 and 4) and
Heckman probit (column 7). Note that this effect is significant after controlling for
knowledge spillovers from public sources that include patent literature. This indicates
that net of knowledge spillovers during the invention process, technological familiarity
(and maturity of technology) still has some impact on the commercialization process.
However, the significance disappears in the multinomial logit model. Therefore, we find
only weak evidence about the association between the external path of commercialization
and technological uncertainty. One source of the weak association is because our public
knowledge variable mediates technology familiarity. When we ran the same regression
without the public knowledge variable, the coefficient on component familiarity turned

41

Fleming (2001) found that this measure is in inverted-U relationship with the utility of the invention. In
our estimation, curvilinear relationship was not confirmed.
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significant. Another source of the weak association may be attributed to the characteristic
of this measure. While Fleming interpreted component familiarity as a measure of
potential technological variation or maturity, this may also represent the size of the
technology supply or technological interdependency. As the size of a pool of similar
technology with the focal invention increases, the alternative buying options for the
potential buyer of the technology will increase. The former, technology supply effects,
therefore, would reduce the demands for the technology in the market for technology.
Also, as the volume of the components of similar technological nature increases, they
may link to each other in a more complex way or, in other words, technological
interdependency may increase. This will put additional complexity in assessing the
prospect and value of the focal technology and therefore increase transaction costs. These
confounding effects or measurement noises inevitably accompanying the patent
indicators will limit the effectiveness of this measure in capturing technological
uncertainty.

Complementary assets
The patents having a strong internal position of complementary assets are hypothesized to
be more likely to take an internal commercialization path. We operationalized strong
internal complementary assets using two measures: 1) whether an inventor belonged to a
manufacturing unit at the time of invention and 2) whether an invention is linked to
existing competences (i.e., competence-enhancing rather than destroying) (Anderson and
Tushman, 1990).
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In column 1, the coefficients on “Inventor in manufacturing unit” is highly significant
and positive, indicating that a patent from manufacturing units is more likely than a
patent from non-manufacturing units (e.g., dedicated R&D units) to internally
commercialize. The effects of complementary assets on the choice of commercialization
path are clearly shown in the bimodal comparisons (column 3 through 7). Strong position
of internal complementary assets is likely to increase the probability of internal
commercialization compared to either nonuse or external commercialization.

An alternative measure of complementary assets also has an expected sign. When an
invention is not targeted to improving a current product or process (“competencedestroying invention”), it is more likely to be used externally. When the dependent
variable is “internal commercialization,” the estimated coefficients on this variable are
significant (at 5% level) and negative across all models, while positive for “external
commercialization.” In the full model of the restricted sample, for a patent from a large
firm in electrical engineering, being an inventor belonging to a manufacturing unit raises
the probability of internal commercialization by 17.8 percentage points, holding other
variables constant at their means or modes. In the same conditions, the competencedestroying invention lowers the probability of internal commercialization by 5.1
percentage points.

In conclusion, we are confident that a strong position of internal complementary assets
will increase the probability of internal commercialization and lowers the probability of
external commercialization.
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External knowledge
We examine the effects of external knowledge on the organizational trajectory of
commercialization using the variables “industrial knowledge” and “public knowledge” by
distinguishing the sources of external knowledge. The diverging effects of these variables
on the commercialization path are as predicted. Industrial knowledge has a highly
significant and positive impact on the probability of internal commercialization
supporting hypothesis M4a. On the other hand, public knowledge has a highly significant
and positive impact on the probability of external commercialization supporting
hypothesis M4b. Interestingly, public knowledge has a significant and negative impact on
the probability of internal knowledge. Although we controlled for firm size, one can
argue that large firms would not utilize external knowledge as much as small firms would.
In order to test the robustness of the impact of external knowledge over firm size, we ran
the same regressions with the firm size variable excluded in two split samples: large firm
only and small firms only. Signs and significance on both external industrial knowledge
and external public knowledge were still maintained in both of the split estimations,
indicating that the results from the main estimation are indeed robust against firm size.
However, the magnitudes of the coefficients are larger in the small firm estimation for
both variables. This suggests that the impact of external knowledge on choice of
organizational paths of commercialization might depend on firm capabilities42.

Collaboration effects
42

In the sample, small firms utilize more external public knowledge than large firms when their inventions
are commercialized, regardless of modes (N=651, small firm mean=0.287, large firm mean=0.246, Pr(|T| >
|t|) = 0.0605). However, the differences become insignificant in each mode of commercialization.
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Collaboration raises the probability of internal and external commercialization when the
importance of external knowledge is not controlled.43 After controlling for external
knowledge, the coefficient on collaboration remains significant (and positive) for external
collaboration but not for internal collaboration. (Not reported. Available on request.) This
finding indirectly indicates that, while internal commercialization exploits a knowledge
advantage from collaboration, external commercialization exploits both knowledge
advantage and network advantage from collaboration. We clarified these suspects by
distinguishing the types of collaboration by relationship with collaboration partners. In
hypothesis M3a, we argue that collaboration with vertical firms will bring forth
knowledge and learning advantage, which is suitable for integrating into the downstream
commercialization process. This seems to be supported at the first look from the full
model estimation as indicated by a highly significant and positive coefficient on
“Collaboration -vertical” in the full sample (column 1). However, the effects of vertical
collaboration on organizational paths of commercialization are not confirmed as indicated
by insignificant estimates of the coefficients in the bimodal estimations (columns 3 to 7).
The vertical collaboration has discriminating effects on internal commercialization only
against nonuse as indicated by significant and negative estimation of the coefficient in the
multinomial logistic regression (column 5). In conclusion, hypothesis M3a is only
partially supported.

43

We test two different measures of collaboration: 1) binary variable constructed from survey and patent
documents (coded 1 for collaboration and 0 otherwise) and 2) binary variable constructed only from survey
(coded 1 for collaboration and 0 otherwise). We had robust results for both measures. Although not
reported, this may be estimated by comparing coefficients on the collaboration variables in models 2 and 4.
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On the other hand, collaboration with firms in a horizontal relationship uniquely affects
external commercialization. Having collaborated with horizontal firms raises the
probability of external commercialization by 12.5 percentage points, holding others at
their means or modes (column 2). Horizontal collaboration especially raises the
probability of an external path against an internal path as indicated by a negative sign on
the coefficient of horizontal collaboration in the restricted sample.

To test hypothesis M3c, we added the interaction term (component familiarity *
horizontal collaboration) in column 4. The coefficient on the interaction term is not
significant in the model, but this does not tell us that there is no interaction effect. In a
nonlinear model, interaction terms (sign, magnitude, and significance) vary with
covariates (Ai and Norton, 2003). So we plotted z-statistic of the interaction term against
the predicted probability using “inteff” function in STATA (Norton, Wang, and Ai, 2004).
As Figure 9.1 shows, most significant interaction effects (|z|>1.96 at conventional
significance level, P<0.05) have negative signs and are located on the right side of the
graph where the internal commercialization is predicted (predicted probability>0.5). Also,
regardless of significance, interaction terms show decreasing trends as the probability of
internal commercialization increases. Recall that both component familiarity and
horizontal collaboration have a negative impact on the internal collaboration in our
estimations. The negative interaction effect, thus, indicates that the effects of horizontal
collaboration are stronger for technologically more uncertain inventions (or a higher
likelihood of internal commercialization). This result supports hypothesis M3c. However,
the magnitudes of interaction effects are very small (around 0.3 percentage points).
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Figure 9.1 Interaction effects of component familiarity and horizontal collaboration

9.1.2. Other variables

Technological value
In the full sample including nonuse, technological value is significant and positively
associated with both types of commercialization paths. Interestingly, the coefficients on
this variable are larger for external use than for internal use (columns 1 and 2). In the
restricted sample and multinomial logistic estimates, it is clearly shown that the higher
technological value, the higher propensity to externally commercialize, holding all others
constant. One possible explanation is that, to find a commercial application,
technologically advanced inventions may require broader and more diverse technological
capability that a single firm can hardly command. Another explanation is that
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technologically advanced inventions are less uncertain in value and promote market
transactions. However, given that we controlled general technological uncertainty,
internal demands, and whether or not the invention is competence-destroying, these
explanations are not fully satisfying. Another explanation might be found in inherent
endogeneity involving in the assessment of the “value.” Due to technological complexity
and cognitive limitation, it may be very hard for an inventor to assess technological
values of certain technologies on an absolute measure. Because of this ambiguity in
evaluating technological value, inventors may assess technological superiority of their
inventions by watching the reaction of the community. So external commercialization is
associated with high technology value partly because the interests from others
accompanying the external commercialization may have affected inventors to “inflate”
the technology value.44 This is one possible avenue for future research.

Firm size
Our estimates show strong and consistent results that patents from large firms are more
likely to take an internal commercialization path than an external path. The coefficients
on “large firm” are highly significant and have expected signs (positive on internal use
and negative on external uses). This result is consistent with findings by Gambardella et
al. for European firms (Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). The firm size effects are
substantial after controlling for complementary asset effects. Gambardella, Giuri and
Luzzi discuss two reasons driving the lower propensity of large firms’ licensing. First,
large firms are better positioned to integrate complementary assets than small firms.
Second, given that large firms generally have stronger market presence, “rent dissipation
44

Personal communications with Diana M Hicks.
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effects” from licensing will be greater for large firms than small firms where the revenue
earned from licensing is invariant of firm size (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003; Arora, Fosfuri,
and Gambardella, 2002). Our finding of strong firm size effects even after controlling for
the internal strength of complementary assets corroborates the validity of the rent
dissipation explanation.

Unlike a finding from Kim and Vonortas (2006) for licensing propensity, our estimation
does not show a significant relationship between the patent stock of a firm and the
propensity to commercialize externally (which includes licensing).

Strength of patents
Our measures of patent strength (number of claims and number of technology classes) do
not have a significant impact on commercialization paths. This is different from what
Gambardella et al. (2007) found from the PatVal-EU survey. This is probably because of
multiple meanings attached to the measures. As Gambardella et al. claimed, as
technological scope and complexity increases, the possibility of inventing-around will
decrease and, thus, the protective role of the patent will be strengthened. This is one
interpretation. Another interpretation is that the larger scope and higher complexity will
increase transaction costs. These multiple connotations from the same measure actually
work in the opposite directions with regard to the organizational paths of
commercialization. To overcome this difficulty of measurement, we estimated the model
with additional control of industry level strength of patent appropriability constructed
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from the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).45 The estimates of
our independent variables are robust against additional control of this variable. However,
this appropriability measure is also insignificant.

9.2. Robustness Checks

We created a nominal variable “mode of use” by coding 0 for nonuse, 1 for internal use,
and 2 for external use.46 Then we ran a multinomial logit with “internal use” as a
comparison group.47 The results are shown in columns 5 (nonuse) and 6 (external use) of
Table 9.1. Multinomial logit assumes the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
which means that the odds should not be affected by addition or omission of another
outcome category. Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption indicate that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that omission of nonuse is irrelevant to the choice between internal and
external use at 5% significance level.48 Multinomial logit model is proper based on
empirical tests. In the textbook, multinomial logit model is said to be proper when the
outcomes are distinct and not substitutes for one another (Long and Freese, 2006). In our
model, the modes of uses are distinct (as shown by the results of Wald and Likelihood
Ratio tests for combining alternatives). However, they may be substitutes for one another.
45

We used the mean of patent effectiveness at industry level (transformed into NAICS from International
SIC).
46
We did not distinguish “licensed” from “for a new firm” because of the small number of observations
assigned to each of these two categories.
47
Multinomial logit should not be much different from multinomial probit except in extreme values. We
ran multinomial logit because multinomial probit is known to be not as reliable as multinomial logit (Long
and Freese, 2006).
48
Small-Hsiao test results are different in each run because it uses different random seeds (Long and Freese,
2006). However, 9 out of 10 tests we have run show that we cannot reject the IIA assumption for nonuse.
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The probability of mode choice when every patent is forced to use will be different from
when nonuse is allowed. For example, if a bargaining failure view of strategic nonuse
(Merges, 1994) is valid, then adding or removing a choice for strategic nonuse will affect
more on licensing than other choices. This point is explicitly dealt with in Part III.
Another complexity of interpretation stems from the way we classify the modes of use.
We assign those patents in dual use (both internal and external use) to external use.
Theoretically, those dual-use patents should have characteristics of both internal and
external use and possibly make our interpretation more complex. However, at least
empirically, it seems that the characteristics of dual-use patents are more bound with the
characteristics of external use. We test the distinctiveness of dual use from purely
external use using multinomial logit regression and cannot reject the null hypothesis that
they are the same in relations with our covariates (Chi2(23)=26.19, P>chi2=0.292). Also,
according to some studies, in the situation where IIA is violated, a well-specified
multinomial logistic model is comparable in sign and significance of coefficients with
nested or mixed logistic models (Cushing and Cushing, 2007; Train, 2003). Indeed, our
main estimation, binary probit regression in the restricted sample, does not show a
notable discrepancy from the multinomial logistic regression. Therefore, we conclude
that, despite some theoretical concerns, taking the binary probit specifications in the
restricted sample as the main results is acceptable.

Our final specification, the Heckman selection model with selection of “any use” in the
first stage, addresses the selection bias problem. In the selection equation, we regressed
“any commercial use” on six variables: technology value of patents, collaboration, non-
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commercial purpose of R&D, number of inventors, age of invention, and component
familiarity. The selection probability term fed into the main equation (Heckman’s rho) is,
however, not significant. This indicates that, at least, we do not have significant bias in
analyzing modes of use due to the propensity of any commercial use. The empirical
validity of both the Heckman selection and multinomial logistic regression specifications,
in turn, indicates that simple binary probit regressions in the commercialization sample
would also be valid, and the estimates from all three specifications would be consistent to
each other. Indeed, the estimates from all the models are quite consistent. For simplicity’s
sake, we use binary probit regressions as our main models.

Before we conclude this section, let us briefly address another possible source of bias –
possible self-selection effects related to the missing values on some of the covariates.
Because the number of dropped observations is substantial, we examined the possibility
that the listwise deletion has to do with self-selection by running the Heckman probit
selection model with a dummy for complete cases as the dependent variable in the
selection equation. The self-selection effect is not significant as indicated by insignificant
correlations (Heckman’s rho) between error terms in the selection equation and error
terms in the outcome equation. Also, we ran the same models with missing values on
“technological value” replaced with its mean (=2.19) and dummy for missing added.49
While we have about 16% larger sample size for binary probit models (from N=1226 to
1415) through this way of missing value handling, we found no notable differences

49

We also tested different imputation methods. For example, we imputed predicted value estimated from
regression equation with “technological value” regressed on a set of value-predicting patent indicators.
Almost all predicted values, however, narrowly distributed around the sample mean and did not make much
difference from using simply mean.
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between dummy-adjusted models and the original ones. We also ran the models in the
imputed sample using bootstrap re-sampling methods. A basic idea is that, if there is a
significant bias due to missing values, then the coefficients and standard errors estimated
for the subsample will be different from the original one. We re-sampled 50 random
subsamples from the imputed sample (N=1415) and calculated bootstrap coefficients and
standard errors. The results are quite similar to the main results. Furthermore, we found
no significant difference in the means of our dependent variables between the full set
(N=1807) and the uncensored subset (N=1226). The only significant difference of means
of independent variables between two groups is found for collaboration diversity.
However, even if listwise deletions are not totally random to some extent, this does not
indicate that we will have biased estimates for the following reasons: First, our sample is
not censored by the characteristics of the dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2002).
Second, the signs and significance of the coefficients in binary probit models are almost
identical with them in probit selection model (not reported). This tells us that a bias that
may stem from omitting the selection correction term is ignorable. Therefore, using
binary probit analysis for the complete cases is appropriate.

9.3. Breakdown of External Commercialization

External commercialization paths in our estimation indeed enclose several different uses
of patents: licensing, cross-licensing, and using patents for starting a new firm. To further
examine diverging effects of our key independent variables on different paths of external
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commercialization, we estimated two additional models. First, to examine the difference
between licensing and “new firm,” we estimated a multinomial logistic model with four
outcome levels: nonuse, internal commercialization, licensing (including cross-licensing),
and use for a new firm. We use internal commercialization as the reference category.
Second, to clarify diverging effects between cross-licensing and unilateral licensing, we
estimated probit selection model with all kinds of licensing as a selection variable and
cross-licensing as the dependent variable in the main equation. Because of the small
number of observations for cross-licensing (N=40), we estimated the main equation only
with several significant variables. As indicated by strongly significant Heckman’s rho,
independent estimation of cross-licensing propensity without conditioned on the licensing
propensity may be biased. The results are presented in Table 9.2. Both models passed key
specification tests and show acceptable goodness-of-fit statistics (p<0.0001 for
multinomial logistic regressions and p<0.0005 for Heckman probit).50

The estimates for licensing propensity are largely similar with the main results. The signs
of main independent variables are maintained. However, competence-destroying
invention and component familiarity are not significantly associated with licensing. A
competence-destroying invention is likely to be commercialized externally but
particularly via establishment of a new firm rather than licensing. This observation
supports Schumpeter’s notion of “creative destruction” and is consistent with Anderson
and Tushman’s (1986) observation on the tendency of small and new firms to conduct
competence-destroying innovation. One possible reason for no significant impact of
50

Some runs of Small-Hsiao tests indicate that IIA assumption does not always hold for the multinomial
logistic regressions. However, as we discussed in the previous section, this does not indicate that the
estimation is significantly biased in the signs and significance of regression coefficients.
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competence-destroying invention on the propensity to license is because it may have a
negative impact on cross-licensing. Patents offered for cross-licensing agreement are
generally used to obtain access to others’ technologies in complex industries (Grindley
and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). They may not involve as much know-how
transfer as in unilateral licensing and tend to occur between symmetric firms (Nagaoka
and Kwon, 2006). Therefore, patents offered for cross-licensing may be related to the
existing competences shared by similar firms. Indeed, the Heckman selection estimation
shows a negative sign on competence-destroying invention, although not significant.
Another reason is related to a measurement error. In the question asking whether the
invention project targets a new or improved product or process, the survey did not
explicitly state whether it is with regard to the firm or to the industry. If the respondent
answered the question with regard to the industry, then the competence-destroying
invention has no advantage for licensing or cross-licensing as well as for internal
commercialization.

Component familiarity is not significantly associated, albeit marginally so (zstatistic=1.49), with new firm formation (column 3). However, the coefficient is positive.
This is inconsistent with what Shane (2001) found for the propensity to license university
patents to start-ups. He argued that start-ups based on university patents should be more
likely to form in the nascent technologies because of no disadvantage of start-ups
(relative to the incumbents) in market power, learning curve, scale economy of
production, and complementary assets in new technologies. However, consider the
following counter arguments. In mature technology, demands for the technology are

164

well-established, and there will be larger small opportunities, which can be covered by
niche players. Large incumbents having a profit model from a large production facility
will not properly cope with these niche areas. Also, in mature technology, innovation
labor will be more widely distributed and, therefore, procuring complementary assets
required for commercialization from the markets will be easier. These counter arguments
refute Shane’s claims that immature technology is more attractive to start-ups. However,
more importantly, there may be some fundamentally different mechanisms working
between science-based start-ups and corporate spin-offs. In addition, as we argued in
Hypothesis M1, lower transaction costs (both in the market for technology and in the
financial market) in mature technology favor corporate spin-offs. Deeper analysis on this
aspect will be an interesting topic for future research.

Turning to the licensing propensity, component familiarity shows insignificant
association with the licensing propensity (columns 2 and 5). Actually, the effects of
component familiarity on external commercialization are concentrated on cross-licensing
as indicated by a significant and positive coefficient in the Heckman probit estimation
(column 4). Increase of technological familiarity is likely to increase the propensity of
cross-licensing relative to the propensity of unilateral licensing. Component familiarity
has indirect effects on the licensing propensity via public knowledge and collaboration
with public organizations. When we estimated the model without these two variables, the
significance of the coefficient on component familiarity was enhanced (but still
marginally insignificant). In another estimation limited to the sample composed of
commercial use, the coefficient on component familiarity is significantly and positively
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associated with the licensing propensity. On the other hand, exploitation of public
knowledge and collaboration with public organizations during the invention process may
have some spurious effects related to technological uncertainty. Provided that knowledge
exchange is reciprocal, collaboration during the invention process may have generated
some outward spillovers. This effect will be greater for collaboration with public
organization given that they are more dominated by open science norms. Also,
knowledge in the public domain is generally available for anybody. Therefore, invention
that had incorporated more public knowledge may be better understood by others and be
less uncertain in technology prospect.

One interesting finding is that public knowledge has particularly strong positive impacts
on formation of patent-based spin-off. Note that we excluded from the sample
independent start-ups and spin-offs/start-ups from academic or public organizations. In
the literature, it is known that public knowledge plays an important role for academic or
independent start-ups (Zucker and Darby, 1996; Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong, 2002).
Our finding indicates that public knowledge will also be important for corporate spin-offs.
On the other hand, whereas patents offered for unilateral licensing are likely to have
utilized more public knowledge (as predicted in Hypothesis M4b), patents offered for
cross-licensing are less likely to have utilized public knowledge than unilateral licensing.
This discrepancy indicates that open innovation and institutional approach, besides
transaction costs, are indeed importants factor affecting the innovation.
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As we argued in Hypothesis M3b, horizontal collaboration has indeed particularly strong
impact on cross-licensing (relative to unilateral licensing as well as an internal path of
commercialization). Finally, we added a new variable, “complexity of product
technology,” in the cross-licensing estimation. This measure is constructed from the
survey question asking how many patents are combined to produce a target product.
Consistent with the previous observation (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001), our estimate shows cross-licensing is more likely to occur in complex
products relative to unilateral licensing.
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Table 9.2 Results of regressions for further examination of external
commercialization paths
Multinomial logit (reference=internal)

Inventor in
manufacturing unit
Competence-destroying
invention
Component familiarity
(/1000)

Nonuse
-0.694***
(0.254)
0.245*
(0.137)
-0.372
(0.440)

Licensing
-1.701***
(0.628)
0.309
(0.231)
0.528
(0.491)

New firm
0.510
(0.473)
0.655*
(0.386)
0.991
(0.666)

-1.994***
(0.425)
2.167***
(0.421)
-0.415**
(0.174)
-0.074
(0.299)
0.035
(0.309)
-0.465*
(0.258)
0.108***
(0.031)
-0.442***
(0.067)
0.339**
(0.163)
1.105**
(0.452)
-0.250*
(0.137)
-0.167
(0.319)
-0.083**
(0.037)
0.023
(0.019)
0.005
(0.005)

-1.531**
(0.667)
1.423**
(0.675)
-0.421
(0.278)
1.105***
(0.351)
0.335
(0.414)
-1.145***
(0.381)
0.047
(0.053)
0.111
(0.116)
-0.278
(0.285)
0.748
(0.742)
-0.383*
(0.218)
0.364
(0.464)
-0.110
(0.068)
-0.034
(0.035)
0.001
(0.006)

-1.050
(0.963)
3.421***
(0.760)
0.103
(0.408)
-0.093
(0.639)
-1.027
(0.672)
-1.581***
(0.442)
-0.058
(0.073)
0.260
(0.180)
-0.072
(0.403)
-1.041
(1.156)
0.288
(0.341)
-0.864
(0.742)
0.035
(0.094)
0.049
(0.035)
0.016**
(0.008)

Complexity of product
technology
Industrial knowledge
Public knowledge
Collaboration - vertical
Collaboration horizontal
Collaboration - public
Large firm (employees
>500)
Ln(patent stock)
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D (/100)
Product invention
Man-month
(normalized)
Number of inventors
Complexity of
technology (# USPC)
Number of claims
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Heckman probit
crossSelection
licensing
(licensing)
-0.542*
(0.289)
-0.157
0.103
(0.211)
(0.108)
1.203**
0.279
(0.475)
(0.255)
0.010*
(0.005)
-0.349
(0.301)
-1.192**
0.077
(0.595)
(0.307)
-0.120
(0.125)
1.284***
0.613***
(0.301)
(0.182)
0.206
(0.190)
-0.414**
(0.174)
-0.009
(0.024)
0.153***
(0.051)
-0.207
(0.130)
0.241
(0.305)
-0.176*
(0.097)
0.703
0.273
(0.447)
(0.229)
-0.032
(0.029)
-0.023
(0.016)
0.000
(0.003)

Table 9.2 (continued)
Age of invention
(months)
Electrical engineering
Chemistry,
pharmaceuticals
Process eng, special
equipment
Mechanical eng,
machinery
Consumer goods &
Construction
Constant

-0.006
(0.005)
-0.363*
(0.199)
-0.058
(0.213)
-0.100
(0.243)
-0.311
(0.230)
-0.503
(0.484)
1.617***
(0.520)

0.012
(0.010)
0.143
(0.315)
0.084
(0.345)
0.186
(0.386)
-0.551
(0.431)
0.190
(0.616)
-1.403
(0.906)

Heckman's Rho
(Arctanh-transformed)
N (censored N)
Log Likelihood
Wald chi2
Pseudo R2

1226
-1154.73
309.24
0.125

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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-0.005
(0.015)
-0.687
(0.448)
-0.255
(0.461)
-0.107
(0.531)
-2.406**
(1.070)
-0.643
(0.910)
-2.727**
(1.240)

0.006
(0.004)
0.146
(0.145)
0.037
(0.159)
0.063
(0.181)
-0.196
(0.197)
-0.012
(0.298)
-1.501***
(0.420)

-2.089***
(0.313)
1.120***
(0.426)
1226 (1104)
-417.01
27.41
.

CHAPTER 10. Conclusion to Part II

This study examined the impacts of technological uncertainty, strong internal
complementary assets position, characteristics of knowledge search, and collaboration on
the organizational path of commercialization. Departing from Teece’s framework on the
profitability of innovation, we synthesized various theories to explain why firms choose
different organizational paths in the downstream commercialization process. We found
that technological uncertainty suppresses external paths of commercialization. The main
argument of this hypothesis builds on TCE but also incorporates the evolutionary
explanation of technological development. Stage of technological development,
technological uncertainty, and profitability of innovation are interrelated with each other.

As Teece argued and many following studies showed, strong internal position for the
complementary assets have a strong positive impact on the internal commercialization
paths. Also, as Tushman and Anderson argued, we found that there was a strong
organizational inertia for a firm to tend to keep doing what it had been doing. This
implies that firms’ innovation activities would have a strong path dependency and,
therefore, may well fall into the competence trap (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and
March, 1988). This finding contributes to the Teecian framework of profitability of
innovation and arguments of markets for technology by providing a direct test of the
effects of co-specialized complementary assets on a choice of commercialization paths.
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Also, in explaining the relationship between strong coupling with internal complementary
assets and vertical integration of downstream commercialization processes, we enriched
the discourse by synthesizing theoretical implications from TCE and KBV of a firm. One
avenue of future research will be looking at how the effects of co-specialized assets on
commercialization paths are moderated by the characteristics of technology (e.g., general
purpose v. specialized) or by the stage of the technology development cycle. Our
conjecture is that the impact of co-specialized assets on the choice of commercialization
paths will be weaker for general-purpose invention or in mature technology.

Further departing from Teece, we argue that openness of innovation processes and
network relationship should affect the choice of commercialization path. Consistent with
our hypothesis, empirical results show that external knowledge from industrial nature
increases the propensity of internal commercialization. Industrial knowledge tends to
focus more on specific industrial problems and require for more hands-on knowledge
typically acquired from field experience. These characteristics of industrial knowledge
would make coherent authoritative controls more efficient than distributed controls across
firm boundaries. As hinted by KBV, internal synergy of this type of technology is
expected to be higher. Detailed examination of external paths of commercialization
revealed some interesting aspects of public knowledge. External public knowledge has a
positive impact on licensing, particularly strong impact on formation of patent-based
corporate spin-offs, and either weaker or even negative impact on cross-licensing.
Furthermore, proceeding one step further from the open innovation arguments, it shows
that the nature of external knowledge should be taken into consideration in studying
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innovation. The previous empirical studies focused on how broadly or deeply firms
sourced external knowledge and how they affected intermediate output of innovation
process or firm performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). In doing
so, they did not turn their attentions to the qualitative differences of sourced knowledge.
Other studies examined a limited number of leading firms to show how they had
successfully utilized some types of external knowledge for innovation (Dyer and
Nobeoka, 2000; von Hippel, 1988). This study attempts to overcome the weaknesses of
both studies by examining the impact of different types of external knowledge in a largescale, cross-industry sample. Furthermore, it reveals that not only the different nature of
external knowledge has a different impact on innovation but also it would be bound with
a different commercialization strategy. While external industrial knowledge is conducive
to internal commercialization, external public knowledge spawns external
commercialization. Or, the other way around, firms that chose an internal integration
strategy would have sought more industrial knowledge, while firms that chose to provide
their inventions to external parties for commercialization might have relied more on
public knowledge. Certainly, the analysis leaves more questions to be answered.
Although we tried to justify distinctiveness between external industrial and public
knowledge in the context of mode of commercialization both theoretically and
empirically, it still leaves ambiguity in concepts and measurement. First, it overlaps with
a basic-applied distinction. We argued that they were different because external public
sources can deliver an applied type of knowledge, and external industrial sources can
deliver a basic type of knowledge. We also controlled for the basicness of an R&D
project. We suggested—separate from a basic-applied nature—technological fitness,
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learning-curve effects, and inclusion of organizational routines as some discriminating
characteristics of this distinction. However, they need to be better articulated in the
practical context. Second, external public knowledge is confounded with the maturity of
the field of technology, as we discussed in Part II. This also contributes to the ambiguity.
In summary, further research on the characteristics, drivers, and impact of the different
types of knowledge is required.

Collaboration has diverging effects on the choice of commercialization paths, depending
on the characteristics of collaborating partners. While collaboration with firms in a
vertical relationship tends to favor internal paths, collaboration with firms in a horizontal
relationship tends to favor external paths. In particular, horizontal collaboration is
strongly associated with licensing (both unilateral and cross-licensing). This finding
shows that collaborative networks, net of knowledge flows, influence the organizational
trajectory of commercialization. Furthermore, it shows that relative position of the
innovator in the network is indeed an important predictor of the trajectory. By the relative
position in the network, we do not mean the structural or topological relations that many
studies of networks focus on (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004), but the relative positions
in a value chain or in competitive relations in the product markets. Previous studies
argued why particular ties affect the firm or innovation performance (Afuah, 2000; Dyer
and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). This study contributes to the
field by arguing and showing that firms utilize different types of networks for different
innovation strategies. As a novel contribution, it shows that perspectives on collaborative
networks have unique explanatory powers in the region that TCE cannot address. Where
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technological uncertainty is high, collaboration has a stronger impact on the choice of the
organizational path of the downstream process of innovation. This finding empirically
corroborates Granovetter and Powell’s (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990) arguments that
economic theories alone are incomplete in explaining social behavior so that network
perspectives can complement them.
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PART III. STRATEGIC NONUSE OF PATENTS
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CHAPTER 11. Introduction to Part III

Betraying the original design goals of the patent systems, some patents add friction to
innovation systems. For example, some patents heighten an entry barrier into a product
market, undermine a rival’s competitiveness, or increase the transaction costs of
technology. As technology has become more critical in the competitiveness of
contemporary firms (Baumol, 2002; Jaffe, 2000) and the filings of patents have exploded
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Shapiro, 2000; van Zeebroeck et al., 2008), firms have been
more attracted to using patents for these purposes (Blind et al., 2006; Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh, 2000; Shapiro, 2000). Using patents to enhance strategic advantage in the
competitive landscape is not a recent phenomenon at all.51 However, a wider diffusion
and heightening stack of them during recent years has raised fundamental concerns about
whether the current patent system is working as it was designed (Shapiro, 2000).
Especially pertinent to these woes are patents that generate economic value by preventing
others from using the patented technology while being neither integrated into a
commercial application nor licensed to others. We call this class of patents “strategic
nonuse patents.” Strategic nonuse patents are distinct from commercially exploited
patents in that they are not used for commercial products or processes. They are also
51

A classic example is the “Fleming valve” patent issued in 1905, which stalemated development of radio
communication technology (Marconi Wireless & Tel. Co. v. De Forest Radio Tel & Tel. Co., 236 F. 942
(S.D.N.Y. 1916)). Other historical cases are nicely described in the following legal literature: (Merges,
1994; Saunders, 2002; Turner, 1998).
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distinct from plain nonuse patents (or sleeping patents)52 in that they generate strategic
benefits. While this class of patents benefits an individual firm that owns them with a
strategic advantage in the competitive landscape, it may undermine competitiveness of an
economy as a whole and the potential for scientific and technological progress (Heller
and Eisenberg, 1998; Saunders, 2002).

Strategic nonuse patents may have significant negative effects on resource allocation and
on the innovative capabilities of a society. A patent system was put in place to “promote
the progress of science and useful arts” (U.S. Constitution, art. I, sec. 8), basically by two
mechanisms: first, incentivizing investment in R&D and, second, enforcing disclosure of
the resultant technical arts to the public. A core instrument that enables these mechanisms
is the property rights awarded to inventions and temporary exclusivity legally allowed
over using, making, and selling the inventions. Using these legal instruments, the
inventors would be able to exclude others from the product market based on the patented
technology and, resultantly, appropriate their investment on R&D and the follow-up
commercialization. On the other hand, because of the monopoly, society may suffer, at
least temporarily, from a suboptimal level of the supply of goods and inefficient
allocation of resources, both in R&D and in production. A society is willing to tolerate
the potential loss of social efficiency inevitably accompanying the temporary monopoly
only because it expects a larger amount of rewards (beyond just countervailing the loss)
in the following forms: increased level of investment in R&D, introduction of innovative
products, and spillover of useful knowledge. Strategic nonuse patents are often criticized

52

This class of nonuse patents is conceptually equivalent to a “sleeping patent” (Gilbert and Newbery,
1982) or “paper patent.”

177

as causing excessive duplicate investment in R&D, blocking introduction of an
innovative product, slowing down innovation, and incurring unnecessary costs for
managing patents and, therefore, seem to violate the “good-will” bolstering the patent
system (Merges, 1994; Turner, 1998). However, they are lawful (Merges, 1994; Turner,
1998) and increasingly exploited by contemporary firms (Sheehan, Martinez, and Guellec,
2003).53 Studying strategic nonuse patents will be of crucial importance for
understanding innovation as well as patent system reform.

A number of legal studies have investigated historic cases of strategic nonuse patents.
Also, some economic studies have theoretically discussed social welfare aspects, anticompetitiveness effects, and the effects of the presence of strategic nonuse patents on the
patent system. However, there are only a limited number of empirical studies, most of
which, except Blind et al, are at the industry or firm level (Blind et al., 2006; Ceccagnoli,
2009; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Reitzig, 2004; Ziedonis, 2004). Using
information from the U.S. inventors survey, this study reveals an empirical reality of the
motives for patenting and reasons for patent nonuse at the patent level. Then it tests the
discriminating effects of firm and technology characteristics on the propensity of
strategic nonuse patents. In particular, this study tests how the size of upstream and
downstream assets of a firm affects the propensity of patents being used for strategic

53

According to some surveys (Giuri et al., 2007; Sanders, Rossman, and Harris, 1958), about 30% to 40%
of the issued patents are reportedly not used. Sanders et al. (1958) report 42% of the surveyed U.S. patents
are not used. After surveying European inventors, Giuri et al. (2007) report that about 36% of European
patents are not used. One survey reports that about a half of nonuse patents are strategic nonuse patents
(Giuri et al., 2007). Regardless of a patent’s being actually used or not, strategic motives of patenting have
grown significantly recently (Blind et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2002; Harabi, 1995; Sheehan, Martinez, and
Guellec, 2003).
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defensive purposes. It also tests the effects of technological uncertainty and maturity on
the strategic nonuse.
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CHAPTER 12. Analytic Framework

Patent nonuses can be broken down into two classes: strategic nonuse and other nonuse.
Some patented inventions that are not integrated into products or sold in the market for
technology may generate strategic rents. In discrete industry, where products are built on
a relatively small number of technologies, development of substitutable technology by
competitors will be a big threat to the owner of the original technology. For example, in
the pharmaceutical or polymer industries, profits from a particular chemical material of a
certain effect will not accrue to the original inventor if he fails to prevent alternative
methods of synthesis that lead to a material of the same effect. In this industry, the
original inventor often files for “fence” patents to prevent competitors from inventingaround the technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). In complex industries, where
a large number of technologies is integrated into a final product, such as electronics or
semiconductors, patents are often filed to block competitors from further developing the
downstream complementary technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Some
patents, especially those filed by semiconductor firms, are included in a broader patent
portfolio to ensure freedom-to-operate (Grindley and Teece, 1997) and, sometimes, used
as a bargaining chip to enhance the position of negotiation in cross-licensing deals (Hall
and Ziedonis, 2001). Either fence or blocking would not generate financial benefits
directly from the patented technology but generate strategic benefits in the form of
stronger protection of core technologies or raising competitors’ innovation costs. Some
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blocking patents are used strategically for improving position in negotiation of future
cross-licensing deals (called “bargaining chips” or “player strategy”). So we distinguish
this class of patents that generate strategic value from other nonuse patents. Certainly,
some non-strategic nonuse patents will generate some protective value. We focus on a
certain class of nonuse patents that generate strategic value on top of conventional
protective values.
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Table 12.1 Values/benefits accruing to the inventor organization by the modes of use
Values/benefits accruing to the inventor organization
Mode of
uses
Direct
Indirect/strategic
Internal use
Integration
Enhanced product
Enhanced absorptive capacity
into own
competitiveness
product/
process
Reduced manufacturing cost
External use
Licensing
Licensing revenue
Increased competition in the product
(unilateral)
market (-)
CrossSaved costs in not negotiating
“freedom of operation”
licensing
individual license agreements

Player
strategy

Fencing

Blocking

Sleeping

Access to others’ technology
Strategic use
Enhanced position in
“freedom of operation”
negotiation for cross-licensing
deal
Strategic nonuse
NA
Securing the rent from the core
inventions (which is related to but not
covered by the focal patent)
Heightening entry barriers to a certain
product market
Increasing competitors’ innovation
costs

NA

NA

Preventing competitors from further
innovation
Other nonuse
Option value
Reducing litigation risk

Non-practicing strategic patents are often cited as an example of how patents are abused
to slow down innovation. The critics say that the threat of litigation and compensatory
awards causes licensing royalties to inflate (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007) and moves firms
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to build a protective web of patents to reduce the litigation risks. Also, keeping a large
number of patents (especially not practiced patents) creates a huge amount of
maintenance costs for a firm. Therefore, many large firms in complex industries support a
policy measure to reduce non-practicing strategic patents.54 This can be called a “prouser” perspective of patents. On the other hand, if not classified as “misuse” (for the
definition and cases of patent misuse, see Hoerner, 1984; Saunders, 2002), non-practicing
strategic patents are legitimate. Moreover, they work as an incentive to investing in R&D.
In particular, for small firms or start-ups having technology but lacking manufacturing
facilities, fencing their core technology using non-practicing patents or blocking
competitors from entering into the same technology markets are sometimes the only
means by which they can appropriate from investing in R&D. This can be called a “proholder” view of patents. This study does not aim to assess whether non-practicing
strategic patents are anti- or pro-innovative but aims to identify which characteristics of
technology, organization, and invention affect them.

12.1. Hypotheses Development

Strategic nonuse patents are a class of patents that are not commercially exploited but
generate strategic rents to the owner of patents by blocking competitor’s technological
advances or protecting the owners’ existing assets. This class of patents covers both
“offensive blockade,” or thicket builder, and “defensive blockade,” or fence builder.

54

See, for example, amicus curiae filed by Cisco or IBM in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. et al.
case (Supreme Court 04-1350). Also, see the public comments on the “Hearings on the Evolving
Intellectual Property (IP) Marketplace” hosted by the Federal Trade Commission.
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Some existing studies distinguish thicket and fence, but in this study we focus on their
common characteristics: a defensive or protective role without commercial application.

12.1.1. Size of upstream and downstream assets to protect

From the interviews with managers in the semiconductor industry, Hall and Ziedonis
(2001) found that firms with large sunk costs in manufacturing facilities had large
incentives to use patents for a safeguard against the threat of costly litigation as well as
“bargaining chips” in licensing negotiation. They further showed that the patent
propensity indeed increased with the capital intensity. Although they did not show how
many of these patents are particularly intended for strategic nonuse, they claimed, based
on the interviews, that the increased level of patenting would be somehow related to
strategic nonuse. As seen in the patent infringement lawsuit by Polaroid against Kodak,
patent infringement sometimes causes the shutdown of an expensive production facility
implemented with the infringed technology. In order to prevent this significant loss, firms
will tend to avoid infringing others’ patents when they build a new production facility.
However, in some complex technology areas, it will be hard to identify before a court
decision which technology infringes on others’ patents. In this case, patents not used for
building their own facility but are related to potential litigators will be useful for
negotiation. On the other hand, when a production facility is crucial for a firm’s
competitive advantage and a certain technology is essential for building this facility, the
firm will have a large incentive to hinder competitors from building a similar level of
production facility by filing for blocking or fencing patents.
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In order to identify this relationship empirically, however, we have to look at the
comparative aspects of patent uses. In other words, how do the large sunk costs in
production facilities affect the propensity of other uses? For internal integration, the
larger the sunk costs, the lower the propensity to integrate an individual patented
technology into the existing facility because of two reasons: first, firms with higher
capital intensity will generally have other options to appropriate the innovation and
maintain competitive advantage than patents. First-mover advantage, scale economy of
production, and secrecy of production technology all play a role (Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). Second, upgrading the facility requires implementation
costs. Also, organizational costs to write a new manual, to train workers, and to optimize
the process will accrue in the upgraded facility. Therefore, upgrading the existing facility
with an incrementally improved technology will be progressively less beneficial as the
size of the facility (and the cost for upgrading) increases. Also, the larger the capital
intensity, the smaller the incentive to license out the relevant technology will be. While
the potential harm to the expensive facility due to knowledge leakage accompanying the
license will increase, this risk factor may not be easily justified ex ante in the licensing
agreement. The above arguments lead to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a. As capital intensity of a firm increases, the propensity of strategic nonuse
of its patents will also increase.
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A similar argument is applied to upstream technology assets. For contemporary firms in
technology-intensive sectors, intangible assets, especially technology assets, are
important resources to protect. Some technologies constitute an essential foundation for
key products and processes, and some other technologies create direct rents by being
traded in the market for technology. Sometimes in the complex technology industries, a
single technology will not be enough to secure the rents from a product that can be made
only through the combination of multiple technologies. In this case, a firm having a core
technology will need a set of other technologies that are complementary to the core
technology to fully leverage the power of the core technology. In discrete technology
industries, the utility of a core technology will not be secured without having commands
over the substitute technologies (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). Therefore, firms
having a large portfolio of technology assets will have large incentives to protect it by
filing for strategic nonuse patents.

Hypothesis 1b. As the size of technological assets of a firm increases, the propensity of
strategic nonuse of its patents will also increase.

12.1.2. Bargaining failure and emergence of a dominant design

Merges (1994) views the existence of blocking patents as a result of bargaining failure
between innovators and radical improvers. When both the patentee and the infringer see
mutual benefits from a bargain over the right to use the patent, they will reach one.
Otherwise, they will face a risk of injunction or a forced bargain on top of costly
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litigation fees. Then when do the patentee and potential infringer fail in bargaining? TCE
points out transactional uncertainty as a main reason (Williamson, 1981). In the market
for technology, major uncertainty stems from an asymmetric view on the prospect and
value of technology (Arrow, 1969; Oxley, 1997). Because a single patent document
cannot carry all the information required for a potential buyer to assess the value of the
technology, it plays a crucial role in bargaining success for both parties to share a
common understanding on the technology. This common understanding can be acquired
through individual efforts (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) but also depends on a stage of
technology evolution.

Technological development follows a pattern characterized by a sporadic discontinuity
and following incremental innovation. Dosi (1982) characterized it as a paradigmatic and
normal stage. Abernathy and Clark (1985) and Henderson and Clark (1990) distinguished
“architectural innovation” from “incremental innovation.” Anderson and Tushman (1990;
1986) take a similar view by distinguishing “technological discontinuities” from
incremental innovation. Despite different language and subtle differences among them,
there are some common observations across these theories. First, in the phase of
technological discontinuities, the value and real impact of innovative technology are
hardly foreseeable to the existing firms. Therefore, technological uncertainty is prominent
for this type of innovation. This discontinuous technology sometimes creates a new field
of technology. Second, after this discontinuous technological innovation acquires a
paradigmatic status, lots of incremental innovation follows and populates the field of
technology. Technological knowledge in this phase, then, is well-diffused among the
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participants and, therefore, the value and utility of incremental innovation become quite
well-grounded on the common prospectus. This leads to the following conclusion: as a
particular technology becomes more familiar to the players of the technology,
technological uncertainty will decrease and, therefore, the odds of bargaining failure will
decrease. In summary, we will see a lower propensity of strategic nonuse patents and a
higher propensity of licensing as technological familiarity increases.

Besides the transactional point of view, as a dominant design paradigm emerges, a rent
that can be generated from a new incremental design will decrease. Competitive
advantage will shift to the capacity of mass production and cost efficiency from a design
initiative (Teece, 1986). This argument is in line with Schumpeter’s description of the
“creative destruction” process or Utterback’s description of the emergence of a dominant
design (Schumpeter, 1942; Utterback, 1994). Also, while wide diffusion of technological
knowledge makes competitors’ inventing-around easier and a claimable portion of the
patent lower (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2000) (and, therefore, reducing the
effectiveness of the protective role of a patent), it will lower the costs for integrating the
technology in the existing facility. Therefore, strategic nonuse will also be less attractive
than internal integration. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. As technological familiarity of a patented invention increases, its
propensity of strategic nonuse will decrease.
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CHAPTER 13. Survey Results

In this chapter, we provide explorative, bivariate analyses of the survey about reasons for
patenting and reasons for actual nonuse. The main purpose of this chapter is to present
the status of strategic nonuse of patents that the newly conducted survey reveals. So the
chapter is not structured to center on the hypotheses we formulated above. Testing
hypotheses will be a main focus of the next chapter, where we show the results from
multivariate analyses.

The survey asks two questions regarding strategic nonuse of patents. One question asks
about intentions of using the patent at the time of the invention. The other question asks
about the reasons the patent was not used.

13.1. Reasons for Patenting

The GT/RIETI survey asks why inventors filed for a patent. In particular, the survey asks,
in five-point Likert scale with 1 for “not important” and 5 for “very important,” how
important the following eight reasons were for their patenting: commercial exploitation,
licensing, cross-licensing (improving bargaining positions in negotiation), pure defense,
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blocking others, preventing inventing-around other key patents, inventor reputation, and
firm’s reputation.

In addition, we divide blocking patents into two mutually exclusive classes: “player
strategy” and “fence strategy.” Cohen et. al. (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh, 2000) and others (Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001) found that
some blocking patents were used as a bargaining chip in cross-licensing deals. This class
of patents, named “player patents” by Cohen et. al., is appropriated in a different way
from those patents integrated into commercial products or processes. While the latter
generates revenues from product markets or technology markets (e.g., by licensing the
patents), the former generates strategic rents for the owner to better access to other’s
technology or secure the freedom of operation.55 Following Cohen et. al., we define a
player strategy as having dual purposes of both cross-licensing and blocking (but in a
broad sense, so as to include survey answers for “pure defense,” “blocking others,” and
“prevention”).

We interpret “blocking patents” broadly to include both offensive and defensive blockade
(Blind et al., 2006). In our survey, we have three “blocking” questions: 1) pure defense
(to ensure that the use of your own technology not be blocked by others), 2) blocking
patents (preventing others from patenting similar inventions, complements, or substitutes),
and 3) preventing inventing-around other key patents of your firm. More precisely,
55

See an example provided in Rivette and Kline (2000) about how S3, a small graphic chip maker,
leveraged its position in a cross-licensing deal with Intel by holding up Intel’s developing next-generation
processor using the patents acquired from a bankrupt chip maker, Exponential Technologies. Thanks to the
resultant cross-licensing, S3 secured the freedom to develop its high-performance graphic chip beyond a
siege of Intel’s patents.
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“blocking patents” in our survey was meant to ask about offensive blockade and “pure
defense” and “preventing inventing-around” about a defensive blockade. Initially, we
impose a slightly different nuance on each of three questions. For example, “pure
defense” aims to prevent others from degrading the patentee’s innovation that may stem
from the patented technology. “Blocking patents” aims to prevent others from innovating
further based on the patented technology. “Preventing invention-around” aims to prevent
others from degrading profitability of the patentee’s other technology but related to the
patented technology. These different nuances among three questions, however, seem to
be mixed in practice and not to make a difference to some respondents in our survey.
Indeed, scores of three variables are highly correlated to each other (Cronbach’s
alpha=0.74; tetrachoric correlations=0.53 between pure defense and prevention, 0.73
between pure defense and blocking, and 0.67 between blocking and prevention) and
reflect one common latent factor. Therefore, we use “blocking patents” in a broad sense
to include pure defense and prevention, while we used “blocking patents” narrowly in the
survey.

On the other hand, a “fence” patent is a subclass of blocking patents that are not intended
for licensing or bargaining chips. This class of patents benefits the owner in a different
way from the player patents in that it 1) prevents competitors from going ahead in the
innovation race,56 2) protects other core technologies owned by the firm from being

56

An exemplary case is “Fleming valve” patent by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph company which
refused to license the competitor, De Forest company, and blocked developing improvement technology.
(Marconi Wireless & Tel. Co. v. De Forest Radio Tel & Tel. Co., 236 F. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)). The stymie
in developing radio technology brought forth by fragmented patents was finally resolved by introduction of
a consortium, RCA. (Merges, 1994).
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invented-around,57 or 3) reduces future litigation risk (Lemley and Shapiro, 2005). This
class of patents is close to a “defensive blockade” in Blind et. al.’s (2006) usage.
Following Cohen et al. (2002), we define fence patents as those patents filed for blocking
purposes but neither for licensing nor for cross-licensing. Thus, fence patents and player
patents are mutually exclusive subsets of defensive patents.58

Figure 13.1 illustrates the proportion of “important” or “very important” for each reason
for patenting. Not surprisingly, commercial exploitation (82.3%) is the most important
reason to patent. Consistent with the findings from the Carnegie Mellon survey, blocking
is reported as one of the most important reasons for patenting. Offensive blocking
(46.2%) is the second highest and pure defense (44.9%) the third highest reason to patent
in the survey. Also, about one-fifth of the patents in the survey were filed to prevent
inventing-around. Overall, 71.6% (=1180/1647) of inventors in the sample reported that
at least one of the three blocking purposes were important or very important for their
patenting. As for the two external commercialization strategies, licensing and crosslicensing, about a quarter and about half (50.2%) of inventors in our sample, respectively,
reported them as important or very important reasons for patenting. For player strategy
and fence strategy, 17.1% and 35.6% of patents in the survey, respectively, were reported
as important or very important for patenting.

57

A famous case is a color proofing process technology invented by Roxy N. Fan, a scientist at Du Pont at
the time of invention, and subsequently patented to Du Pont. The Fan patent was not commercially
exploited by Du Pont but used for blocking out a competitor from the color proofing market in which Du
Pont’s competing technology, Cromalin process, took 90 percent of the share (E. I. du Pont Nemours & Co.
v. Polaroid Graphics Imaging, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (D. Del.). aff’d. 887 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir.
1989)) (Turner, 1998).
58
Note, however, that they are not mutually exhaustive because fence strategy is one more constraining
condition, licensing, than player strategy.
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Figure 13.1 Reasons for patenting
Note: fence and player strategies were constructed from a combination of multiple
reasons as described above

Patenting strategy varies significantly across sectors. Figure 13.2 shows the share of the
patents giving high importance to each reason within the sector. Again, commercial
exploitation is the most prominent reason for patenting. The second highest reason is
offensive blocking (in Chemistry, Process Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, and
Consumer Goods and Construction) or “pure defense” (in Electrical Engineering and
Instrument). Process Engineering (which includes chemical engineering, textiles, paper,
printing, food process, etc.) shows the highest share of blocking (54.3%) and preventive
reasons (28.4%) among six sectors. The most prominent differences among sectors occur
in cross-licensing. Consistent with the previous literature (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh,

193

2000; Grindley and Teece, 1997; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), Electrical Engineering
(39.7%) and Instruments (27.2%) show a higher share of cross-licensing while
Mechanical Engineering (10.7%) and Consumer Goods and Construction (2.5%) show a
very low rate. Also, player strategy shows a similar pattern with cross-licensing while
fence strategy shows an offset-like pattern with cross-licensing. This pattern is roughly
consistent with the results from the Carnegie Mellon survey, which observed that player
strategy was more prominent in complex industries (such as electronics, instruments, and
transportation equipment) than in discrete industries (such as food, textiles, drugs, and
metals) and that fence strategy was more prominent in discrete industries (Cohen et al.,
2002; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).
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Figure 13.2 Share of patents giving a high importance to the reasons of patenting by
industry

Next we examine the differences in motives for patenting by firm size and the complexity
of technology. The survey shows significant differences in the reasons for patenting by
the size of firms to which the respondent belonged at the time the invention was made. In
our survey, the share of inventors giving high importance to commercial exploitation,
licensing, and firm’s reputation is statistically significantly higher in small firms than
large firms. While almost 43% of the patents from small firms are filed for licensing,
only 27% of large-firm patents are filed for licensing. On the other hand, cross-licensing
is reported as an important reason for patenting more in large firms (27%) than in small
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firms (17%). A higher share of patents from large firms are for cross-licensing, player,
and fence strategies.

In order to examine whether the reasons for patenting differ by the characteristics of
technology, we break down the technological areas into 30 subgroups. The first four
columns of Table A. 8 in Appendix E characterize each technology in four dimensions:
complexity of technology, importance of complementary technology, importance of
patents, and importance of short lead-time. They are all constructed from the survey.
Complex technology areas are identified using the survey. The GT/RIETI survey asks the
inventors “how many domestic patents are jointly used in the commercial application of
the invention.” It provided eight categories: 1, 2 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 50, 51 to 100, 101 to
500, 501 to 1,000, and more than 1,000 patents. We averaged the median values over 30
subgroups of technologies and constructed a variable, “technological complexity.” Then a
dichotomous variable, “complexity of product technology,” is coded 1 if the
technological complexity of the subclass to which the focal patent belonged was higher
than the median value of technology complexity. The complex technologies classified in
this way include information technology, semiconductors, telecommunication, electronics,
biotechnology, and chemical engineering. The non-complex (or discrete) technologies
include textile, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and food, construction, and transportation
technologies.59 Complexity of technologies calculated in this way is roughly consistent
59

The other three variables are all constructed from the survey questions about the strength of
appropriability conditions. The GT/RIETI survey asks the inventors to rate, in a five-point Likert scale, the
importance of eight appropriability conditions for protecting a firm’s competitive advantage regarding
commercializing the invention. The importance of complementary technology is constructed from the
maximum value of two items: “[f]irst mover’s advantage in follow-up R&D (developing complementary
technologies and the patent portfolio)” and “[c]ollaboration with other firms having complementary
technologies.” The importance of patents and the importance of short lead-time are constructed from the

196

with a simple dichotomy based on the qualitative studies (Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen,
Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Kusunoki, Nonaka, and Nagata, 1998).

This characteristic of industry has discriminating effects on the patenting strategies as
indicated by statistically significant differences for almost all reasons of patenting in the
right pane of Table 13.1. Consistent with the findings of Cohen et al., player strategy is
adopted significantly more in complex technology areas, while fence strategy is adopted
more in discrete technology areas. This seems to stem from the prominence of crosslicensing in complex technology. Two of the three blocking purposes (pure defense and
prevention) show no significant differences by complexity of technology. Offensive
blocking is slightly more favored in discrete technology.

reported value of each corresponding item. Similar to the technology complexity variable, we then average
these values over 30 subgroups of technology and dichotomize them by industry median, respectively.
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Table 13.1 Share of patents giving a high importance to the reasons for patenting by
the size of firms and the complexity of technology

N
Commercial
exploitation
Blocking
(offensive)
Pure defense
Fence strategy
Firm's
reputation
Licensing
Cross-licensing
(negotiation)
Preventing
inventingaround other key
patents

Firm size
Small
&
Pearson
medium Large chi2(1)

Complexity of technology

N

Discrete Complex

Pearson
chi2(1)

1688

89.1

80.8

9.7***

1689

86.1

79.4

12.6***

1649
1655
1637

45.2
41.4
30.6

46.4
45.6
36.5

0.1
0.2
3.1*

1650
1656
1637

49.7
44.8
41.8

44.1
45.2
31.5

5.0**
0
18.3***

1663
1646

37.7
42.7

28.9
26.9

7.5*** 1664
24.9*** 1646

25.4
27.1

33.5
30.7

12.5***
2.4

1639

16.9

26.4

9.9***

1639

16.5

30.9

43.5***

1636

22.5

21.2

0.1

1637

22.5

20.8

0.7

Player strategy 1634
13.5
Inventor's
reputation
1647
14.7
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

18.1

3.0*

1634

12.0

21.2

23.0***

14.6

0

1648

12.0

16.7

6.7**

Above we show that profiles of patenting strategies vary by firm size and characteristics
of industry (i.e., technological complexity of products). In order to further understand
how the different profiles of patenting strategies between large and small (and medium)
firms vary by industry, we cross-tabulate the share of importance of each patenting
strategy by the size of firms and by complexity of product technology.
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Table 13.2 shows the relationship of three strategies (detail statistics are presented in
Table A. 9 of Appendix E). The table reads as follows: the share of patents filed because
of the importance of player strategy is larger for large firms than for small or medium
firms in complex technology. Licensing is unanimously favored by a larger share of small
and medium firms than large firms in all technologies. Fence and player strategies show
discrepancy by technology between large and small firms. Both fence and player
strategies are more adopted by large firms overall. However, the differences are
statistically significant in discrete technologies for the fence strategy and in complex
technologies for the player strategy. This observation is largely consistent with the
arguments that view the roles of patents as protecting the existing firm assets (Hall and
Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004). More interestingly, player strategy is more favored by
small firms in pharmaceutical, polymers, and biotechnology (although the difference is
not statistically significant for biotechnology due to small N). On the other hand, small
firms favor the fence strategy in electrical engineering technologies. This implies that,
separate from the “assets-at-risk” argument, there may be a fundamental discrepancy of
R&D and patenting strategy between small and large firms according to the
characteristics of industry.
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Table 13.2 Reasons to patent by firm size and by complexity of product technology
Discrete
Complex
Small & medium;
All
large
all
Pharm & Poly
all
Bio
EE
Licensing
>***
>***
>***
>
>
>***
Fence strategy
<*
<
<
<
>*
<*
Player strategy
>
>***
<***
>
<***
<*
Note: Pharm & Poly: Pharmaceuticals & Polymers; Bio: Biotechnology; EE:
Audio/Visual, IT, Telecom & Semiconductors
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In this section, we presented a similar finding by Cohen et al. (2002) that player and
fence strategies account for a substantial share of firms’ patenting, and they are, indeed,
subject to the complexity of product technology. In doing so, we applied an advanced
measure of the complexity of product technology. We presented novel findings that
patenting strategy differs by the size of firms. Moreover, the analysis shows that
patenting strategies from different sizes of firms are heterogeneous across industry. In
particular, diverging patenting strategies of firms according to their sizes are prominent
(and somewhat distinct in their effects from the rest) in chemical and pharmaceutical
industries.

13.2. Reasons for Nonuse
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In this section we present the results for the reasons a patent has not been commercially
exploited. In our survey, we asked for the nonuse patents reasons a patent has not been
used (Figure 13.3). Among 1,672 patents from firms that reported their modes of uses
and/or the reasons for nonuse, 769 patents (46.0%) were not used at the time of the
survey. A dominant share of firms were still exploring the commercial possibility (59.3%
of nonuse patents or 27.3% of all reported patents) or used internally as a research tool
(8.0%). However, our survey reveals that a significant share of nonuse patents was
strategically exploited for blocking, either offensively (15.2%) or defensively (10.3%).
Offensive and defensive blocking, together, account for 16.7% of patent usage. The other
reasons for nonuse include a family that fall into obsolete patents (technology or market
shift, downsized or failed line of business accounting for 18.9% together), a family
related to lack of sponsors to commercialize the technology (licensees or financiers
accounting for 5.2% together), or other technological problems (low technical level,
delay in developing complementary technologies, or lack of technologies for application,
accounting for 11.6% together).
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Figure 13.3 Reasons for nonuse (N=1672)

Among the various reasons for nonuse, we particularly focus on three families of reasons:
1) strategic nonuse family including “blocking other firms” and “preventing inventingaround, 2) obsolete patents family including technology or market shift, downsized or
failed line of business, and 3) non-sponsor patents family including “lack of capital for
starting a new firm” and “lack of interest from potential licensees.”60 The strategic
nonuse family refers to blocking patents, both offensive and defensive. The latter two
families refer to a proven failure of commercialization (obsolete patent family) and a

60

The results of an exploratory factor analysis based on tetrachoric correlations are consistent with this
grouping.
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potential institutional failure for commercialization (non-sponsor patents that failed to
recruit investors for commercialization).

The economic and technological values61 of strategic nonuse patents are lower than
commercially used patents but higher than obsolete patents (Table 13.3). However,
strategic nonuse patents are evaluated almost same level as non-sponsored nonuse patents.

Table 13.3 Value of nonuse patents
Economic value
Mean
Mode of (non)use
N
(percentile)
Any commercial use
748
60.02
Strategic nonuse
225
44.86
Strategic nonuse (broad) 337
46.09
Lack of sponsors
71
45.70
Obsolete patents
259
40.97
Total
1339
53.71

Technological value
Mean
N
(percentile)
757
65.49
236
52.49
359
53.50
76
53.03
276
49.54
1388
60.32

Table 13.4 shows the value (both economic and technological) of strategic nonuse patents
in the sample by firm size. In the sample, the value of strategic nonuse patents from large
firm are lower than those from small or medium firms.

61

In our survey, we ask the inventor to assess the technical significance and economic value of the
invention relative to other technical developments in the field during the year when the focal patent was
applied for. We used the midpoint of each category (top 10%; 25% (but not top 10%); top 50% (but not top
25%); and bottom half).
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Table 13.4 Value of strategic nonuse patents by firm size
Economic value
Technological value
Mean
Mean
Firm size
N
(percentile)
N
(percentile)
Small & medium
13
49.81
16
63.91
Large
212
44.55
220
51.66
Total
225
44.86
236
52.49

Next, we examine how the share of the three reasons is associated with a set of
characteristics at invention-, firm-, and technology-level. The criteria examined are firm
size, complexity of technology, the appropriability regime of patents, collaboration
(whether or not the invention involves any external collaborator), type of innovation
(product v. process), and inventor unit (whether the inventor belonged to a manufacturing
unit at the time of invention). The summary results are presented in Table 13.5.

While the share of strategic nonuse and obsolete patents is significantly higher in large
firms, the share of non-sponsor patents is higher in small firms. The previous chapters
show that large firms are more likely to use patents for commercial purposes, especially
via internally integrating them. The survey shows that large firms not only have larger
numbers of strategic nonuse patents but also filepatents for a larger number of proven
failed technologies. This finding implies two things. First, patent propensity may be
higher for large firms than for small firms. Large firms file for patents even such
technologies that have no immediate commercial uses or marginally superior
technologies. Second, particularly for obsolete patents, large firms may have broader
capabilities for which they can apply even marginally superior technologies.
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Next, the survey shows that there are more obsolete patents in complex technology than
in discrete technology. This may reflect the short life cycle of technology in complex
technology areas. Interestingly, collaborative inventions and inventions tightly coupled
with manufacturing processes are lower in the rate of failure. Recall that we showed that
the patents of these characteristics are also more likely to be commercialized (internally).
It seems that collaboration and tight coupling to manufacturing process in the invention
process will not only have positive effects on commercialization but also reduce negative
effects of failure.

Patent strength and the degree to which the invention is linked to the existing capabilities
(i.e., competence-destroying or enhancing) do not make obvious differences on any of
these reasons of nonuse. Other appropriability conditions (such as the importance of
complementary technology or the lead time advantage) do not make a significant
difference for these reasons, either.
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Table 13.5 Share of three types of nonuse patents by several characteristics
Strategic
Strategic
Lack of
nonuse
Obsolete
Criteria
Value of criteria
nonuse
capital or
patents
patents
patents
licensee
(broad)
Small and medium
7.6
14.9
12.1
10.0
Firm size
Large
18.3
27.3
20.5
4.2
(N=1672)
Chi-square
17.3***
17.4***
9.6***
14.9***
Complexity of
Discrete
17.6
25.9
15.7
3.7
product
Complex
16.1
25.2
21.6
6.0
technology
Chi-square
0.7
0.1
9.1***
4.5**
(N=1672)
Importance of
Low
14.8
24.2
17.8
5.9
patents for
Hi
18.3
26.6
20.4
4.5
appropriation
Chi-square
3.7*
1.2
1.7
1.6
(N=1670)
No
17.2
26.9
21.2
4.7
Collaboration
Yes
15.3
21.6
13.5
5.9
(N=1665)
Chi-square
0.8
4.7**
12.5***
1.0
CompetenceEnhancing
19.1
26.1
19.5
4.4
enhancing or
Destroying
14.8
24.9
19.1
5.6
destroying
Chi-square
5.2**
0.3
0.0
1.3
(N=1665)
Non-manufacturing
17.0
26.1
19.9
5.3
Inventor unit
Manufacturing
14.3
20.0
12.1
3.6
(N=1656)
Chi-square
0.7
2.5
4.9**
0.8
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER 14. Hypotheses Tests

14.1. Data
The estimation sample is based on the GT/RIETI survey and supplementary data sources
including PATSTAT, the USPTO database, and COMPUSTAT as described in Chapter 4.
Out of 1,919 valid responses, 1,807 cases are from firms. After deleting listwisely the
cases that have missing values on our covariates, we have 1,241 complete cases for
estimation.

14.2. Variables
This section introduces variables used for multivariate analysis.

14.2.1. Dependent variables
Our dependent variable, “strategic nonuse” is constructed using the GT/RIETI survey. A
binary variable, “strategic nonuse,” is coded 1 if the patent was used for “blocking other
firms” or “preventing inventing-around” and not used for any commercial purpose. We
also construct a second measure of strategic nonuse by fusing information on the reasons
for patenting with the reasons of actual nonuse. In the survey, some patents filed for
strategic purposes are reported to end up with some other uses. About a half of them
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reported to “still explore commercial opportunities.” They may indeed play a blocking or
fencing role while waiting for commercial applications. Therefore, we identified those
patents of high intention for strategic nonuse at the time of patenting additionally as
strategic nonuse patents. A broadly defined strategic nonuse is coded 1 if the original
variable is one or if nonuse is true and the reasons for patenting for blocking or
prevention are reported important or very important. The strategic nonuse is different
from fence or player strategies. Recall that player strategy is more than blocking. It is
designated to using patents to improve a position in (cross-)licensing negotiation.
Strategic nonuse as defined in this section excludes the patents used for licensing or
cross-licensing. It is actual nonuse targeted for blocking competitors or preventing other
core inventions owned by the holder of the strategic nonuse patents. Therefore, strategic
nonuse includes all fence patents but a part of player patents.

14.2.2. Explanatory variables
Capital intensity
Following Hall & Ziedonis (2001) and Ziedonis (2004), we measure capital intensity
using the deflated book value (constant U.S. dollars in 2000) of property, plant, and
equipment divided by number of employees. In order to mitigate yearly fluctuation and
reduce missing values, we use a three-year running average centered on the filed year of a
focal patent. Main data sources are COMPUSTAT North America–Fundamentals Annual
and COMPUSTAT Global–Fundamentals Annual.62 For a few firms, we directly find the
data from their web sites. In the sample, about a quarter of firms are either private or
62

We use consolidated financial reports. Therefore, many subsidiaries in our sample are regarded as a
parent company whose financial information is available.
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foreign whose financial information are not available in either the COMPUSTAT or
alternative sources mentioned above. They are coded as a dummy variable named
“dummy for missing capital intensity.”

Technological assets
We use patent stock as a proxy for technological assets of a firm. Patent stock is
calculated as the number of granted U.S. patents assigned to the first assignee in the focal
patent and filed before the filed year of the focal patent. Patent stock of firm i for a focal
patent filed in year t is:

PSit=PSi (t-1)(1-d)

where d represents the constant depreciation of knowledge which is set to 15% following
the previous studies (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008; Hall, 1990).

Similar to the way we construct the capital intensity, subsidiary firms are consolidated
into their ultimate parents. Patent stock of merged and acquired firms is also consolidated
into the merger. We use the April 2008 version of the “EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database” (henceforth, PATSTAT) provided by the European Patent Office. There are
two advantages using PATSTAT for this purpose. First, PATSTAT provides relational
tables and an SQL interface for the bibliometric information of the U.S. patents, which
make data extraction much easier than other available data sources. Second, PATSTAT
provides standard identification numbers of assignees, which corrected many typos and
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spelling differences. We further cleaned the data by manually searching and correcting
the list of assignees in the sample.

Component familiarity
We operationalize technological familiarity using the familiarity index of technological
components suggested by Fleming (2001). “Component familiarity” captures the degree
to which a patentee is familiar with the technological components that were used in his
patent. The basic assumption is that as a technology matures (therefore, the population of
technological artifacts increases), technological trajectories based on this technology
become more foreseeable (Dosi, 1982). Component familiarity, as suggested by Fleming,
averages the number of patents previously assigned to the same technology classes of the
focal patent and applies a knowledge attenuation factor by temporal distance between the
focal patent and the referred patents. He has empirically shown that component
familiarity is in inverted-U relationship with the uncertainty of utility of the patent as
measured by the variation of forward citation counts.

In order to construct this variable, first we count the number of U.S. patents filed from
1976 to 1999 in each technology class and match them to the subclass of a patent in our
sample.

Component familiarity for patent i =

1
N Ci

å

å1{ patent k assigned to subclass c } ´ kattenuation
j

c j Î C i all patents k filed
from 1976 to 1999

where Ci = { patent subclass assigned to patent i } ,
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k

c j = patent subclass identifier,
N Ci = number of different patent subclasses assigned to patent i,

and knowledge attenuation factor, kattenuationk =
exp(

temporal distance of patent k
),
time constant of knowledge loss

where temporal distance of patent k=
4.5 if patent k was filed from 1995 to 1999
9.5 if patent k was filed from 1990 to 1994
16.5 if patent k was filed from 1976 to 1989

Time constant of knowledge loss is set to 5 following Fleming (2001). We rescaled
component familiarity by dividing it by 1000.

Patent effectiveness
In order to test the effects of patent effectiveness at the technology or industry level, we
use two measures. One measure is constructed from the question of the GT/RIETI survey
addressing patent strength in maintaining competitive advantage of the commercialized
patented inventions. We aggregate the answer to this question in a five-point Likert scale
at technology class. Because this question was directed to the inventors whose patents
were commercialized, this may not properly represent overall effectiveness of patents.
Thus, we also adopt the patent effectiveness measure provided by the Carnegie Mellon
survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000). We averaged the median value of the original
CMS measure of patent effectiveness at International Standard of Industry Code (or ISIC)
over four-digit NAICS code of assignee firms in our survey. About 16% of cases for
which we could not find NAICS code were dummy-coded as “Missing patent
effectiveness.”
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14.2.3. Controls
We included several variables to control for alternative factors that may influence the
propensity of strategic nonuse.

Fragmented ownership of a patent
Ziedonis (2004) showed that the patenting propensity of firms in the semiconductor
industry increased as the patenting ownership was more fragmented. She suggested that a
large portion of the increased patenting would be ascribed to the patents filed for strategic
nonuse. Although she did not prove the direct relationship between the increase of
strategic nonuse patents and the fragmentation in that paper, she had provided anecdotal
evidence on that in her previous paper with Hall (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001). Adapting
Ziedonis’s fragmentation index at firm level to patent level, we constructed a “patent
fragmentation index.” In the United States, an invention is patentable only if differences
between the claimed invention and the prior art should not be “obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains” (35 U.S.C. 103). Prior art is pertinent and applicable to the patent and
has “a bearing on the patentability of any claim of the patent” (37 C.F.R. 1.501) as
assessed by the applicant, examiners, or a third party.63 Therefore, in order to fully utilize
the patented invention, the executor of the patent (e.g., the owner or a licensee) would
need access to the entirety or a part of prior arts. The patent fragmentation index
measures how widely the prior art that is beyond a command of the owner of the focal
63

For the discussion about citation of prior art, see a recent paper by Alcacer, Gittelman, and Sampat
(2009)
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patent is distributed. Fragmentation index of a patent k assigned to firm ik is constructed
as

æ
NBCITES jk
FRAGk =1− å ç
ç
jk ¹ik è NBCITES k - NBCITES ik

2

ö
÷ ,
÷
ø

where jk refers to each unique assignee that is cited by a patent k assigned to firm ik and
whose patent was filed after 1984. NBCITES k is the number of the U.S. patents cited by
patent k, NBCITES ik the number of the self-cited U.S. patents, and NBCITES jk the
number of the U.S. patents cited by patent k and assigned to jk . We consider the cited
patents filed only after 1984 because most patents filed before 1984 must have expired by
the time the focal patents of the sample was granted and, therefore, would not claim for
ownership rights. We also tested the fragmentation index without restriction of filed year
of cited patents to find no difference. The patent fragmentation index indicates the
difficulties (or costs) of bargaining that may be required for full access to the subject
technologies claimed in the patent.64

Strength of patents and appropriability regime

64

The patent fragmentation index measures how widely the ownership of technological components that
might be need to use the technology claimed in the focal patent. This is different from the complexity of
product technology which measures how many technological components are required to make a final
product. For example, if one technological component that constitutes a technologically complex product is
built on proprietary prior arts or based on discrete technologies, then the fragmentation index will be low
while complexity index of product technology high. Correlation coefficient between these two measures in
the sample is very low (-0.01) and not statistically significant (Table A. 10).
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We control the strength of patents and the regime of appropriability at both patent-level
and technology- and industry-level. The measures for the strength of patent include
complexity of technology as a count of different technology subclasses assigned to the
patent and number of claims. At the technology level, we control the primary technology
fields as identified in the first IPC. Because the semiconductor industry is known to be
prosperous in blocking patents, we control the semiconductor industry as identified by
the primary NAICS codes (333295, 333994, 334411, 334413, 334515, and 335999) of
assignee firms. We also control the strength of patent at the industry/technology level.
The first measure is constructed from the survey question asking about the strength of
appropriability of patents for commercialization. This variable is aggregated at 30
technology classes. However, this variable has some problems. The variable is
constructed from the assessment from the respondents who answered that they used the
patents for internal commercialization. This limitation may distort the overall
effectiveness of patents for appropriating innovation. Hence, we tested an alternative
measure. The patent effectiveness measure provided by the Carnegie Mellon survey
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) was well examined in the literature and showed
consistent results. We matched the CMS patent effectiveness measure to the primary
industry classification (NAICS) and assigned corresponding values, separated by product
and process, to the observations of the sample. Although overall reliability of this
measure is believed to be higher than the first measure, it also has problems, such as
missing NAICS value, missing on product/process distinction, and errors generated by
transformation and aggregation. We additionally control a dummy for missing values on
this variable.
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Openness of innovation process
We control the openness of the innovation process by including two measures: diversity
index of external collaboration and the breadth of openness. The first measure,
constructed from the survey, is the count of different external entities with which the
inventor organization had collaborated during the invention process. The breadth of
openness is a similar measure used by Laursen and Salter (2004) constructed from the
survey by counting the different channels of external knowledge sources.

We also control the technological value of patents, the ownership of complementary
assets (as measured by whether the inventor belongs to manufacturing units), complexity
of product technology, firm size (as measured by the number of employees),65 whether
there is an immediate demand for the technology, size of the invention projects (number
of inventors and man-month), product/process, and basic-applied orientation of the
inventor. Sample statistics are presented in Table 14.1.

65

Correlation coefficient between the firm size and the patent stock is 0.59 and statistically significant,
which falls below the 0.70 threshold and, indeed, is discriminatory (Cohen et al., 2003).
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Table 14.1 Sample statistics (N=1241)
Variable
Strategic nonuse (narrow)
Strategic nonuse (broad)
Explanatory variables
Patent effectiveness (CMS)
Missing patent effectiveness
Strength of appropriability of patents
Capital intensity (M$/employee)
Dummy for missing capital intensity
Ln(patent stock)
Component familiarity (/1000)
Controls
Fragmentation index
Large firm (employees >500)
Inventor in manufacturing unit
Competence-destroying invention
Complexity of product technology
Breadth of openness
Diversity index of collaboration
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D (/100)
Product invention
Man-month (normalized)
Number of inventors
Complexity of technology (# USPC)
Number of citations to the U.S.
patents
Number of claims
Age of invention (months)
Semiconductor industry
Electrical engineering
Chemistry, pharmaceuticals
Process eng, special equipment
Mechanical eng, machinery
Consumer goods & Construction

Mean
0.174
0.261

Std.
Dev.
0.379
0.439

32.877
0.157
3.748
0.076
0.259
5.473
0.085

7.266 16.400 50.200
0.364
0
1
0.294 2.875 4.222
0.131
0 1.908
0.438
0
1
2.740
0 9.865
0.154 0.000 2.489

0.678
0.861
0.084
0.573
0.584
4.666
0.434
2.218
0.222
0.079
0.510
0.182
2.797
4.452

Min

Max
0
0

0.283
0.347
0.277
0.495
0.493
2.899
0.863
1.068
0.416
0.172
0.500
0.229
1.916
3.538

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0.005
1
1

17.697 24.478
22.922 15.585
68.874 12.002
0.069 0.254
0.257 0.437
0.239 0.427
0.135 0.342
0.132 0.339
0.028 0.166

0
1
37
0
0
0
0
0
0
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1
1

Data source
Survey
Survey
CMS
CMS
Survey
COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT
PATSTAT
USPTO

0.979
PATSTAT
1 Survey & Patent
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
10
Survey
8
Survey
4
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
1
Survey
16
Patent
30
Patent
399
181
92
1
1
1
1
1
1

Patent
Patent
Patent
COMPUSTAT
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent
Patent

14.3. Multivariate Analysis
Because our dependent variable is binary, we use a probit regression model. Column 1
through 6 of Table 14.2 show the estimates using the narrowly defined strategic nonuse
as dependent variable and column 7 with broadly defined strategic nonuse for robustness
checks.66 First, we estimated binary probit regressions without patent effectiveness
variables (column 1) and added two different measures of patent effectiveness (columns 2
and 3). Column 2 was estimated with strength of patent appropriability (aggregated at 30
technology groups) constructed from the survey and column 3 estimated with patent
effectiveness measure (aggregated at four-digit primary NAICS) constructed using the
Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).

Next, in order to examine the discriminating effects of independent variables in
relationship with other modes, we estimated multinomial logistic models (columns 4
through 6). The reference outcome for the multinomial logistic models is “strategic
nonuse,” and compared outcome levels are other nonuse (named “sleeping”), internal
commercialization, and external commercialization. The four outcomes compared satisfy
the IIA assumption as shown by the Small-Hsiao tests. Also, both Wald and Likelihoodratio tests reject the null hypothesis that strategic nonuse can be combined with any other
outcome categories. This indicates that strategic nonuse patents are not only a meaningful
category theoretically but also a valid category empirically. Indeed, the multinomial
logistic regression reveals several important aspects to further our understanding on the
drivers of strategic nonuse patents. For example, by treating strategic nonuse distinctively
66

We estimated all models twice using the two dependent variables. All the estimations did not show
notable differences between two definitions, except for the capital intensity in the probit regressions. So we
report the estimations based on the narrowly defined strategic nonuse as a standard.
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from internal use, we could better understand the diverging effects of firm assets and
patent effectiveness on them. By treating strategic nonuse distinctively from external use,
we could test the bargaining failure arguments. Furthermore, the multinomial logistic
regression reveals the distinctive effects of the technology development cycle on strategic
nonuse compared to nonuse and internal use as well as external use. All estimated models
show acceptable range of goodness-of-fit statistics (log likelihood and chi-square
statistics are reported at the bottom of the table). In order to check the effects of dummycoding of one of the independent variables (capital intensity), we ran the models for the
complete set of the sample after removing the observations missing the capital intensity.
There is no change in the basic relationship from the presented models.

Turning to our central variables of interest, as expected from Hypothesis 1a, capital
intensity is significantly and positively associated with the propensity of strategic nonuse
when it is broadly defined (column 7). As the capital intensity increases by $1 million
above its mean, the probability of a patent being strategic nonuse increases by 17.1
percentage points holding all the other variables at their means or modes. However, when
using the narrow definition of strategic nonuse, the relationship turns marginally
insignificant (but still keeping its sign positive). So we have limited support for
Hypothesis 1a. Looking at the result of multinomial regressions, while the distinctive
impact of capital intensity on the strategic use against sleeping patents is not clear
(column 4), it is distinctive against “internal use” (column 5). Compared to internal
commercialization, increase of the capital intensity by $1 million above its mean lowers
the probability of strategic nonuse by 46.3 percentage points, holding all the other
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variables at their means or modes.67 These results, in combination, make two
interpretations possible. First, if we assume that even sleeping patents may play some
protective roles, then we cannot tell whether the effects of capital intensity on strategic
nonuse are related to the protective reason or to the use-suppressing reason. Second, if we
assume no protective roles of sleeping patents, then our results imply that we cannot
confirm the existence of protective roles of strategic nonuse patents, either. In this case
the reason capital intensive firms file more strategic nonuse patents is more likely
because they are left out of the internal commercialization process. In other words,
although many strategic nonuse patents in capital intensive firms are internally
commercializable, the higher level of costs integrating them into larger and probably
more complex plants and facilities had suppressed their uses. So the latter case will be a
byproduct of ordinary innovation activities.

As predicted by Hypothesis 1b, the estimates of patent stock are significant and positive.
This effect is net of firm size because we separately control firm size. The results read
that firms having larger technological assets to protect are more likely to have strategic
nonuse patents. Looking at the multinomial logit models, patent stock has a significant
and positive impact on the propensity of strategic nonuse compared to internal
commercialization (column 5) but no significant impact compared to sleeping patents or
external commercialization (columns 4 and 6). This indicates that, similar to the

67

The main results are robust against missing values of this variable. A multinomial logistic regression run
after excluding the missing values on the capital intensity shows no notable differences from the main
results in signs, magnitude, and significance of coefficients on the key variables. Also, the relationships of
the dependent variable and other key independent variables are held when the capital intensity variable is
dropped from the regression.

219

arguments we made for capital intensity, we cannot isolate the protective effects from the
use-suppression effects.

Finally, our bargaining failure and dominant design hypothesis is well supported by the
empirical estimation. The coefficient on component familiarity is highly significant (at
1% level) and negative in binomial probit models (column 3 and 7). We tested whether
the relationship is curvilinear by including a square term of component familiarity. Our
data do not confirm the curvilinear relationship. In multinomial logit models, the
propensity of both plain nonuse and any commercial uses increases as the familiarity with
technological components increases. Comparing the coefficients on component
familiarity for internal use (column 5) and for external use (column 6), the impact of
component familiarity is larger between strategic nonuse and external use than between
strategic nonuse and internal use. This supports the bargaining failure argument. On the
other hand, the propensity of sleeping patents also increases as technology becomes more
familiar, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the component
familiarity in column 4. This observation bears an important policy implication. As
technology becomes mature and, thus, widely diffused, building patent thickets or fences
will be less attractive than commercial use or even plain nonuse. This is because, on one
hand, reduced technological uncertainty promotes technology transactions and, on the
other hand, protective effectiveness of either a blocking or fencing patent will decrease as
the claimable property rights become limited. Conversely, strategic nonuse is more likely
to be chosen in emerging technologies. This corroborates the evolutionary explanation of
technological advances in which the rents from innovation in the emerging phase of
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technology should depend largely on technologically advanced design. Strategic nonuse
patents thus play a particularly important rent-protecting role in the design competition
before a dominant design appears and competition shifts to price competition.

221

Table 14.2 Probit and multinomial logistic estimates of determinants of strategic
nonuse

base

Probit
Multinomial logistic
Probit
Add patent
effectiveness
(reference=strategic nonuse)
survey
CMS
Broad
measure measure sleeping internal external definition

Main variables
Patent effectiveness
(CMS)
Dummy for missing
patent effectiveness

0.016**
(0.008)
-0.248
(0.161)

-0.027* -0.036**
(0.015) (0.015)
0.735**
0.135
(0.340) (0.337)

-0.024
(0.019)
0.555
(0.376)

0.012*
(0.007)
-0.113
(0.139)

Appropriability of
patents

0.266
(0.205)
0.415
0.390
0.409
0.018 -2.257** -0.852
Capital intensity
(0.324)
(0.325)
(0.329) (0.647) (0.952)
(1.008)
Dummy for missing 0.050
0.037
0.181
-0.568*
-0.295
-0.042
capital intensity
(0.150)
(0.151)
(0.160) (0.335) (0.323)
(0.391)
0.056** 0.057** 0.059** -0.059 -0.142*** -0.087
Ln(patent stock)
(0.024)
(0.023)
(0.024) (0.049) (0.047)
(0.064)
Component
-1.061** -0.938** -1.108*** 2.075** 1.582* 2.787***
familiarity
(0.413)
(0.406)
(0.413) (0.812) (0.846)
(0.841)
Controls
-0.056
-0.052
-0.029
0.008
0.067
0.283
Fragmentation index
(0.165)
(0.164)
(0.164) (0.329) (0.319)
(0.434)
0.250
0.236
0.270
-0.765*
-0.072 -1.218***
Large firm
(0.185)
(0.185)
(0.188) (0.408) (0.390)
(0.434)
Inventor in
-0.156
-0.150
-0.131
-0.270
0.539*
-0.254
manufacturing unit (0.164)
(0.164)
(0.167) (0.391) (0.320)
(0.450)
Competence-0.110
-0.111
-0.122 0.424**
0.015
0.456*
destroying invention (0.088)
(0.088)
(0.089) (0.185) (0.175)
(0.234)
Complexity of
0.020
0.070
0.030
0.044
-0.037
-0.283
product technology (0.115)
(0.120)
(0.114) (0.235) (0.225)
(0.295)
0.029*
0.028* 0.031** -0.051 -0.062** -0.020
Breadth of openness
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016) (0.032) (0.031)
(0.039)
Diversity index of
-0.028
-0.024
-0.030
-0.162
0.140
0.176
collaboration
(0.055)
(0.056)
(0.056) (0.128) (0.117)
(0.132)
-0.182*** -0.181*** -0.183*** 0.043 0.454*** 0.608***
Technological value
(0.043)
(0.043)
(0.044) (0.094) (0.089)
(0.119)
No immediate
0.266*** 0.268*** 0.283*** -0.273 -0.602*** -0.818***
demand
(0.103)
(0.103)
(0.103) (0.204) (0.204)
(0.282)
0.316
0.299
0.268
0.087 -1.382** -0.438
% Basic R&D (/100)
(0.251)
(0.249)
(0.250) (0.466) (0.538)
(0.671)
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0.567*
(0.307)
0.109
(0.144)
0.041*
(0.022)
-1.203***
(0.428)
0.098
(0.152)
0.190
(0.158)
-0.115
(0.151)
0.064
(0.082)
-0.024
(0.104)
0.013
(0.015)
-0.078
(0.054)
-0.184***
(0.040)
0.199**
(0.096)
0.354
(0.234)

Table 14.2 (continued)
Product invention
Man-month
(normalized)
Number of inventors
Complexity of
technology
Number of citations
to the U.S. patents
Number of claims
Age of invention
Semiconductor
industry
Electrical
engineering
Chemistry,
pharmaceuticals
Process eng, special
equipment
Mechanical eng,
machinery
Consumer goods &
Construction
Constant
N
Log Likelihood
Wald chi2
Pseudo R2

-0.176** -0.170* -0.297*** 0.483** 0.626***
(0.089)
(0.089)
(0.107) (0.216) (0.212)
-0.304
-0.296
-0.346
0.812*
0.541
(0.222)
(0.223)
(0.226) (0.465) (0.460)
0.006
0.004
0.005
-0.085
0.049
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.024) (0.052) (0.044)
0.005
0.004
0.005
0.003
-0.011
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.013) (0.027) (0.025)
0.002
0.001
0.001
-0.002
-0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
-0.003
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.002
-0.002
-0.001
-0.002
0.005
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
-0.190
-0.202
-0.164
0.154
0.475
(0.188)
(0.189)
(0.191) (0.391) (0.383)
-0.249*
-0.138
-0.174
0.142
0.322
(0.134)
(0.157)
(0.139) (0.286) (0.276)
0.014
0.068
0.024
-0.046
0.054
(0.152)
(0.154)
(0.150) (0.301) (0.299)
-0.195
-0.105
-0.193
0.195
0.455
(0.155)
(0.168)
(0.156) (0.316) (0.312)
0.033
0.117
0.059
-0.318
0.197
(0.160)
(0.172)
(0.160) (0.337) (0.306)
0.210
0.244
0.274 -1.963** 0.083
(0.270)
(0.270)
(0.275) (0.876) (0.497)
-0.910** -2.005** -1.474*** 2.341**
1.439
(0.413)
(0.924)
(0.473) (0.992) (0.940)
1241
1241
1241
1241
-533.35 -532.65 -529.75
-1462.90
77.04
77.90
81.98
273.28
0.070
0.071
0.077
0.097

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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0.348
(0.259)
0.734
(0.557)
-0.009
(0.063)
-0.030
(0.031)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.001
(0.007)
0.013
(0.010)
0.235
(0.499)
0.566
(0.350)
-0.056
(0.372)
0.433
(0.400)
-0.885*
(0.453)
-0.428
(0.670)
-0.676
(1.209)

-0.218**
(0.095)
-0.336*
(0.203)
-0.028
(0.023)
0.006
(0.012)
0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.046
(0.164)
-0.071
(0.127)
0.072
(0.137)
-0.057
(0.140)
-0.209
(0.152)
-0.096
(0.265)
-0.815**
(0.415)
1241
-669.39
76.12
0.061

Turning to the control variables, patents with higher technology values are less likely to
be used for strategic defensive purpose. Patents without immediate business demands are
more likely to be used for strategic defensive purpose. Consistent with conventional
wisdom, these effects are relative to commercially used patents rather than to other
nonuse patents, as clearly indicated by a significant relationship with uses but no
significant relationship with other nonuse in the multinomial regressions.

Interestingly, strategic nonuse patents are more likely to be linked to the existing
capabilities of firms than other nonuse patents or externally commercialized patents, as
indicated by positive and significant coefficients on competence-destroying invention for
sleeping and external patents in the multinomial regressions. A similar pattern is shown
for the firm size. The coefficients on large firms are significant and negative for both
sleeping and external commercialization in the multinomial regressions. According to
these two factors, strategic nonuse and internal commercialization strategy share
similarities. Both uses of patents are more favored by large firm and less linked to
competence-destroying inventions.

The variables controlling for the strength of patents at patent level do not show
significant relationship with the propensity of strategic nonuse. In columns 2 through 7,
we additionally controlled for the appropriability regime. In column 2, we control the
strength of patent for appropriating innovation constructed from the survey. This variable
is aggregated in 30 technology classes. We expect that the higher the strength, the higher
the propensity of strategic nonuse because the protective value of patents will be higher.
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This variable is positively associated, but not significantly, with the propensity of
strategic nonuse. This may be attributed to the measurement error. The variable is
constructed from the assessment from the respondents who answered that they used the
patents for internal commercialization. This limitation may distort the overall
effectiveness of patents for appropriating innovation. Hence, we tested an alternative
measure. The patent effectiveness measure provided in the Carnegie Mellon survey
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000) was well examined in the literature and showed
consistent results. We matched the CMS patent effectiveness measure to the primary
industry classification (NAICS). In column 2, it shows significant and positive
association with strategic nonuse, as expected. Also, the effects are particularly distinct
against sleeping and internally commercialized patents as indicated by the multinomial
regressions in columns 4 and 5. This is consistent with conventional wisdom that stronger
patents have a larger impact on protective use and uses through contracting.
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CHAPTER 15. Conclusion to Part III

This study reveals an empirical reality on the strategic use of patents. In the first part, we
reported findings on the strategic use of patents using a recently collected survey to the
U.S. inventors. This study shows that a significant portion of U.S. patents are indeed filed
for strategic reasons, including blocking, preventing invention-around, player, and fence
strategies. We also found that characteristics of technology and firms are significantly
associated with different strategies. In particular, confirming findings from Cohen et al.,
player strategy is favored in complex technologies while fence strategy in discrete
technologies. In addition, we found that large firms adopt player strategy more than small
and medium firms.

In the second part, we hypothesized that strategic nonuse was driven by several factors
related to a firm’s financial and technological assets and technology characteristics. As
our results indicate, firms are more likely to use a patent for strategic defensive purposes
when they have valuable downstream assets. The size of technological assets, as
measured by the number of patents owned by a firm, also drives non-practicing strategic
patents. The asset protective roles of patents were previously argued by Hall & Zidonis
(2001; Ziedonis, 2004). This study is different from their studies in at least two points:
first, instead of looking at patent intensity, we directly test the impact of assets on the
presence of non-practicing strategic patents compared to other types of use. Second, we
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examine the phenomenon across multiple sectors. Third, we showed that, not as well as
capital assets, technological assets (patent stock) are also an important determinant of
strategic use of patents. This finding is not free from caveats. Strategy of patent use (or
nonuse) should depend on management direction of firms and industry dynamics as well
as technology characteristics. Future research that incorporates these firm- and industryspecific factors into analysis would advance our understanding on this important
phenomenon.

As technology matures and becomes more familiar, the propensity of strategic nonuse
decreases because of increased propensity of commercial use. The increased commercial
use of mature technology is driven by the nature of innovation (more incremental
innovation) but also driven by lowered technological uncertainty. The latter has a greater
impact on the external path of commercialization.
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CHAPTER 16. Conclusions

16.1. Summary of Findings

In Part I, we examined the effects of evolutionary stages of technology development and
firm capabilities on the commercial uses of patented inventions. We found supporting
evidence for the arguments that the patented inventions in mature technology are more
likely to find a path to commercial applications because of a favorable selection
environment of technology and lower uncertainty linked to the general characteristics of
mature technology. In addition, the study shows that the impact of component familiarity
on commercialization is stronger for complex technologies. We also argued that the
patented inventions from capital-intensive firms are less likely to commercialize because
of the presence of alternative competitive advantage, progressively increasing
organizational rigidity with size, and larger protective value of patents than the benefits
from commercialization. Our empirical estimations based on the U.S. inventor survey
support these arguments.

In Part II, we examined the impact of technological uncertainty, strong internal
complementary assets position, characteristics of knowledge search, and collaboration on
the organizational path of commercialization. Based on Teece’s framework on the
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profitability of innovation, we synthesized various theories to explain why firms choose
different organizational paths in the downstream commercialization process. We found
that technological uncertainty lowered the friction of market transactions of technology
and, hence, favored external paths. The main argument of this hypothesis is borrowed
from TCE but also linked to the evolutionary explanation of technological development.
Stage of technological development, technological uncertainty, and profitability of
innovation are interrelated with each other.

As Teece argued and many following studies showed, a strong internal position for
complementary assets have a strong positive impact on the internal commercialization
paths. Also, as Tushman and Anderson argued, we found that there was a strong
organizational inertia for a firm to tend to keep doing what it had been doing. This
implies that firms’ development capability would have a strong path dependency and,
therefore, may well fall into the competence trap (Levinthal and March, 1993; Levitt and
March, 1988).

Departing from Teece, we argue that openness of innovation processes and network
relationship should affect the choice of commercialization paths. Consistent with our
hypothesis, empirical results show that external knowledge from industrial nature
increases the propensity of internal commercialization. Proximity of industrial knowledge
to specific industrial problems and a tendency to require more hands-on knowledge
typically acquired from field experience would cohere authoritative controls more
efficiently than distributed controls across firm boundaries. As hinted by KBV, internal
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synergy of this type of technology is expected to be higher. Our analysis also indicates
that collaboration has diverging effects on the choice of commercialization paths. While
collaboration with firms in vertical relationships tends to favor the internal paths,
collaboration with firms in horizontal relationships tends to favor the external paths.

Finally, in Part III, we reported findings on the strategic use of patents and then tested
hypotheses about factors driving strategic nonuse. This study shows that a significant
portion of U.S. patents are indeed filed for strategic reasons, including blocking,
preventing invention-around, player, and fence strategies. We also found that
characteristics of technology and firms are significantly associated with different
strategies. In particular, confirming findings from Cohen et al., the player strategy is
favored in complex technologies, while the fence strategy is favored in discrete
technologies. In addition, we found that large firms adopt the player strategy more than
small and medium firms. As our regression results indicate, firms are more likely to use a
patent for strategic defensive purposes when they have valuable downstream assets. The
size of technological assets, as measured by the number of patents owned by a firm, also
drives strategic nonuse. As technology matures and becomes more familiar, the
propensity of strategic nonuse decreases because of increased propensity of commercial
use. The increased commercial use of mature technology is driven by the nature of
innovation (more incremental innovation) but also driven by lowered technological
uncertainty.

Table 16.1 summarizes the findings.
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Table 16.1 Summary of the results
Theory (Key literature)

Measures

Commercialization

Assets/ firm size
(Schumpeter, Mkt4T, Hall & Ziedonis)
Dominant design (Utterback, Dosi) &
TCE / Bargaining failure (Merges)
Favorable selection environment of
mature technologies
(Nelson & Winter)
TCE
(Mkt4T; Patent strength @ pat level)

Capital intensity
Patent stock

Small
Small

External
commerciali
-zation
Small
Not sig

Technology familiarity

+

+

-

Technology familiarity

?

N/A

N/A

Not sig

Not sig

Not sig

+
N/A

-

Not sig
Not sig

Importance of external knowledge

Industrial

Public

+

Inventive collaboration

+

Horizontal

Not sig

Co-specialized assets
Open innovation
(von Hippel, Chesbrough, Laursen &
Salter, KBV)
Networks/Alliance
(Powell, Uzzi, March, Rothaermel)

Number of different USPC’s; Number
of claims
Manufacturing unit
Competence-enhancing
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Strategic
nonuse
Large
Large

16.2. Contribution to the Field

This study examines the commercialization process of innovation. It shows that the
innovation process is determined by multi-level factors at different levels (such as
evolutionary stage of technological development at macro level, firm capabilities at
organizational level, and various factors at project/invention level) and across
organizational boundaries. Also, it casts doubts on the validity of using patents as a proxy
for innovativeness. A majority of patented inventions are used for innovation, but a
significant portion of them are also used for strategic purposes, which may have some
anti-innovative effects. Moreover, our empirical estimations show that a larger patent
stock of a firm raises the probability of strategic uses rather than commercial uses. This
implies that it would be misleading to measure innovativeness using the number of
patents if their actual uses are not properly considered.

This study clearly shows the usefulness of project-level data in understanding innovation.
The results from the study are based on a novel and rich data set covering a broad set of
covariates at technology, firm, invention, and project levels. We show that invention- and
project-level factors are indeed significant determinants of the uses of their outputs. In
particular, detailed information on the nature, organizational background, knowledge
flows, and the uses of inventions are shown important in understanding innovation.
Patent publications also provide this information, but they are in many cases limited or
incomplete. Despite their own weaknesses, large-scale surveys on innovation and
invention will be a promising vehicle that can lead us to better understanding innovation.
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The study has some theoretical implications. It shows that theoretical constructs from the
evolutionary explanation of technology development (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Dosi,
1982; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994) and Teece’s dominant design
explanation have some explanatory power in the uses of patented invention and
profitability of innovations. In particular, we take a measure of a degree to which a field
of technology is populated with patents as a proxy of maturity of a technology field.
Furthering the arguments that relate this construct to search the behavior of entities
(Fleming, 2001; Fleming and Sorenson, 2001), we proposed a novel explanation how this
construct can affect a selection environment of technology adoption. Our estimations,
however, do not directly test the validity of this argument because this construct is
confounded, both theoretically and empirically, with transaction cost effects.
Nevertheless, general characteristics of a mature technology (or post-dominant design
stage) such as lower technological uncertainty as suggested by evolutionary economists
of technological advance seem to have empirical validity when plugged into a transaction
cost explanation.

Previous innovation surveys reported that non-patent appropriability means are heavily
utilized by firms (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000; Levin et al., 1987). This study
suggests that strong ownership of alternative non-patent appropriability means (e.g.,
higher dependence on capital assets) may direct the inventions (patents) of commercial
potential toward hindering the innovation of others. Then stacking of sitting-on or
strategic nonuse patents will reinforce the appropriability of non-patent appropriability
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means. So appropriability means are not independent from each other but mutually
influencing. This observation suggests that the appropriability means may be not only
endogenous within a regime of appropriability as claimed by Dosi et al. (2006) but also
affected by other appropriability conditions.

By examining the multifaceted aspects of the organizational trajectory of
commercializing patented inventions, this study sheds new light on innovation theory,
organizational theory, open innovation, and network perspectives of innovation. In
particular, building on Teece’s framework about strategy for profiting from innovation, it
shows that institutional aspects, including social relationship and knowledge exchange,
should be regarded as important and independent factors affecting innovation. It also
discusses a less-attended element of Teece’s framework: dominant design or
technological cycle.

First, we confirm that strong internal position for downstream complementary assets
favor an internal commercialization strategy. In explaining the relationship between
strong coupling with internal complementary assets and vertical integration of
downstream commercialization processes, we enriched the discourse by synthesizing
theoretical implications from TCE and KBV of a firm. The inventions coming out of
strong coupling with firm-specific co-specialized assets will be more bound to the firmspecific assets and retain a higher level of asset specificity between the research and
commercialization process. More flavors of firm-specific elements in inventions will
lower internal management costs required for coordinating two processes and increase
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the costs of switching to external suppliers. This is an explanation based on TCE. KBV
emphasizes the prospective aspect. The learning curve advantage and internal
coordination attained through the coupling process during the invention process will
provide a higher change of internal synergy. Both theories predict the positive
relationship between strong internal coupling with complementary assets and vertical
integration of downstream commercialization processes. As Conner and Prahalad (1996)
claimed, TCE and KBV may explain the same phenomenon from different sides.
Considering both theoretical implications will provide a more comprehensive
understanding. Apart from the theoretical elaboration to synthesize two complementary
theories, this finding contributes to the Teecian framework of profitability of innovation
and arguments of markets for technology by providing a direct test of the effects of cospecialized complementary assets on a choice of commercialization paths. One avenue of
future research will be looking at how the effects of co-specialized assets on
commercialization paths are moderated by the characteristics of technology (e.g., general
purpose v. specialized) or by the stage of the technology-development cycle. Our
conjecture is that the impact of co-specialized assets on the choice of commercialization
paths will be weaker for general-purpose invention or in mature technology.

Second, we confirm that TCE provides valid explanations in the governance structure of
downstream assets. While most TCE arguments give attention to make-or-buy decisions,
we extended them to integrate-or-sell decisions in an innovation context and provided
empirical evidence conforming to theoretical explanation. However, as TCE literature
admits, operationalizing TCE constructs is indeed difficult. For example, our
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technological uncertainty measure, component familiarity, does not precisely isolate TCE
constructs but is confounded with effects from the technological cycle.

Third, this study reveals the importance of an institutional approach in understanding
innovation. Furthermore, proceeding one step further from the open innovation
arguments, it shows that the nature of external knowledge should be taken into
consideration in studying innovation. The previous empirical studies focused on how
broadly or deeply firms sourced external knowledge and how they affected intermediate
output of the innovation process or firm performance (Katila and Ahuja, 2002; Laursen
and Salter, 2006). In doing so, they did not turn their attention to the qualitative
differences of sourced knowledge. Other studies examined a limited number of leading
firms to show how they had successfully utilized some types of external knowledge for
innovation (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; von Hippel, 1988). This study attempts to
overcome the weaknesses of both studies by examining the impact of different types of
external knowledge in a large-scale, cross-industry sample. Furthermore, it reveals not
only that the different nature of external knowledge has a different impact on innovation,
but also that it would be bound to a different commercialization strategy. While external
industrial knowledge is conducive to internal commercialization, external public
knowledge spawns external commercialization. Or, the other way around, firms that
chose an internal integration strategy would have sought more industrial knowledge,
while firms that chose to provide their inventions to external parties for
commercialization might have resorted more on public knowledge. Certainly, the analysis
leaves more questions open to be answered. Although we tried to justify distinctiveness

236

between external industrial and public knowledge in the context of mode of
commercialization both theoretically and empirically, it still leaves ambiguity in concepts
and measurement. First, it overlaps with basic-applied distinction. We argued that they
were different because external public sources can deliver an applied type of knowledge,
and external industrial sources can deliver basic type of knowledge. We also controlled
for the elements of an R&D project. We suggested that, separate from the basic-applied
type, technological fitness, learning-curve effects, and inclusions of organizational
routines are some discriminating characteristics of this distinction. However, they need to
be better articulated in the practical context. Second, external public knowledge is
confounded with the maturity of the field of technology as we discussed in Part II. This
also contributes to the ambiguity. In summary, further research on the characteristics,
drivers, and impact of the different types of knowledge is required.

Fourth, this study shows that collaborative networks, net of knowledge flows, influence
the organizational trajectory of commercialization. Furthermore, it shows that relative
position of the innovator in the network is indeed an important predictor of the trajectory.
By the relative position in the network, we do not mean the structural or topological
relations that many studies of networks focus on (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004) but the
relative positions in the value chain or in competitive relations in the product markets.
Previous studies argued why particular ties affect the firm or innovation performance
(Afuah, 2000; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; Uzzi, 1996). This
study contributes to the field by arguing and showing that firms utilize different types of
networks for different innovation strategies. As a novel contribution, it shows that
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perspectives on collaborative networks have unique explanatory powers in the region that
TCE cannot address. Where technological uncertainty is high, collaboration has a
stronger impact on the choice of organizational paths of the downstream process of
innovation. This finding empirically corroborates Granovetter’s and Powell’s
(Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990) arguments that economic theories alone are
incomplete in explaining social behavior so that network perspectives can complement
them.

Fifth, the estimations of Part III indicate that firms are more likely to use a patent for
strategic defensive purposes when they have valuable downstream assets. The size of
technological assets, as measured by the number of patents owned by a firm, also drives
non-practicing strategic patents. The asset protective roles of patents were previously
argued by Hall and Ziedonis (2001; Ziedonis, 2004). This study is different from their
studies in at least two points: first, instead of looking at patent intensity, we directly test
the impact of assets on the presence of non-practicing strategic patents compared to other
types of use. Second, we examine the phenomenon across multiple sectors. Third, we
showed that, not as well as capital assets, technological assets (patent stock) are also an
important determinant of strategic use of patents. This finding is not free from caveats.
Strategy of patent use (or nonuse) should depend on management direction of firms and
industry dynamics as well as technology characteristics. Future research that incorporates
these firm- and industry-specific factors into analysis would advance our understanding
on this important phenomenon.

238

16.3. Limitations

This study is not free from limitation. First, uses of patents are identified from the input
from one of the inventors. Although the survey is directed to the lead inventor, who we
assumed to be better informed than other inventors of uses as well as technological
contents of the inventions, some of them may not care about the commercialization
process and possibly provided inaccurate answers or responded “don’t know” to the
survey. If this is random with regard to our variables of interest, then it will not cause a
bias in the estimation. The worst case is that the inventors belonging to an organization in
which innovation labor is well distributed across the organization (e.g., large firms) tend
to be more ignorant of the downstream processes. Indeed, the proportion of those
answering “don’t know” to the use questions are higher for large firms in the survey.
Although we showed that this self-selection effect did not result in a significantly biased
estimation for our analyses, a better and more accurate measure can be obtained by crossvalidating the data by additionally asking R&D or IP managers of firms.

Second, we included a broad set of covariates at technology, firm, invention, and project
levels. However, we could not control firm-specific effects. Individual firms may have
different commercialization strategies or managerial tendencies. We could not fully
control these firm-specific effects because our data set was cross-sectional. Constructing
panel data for the uses of patented inventions at the scale of this study will demand huge
resources that may not be mobilized by a small group of researchers. However, as
national longitudinal surveys in education show, coherent longitudinal surveys on
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innovation will substantially advance our understanding of innovation, we believe.
Otherwise, a detailed case study for the limited set of firms will populate the gap.

Third, the study does not directly test implications from product market characteristics or
industry structure. Instead, it controls broad industry areas and the characteristics of
technology fields. Licensing literature argues that some industry and product market
aspects, such as the level of competition or the level of product differentiation, should
affect the licensing propensity (Arora, 1997). Also, fuller understanding of external
commercialization will be possible when we can consider dyadic relationships as well as
aspects of financial markets, which we could not address in the study. Although we
control some of these effects by including industry dummies, there may still remain some
unobserved heterogeneity.

Fourth, the sample of this study is composed of the U.S. patents whose equivalents were
also filed in the European Patent Office and the Japanese Patent Office. The additional
costs incurred by filing and maintaining patents in multiple jurisdictions affect the sample
characteristics in two different ways. First, because small and medium firms are relatively
weakly positioned in financial status compared to large firms, they may have been
underrepresented in this sampling frame than the sample composed of the patents filed in
a single jurisdiction. Second, the additional costs may have the effect of raising the
threshold of patenting to sieve out low-quality patents.
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Fifth, this study does not address which types of patent uses or nonuses are desirable, or
the impact of commercialization on firm performance or economy. We did not examine
the amount of private or social benefits attached to each mode of patent use. We
presented a survey result about inventors’ assessment of economic value of several types
of nonuse in Table 13.3 and Table 13.4. However, this analysis is far from a
comprehensive analysis from which we can draw a meaningful normative conclusion.
The limitations come from weaknesses of measurement and analysis. First, inventors may
not be in the best position to assess the economic value of their patented inventions.
Indeed, assessing the economic value of a patented invention is not an easy task,
especially if the invention is part of a complex product. This is why the controversy about
the damage awards for an infringed patent is so sharply divided and equally weighed in
the current debate of the patent reform. However, R&D managers or IP managers may be
better positioned to know about it. Second, economic value needs to be defined in a more
accurate way. Is it private economic value or aggregate social value? One way to assess
(minimum) private economic value is to use patent renewal information. Another way is
to look at performance in the product markets or stock markets. One type of social value
can be captured by tracking how the patented invention contributes to developing future
technology. Tracking citations to the focal patent by subsequent patents can be a measure
of this type of social value. On top of better measures of value or performance, then we
can examine how each mode of use (especially non-practicing strategic patents) affect the
private and social value, on one hand, and how they are conditioned on a variety of
factors including characteristics and maturity of technology or firm capabilities. This will
be a promising avenue for future research.
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16.4. Managerial Implications
Some managerial implications on innovation strategy can be derived from this study.
Managers in the firms targeting for integrating inventions into their internal production
capabilities may need to give attention to the following aspects of the invention process.
First, a tight link to firms’ existing downstream assets will help. Involving the field
engineers working for manufacturing process in the invention process will be one way to
do that.

Second, when firms’ value chains are disintegrated, collaboration with participants of the
value chain such as suppliers or customers will help.

Third, coping with technological developments made by other firms and proactively
absorbing them will help in commercializing the inventions. In this sense firms need to
bolster competitive intelligence on technological trends of industry. Participating in
industry forums/fairs or regular conversation with suppliers over technological issues will
work.

For the firms targeting external commercialization paths, the following strategies in the
early stage of the innovation process will be worth considering. First, firms should
evaluate the general level of demands for the technology and the level of potential users’
understanding the technology. Working on mature technology will be a safe choice.
Incorporating publicly available knowledge into inventions will be another way.
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Second, collaboration with potential users of the technology will be crucial. In particular,
firms in horizontal relationships may already have an interest in the technology.
Collaboration with them will probably make the invention process more efficient because
of aligned goals and shared knowledge and, moreover, foster a trust relationship to make
cooperation in the later stage of innovation easier. Especially in emerging technologies,
horizontal collaboration will be more effective in commercializing the resultant invention
over the networks of firms.

Third, new companies will have to give more attention to public knowledge and such
technologies that are not tightly linked to the existing capabilities of the incumbents.

16.5. Policy Implications

The study suggests some policy implications to promote external commercialization of
inventions from our findings. First, we show that small firms are more likely than large
firms to contribute to enlarging the market for technology.68 Enlarged markets for
technology will bring many benefits to society by enabling knowledge exchange more
fluidly across organizations and promoting R&D investment among small firms. Public
policy promoting small firm innovations is therefore justified.

68

Recall that our estimation is based on “innovative” firms (see Section 4.1 for discussion of the sample).
Accordingly, firms referred here, especially small firms, do not include non-innovative firms.
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Second, we found that offering the patented inventions for external parties’
commercialization is not as popular in emerging technologies as in mature technologies.
To make innovation systems more flexible and efficient, some policy measures that can
promote knowledge dissemination in emerging technologies will be desirable.

Third, corporate spin-offs are particularly specialized for competence-destroying
innovation. This will be a blood vessel for economic evolution as noted by Schumpeter.
To promote corporate spin-offs’ public knowledge is particularly important. Any policy
to promote public knowledge will be beneficial. Furthermore, public knowledge will also
increase the division of innovation labor by promoting the market for technology.
Therefore, continuous support of the creation and dissemination of public knowledge will
be essential to make the economy more lively and efficient.

The study shows that patent thickets may decelerate as technologies mature. As a field of
technology becomes mature and more populated with component technologies,
inventions are more likely to be turned into commercial products and less likely to be
strategically exploited. This implies that technology evolution may naturally dampen
stacking-up of non-practicing strategic patents. On the other hand, emerging technologies
will suffer more from stacking non-practicing strategic patents. This is a serious problem
because competitions for design play a bigger role in emerging technologies than in
mature technologies (Utterback, 1994). It is suggestive of the importance of asymmetric
efforts to put the core inventions in emerging technologies in the public domain.
Directing public funds and public organizations to conduct more research on emerging
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technologies and to put their research results in the public domain (e.g., academic
publications) will be one way to do this.

Some implications to patent reforms in the United States can be also derived from this
study. The study supports widely accepted beliefs of the importance of higher quality
patents in innovation. Our results show that the higher the technological quality of patents,
the more likely they will be to commercialize (especially externally) and the less likely be
strategically used. The Patent Reform Act of 2009 pending in the United States Senate
aims to raise patent quality by enhancing the USPTO examination process, allowing the
public to engage in the examination process, expanding the existing inter partes
reexamination process, and institutionalizing post-grant review procedures. This study
does not provide direct answers to the points of technical discussions of the above
proposal. However, it suggests that overall direction underlying these proposed changes
to enhance the quality of patents is right and promotes innovation.

In Part III, we show that the propensity of strategic exploitation, relative to plain nonuse
or internal commercialization, is higher for those patents filed by firms from industries
where patent protection is more effective. One element constituting the effectiveness of
patent protection is the threat of litigation. The Patent Reform Act of 2009 proposes socalled “apportionment-centric” damage awards, the gist of which is to restrict damage
awards accompanying patent infringement to a portion of the total economic value of
final products the infringed invention particularly contributes to. According to a survey
conducted by Shane (2009), the proposed legislation will lower the damage awards by
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about 30 percent. If this reduction results in a decrease of patent effectiveness, then the
proposed change will have an effect on reducing strategic nonuse patents according to the
empirical estimation of this study. However, the weakened patent effectiveness may also
have a negative impact on external use of patents, including licensing as indicated by an
insignificant difference in the coefficients on patent effectiveness between strategic
nonuse and external use in the estimation of Table 14.2. Indeed, the advocates of the
current system argue that reducing damage awards will shrink the market for technology
and disincentivize investment in R&D. Total effects can be estimated only if the above
two opposing effects are considered together along with the cost of litigation. Although
further discussion goes beyond the scope of this study, let us finish this paragraph with
one additional thought. Given that the current legal practices are inclined toward
awarding “excessive” compensation to the litigants (Thomas, 2007), we doubt if the
market for technology will really shrink simply by remedying this excessiveness. Of
course, the infringer (or licensee) will be better positioned in litigation (or licensing
deals) because of the reduced damage awards (or the reduced level of litigation risks),
which, in turn, may make costly R&D investment less attractive to the patent holders.
However, if the legal process removes only the excessive portion of compensation (which
may be hard to accomplish in practice, especially in complex technologies), then the
threat of litigation will be still present and the market for technology will be beneficial to
both parties.

If the proposed shift toward an apportionment-centric system of damages results in
lowering strategic nonuse patents, the effects will be different between large and small
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firms. The study shows that large firms (in terms of employees or capital/technological
assets) are more likely than small or medium-sized firms to use patents for strategic
purposes and less likely to commercialize them. If the protective (or assaultive) roles of
patents decrease as the damage awards lower, the reduction of strategic nonuse patents
will mostly come from large firms (or asset-intensive firms). Then, large firms will
redirect R&D investment previously put into developing duplicative technologies to other
productive activities, including developing innovative technologies. On the other hand,
the thinner thickets may form a technological niche that can be exploited by small and
medium firms. Certainly, relieving large firms of the burden of maintaining excessive
amounts of nonuse patents may make them more efficient and result in strengthening
their advantage in technological leadership to stifle small and medium firms. However,
this may not necessarily undermine social welfare.

As a way to reduce potential negative effects of non-practicing strategic patents, one may
propose a “compulsory licensing” by which the owner of the non-practicing patents
possessing a high potential for social benefits is forced to license them to a certain entity,
which satisfies a certain condition. The compulsory licensing is deeply rooted in the
tradition of intellectual property rights. The Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (in short, the Paris Convention), effective in 1883 and revised for the
last time in 1979, states in Article 5. A (2) that “Each country of the Union shall have the
right to take legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to
prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred
by the patent, for example, failure to work.” In its legal implementation, it has been
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applied in a limited and cautious way. In the United States, only the patented inventions
funded by the federal government are subject to compulsory licensing. The European
Union articulates and restricts both the subject technology (i.e., “pharmaceutical
products”) and beneficiaries (i.e., the manufacturer who export to countries with public
health problems) in a very cautious way (Regulation (EC) No 816/2006 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006). Suppose that “a certain entity” in the
proposal is an innovative small firm and “a certain condition” is commitment and ability
to manufacture goods or services based on the licensed technology. For example, imagine
a technology protected by a non-practicing patent is assessed to have a potential to
enhance social welfare, but the owner of the patent refuses to license it or requires
unrealistically high royalties without commercializing it himself. A compulsory licensing
scheme then forces the owner to license the patent, at reasonable price, to innovative
small firms who commit to making a socially beneficial product based on the patented
technology and show an ability to complete the development projects. This proposal will
have both pro-innovative and anti-innovative effects. Compulsory licensing may reduce
patent abuse to promote innovation by putting in use the patents of wider social benefits.
Indeed, a recent study by Moser and Voena (2009) shows that compulsory licensing of
the foreign patents had a positive impact on domestic invention in the short-term.
However, in the long-term, compulsory licensing may lower the value of patents and
disincentivize an investment in innovation, which, resultantly, slows down innovation. In
addition, expanding compulsory licensing to a wider range of products or territories
requires a more cautious approach because of several practical problems. For example, in
many cases, determining a threshold level of social benefits beyond which compulsory
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licensing is eligible will be disputable. Furthermore, setting a reasonable licensing royalty
is not an easy task either. Our analysis suggests that reduction of non-practicing strategic
patents may largely come from large firms. However, it also shows that the value (either
technological or economic) of non-practicing strategic patents is higher for small firms
than for large firms (Table 13.4). Therefore, we cannot conclude whether the proposal
will impact more on large firms or small firms based on our analysis. Before
implementing this proposal, therefore, further research on both effects and practical
issues mentioned above should cumulate.
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APPENDIX A. Literature Review
Table A. 1 Summary of empirical studies about licensing
Paper

Category

Thesis/ Findings

(Arora, 1997)

Determinants
of licensing

(Bessy and
Brousseau,
1998)

Determinants
of licensing
feature

(Anand and
Khanna, 2000)

Determinants
of licensing
feature

· Presence of specialized
engineering-construction firms =>
increased licenses => lower entry
barrier => induce large incumbents
to license more
· Licensing : industry structure
o Presence of competing tech
o # competing licensers
· “licensing is most common in
sectors with large scale production
facilities, with relatively
homogeneous products, and with a
large number of new plants. It is
less common in sectors marked by
product differentiation, custom
tailoring of products for customers,
and small scales of production.”
· Horizontal agreements: market
sharing; transactional contracts
o K-commonality: more
transactional
· Vertical agreements: tech transfer;
relational contracts
· Prominent ind: Chemical,
computer, elec
· Robust cross-ind diff
o Incidence of licensing
o % ex-ante contracts
o Exclusivity
o % contracts among those w/ past
dyadic relationship
o # cross-licensing
· Presence of patents: start-up is
more likely to license to an
incumbent rather than selfcommercializing
· Start-up strategy and interactions
with incumbents
· “crucial factor determining patterns
of competitive interaction between
start-up innovators and established
firms is the presence or absence of
a “market for ideas””
o Appropriability (excludability)
conditions: type (e.g. patent or
secrecy) rather than the level
o Complementary assets

(Gans, Hsu,
and Stern,
2002)
(Gans and
Stern, 2003)

Start-up
comm. Vs.
lic
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Country
/industry
chemical

Data/ methods
· Historical
industry case
study

France
10 large
firms

· 10 Case studies
· survey

U.S.
Firm
level

· Thompson SDC
· 1612 Licensing
contracts 199093
· Verified by
Lexis-Nexis =>
1365
· Compustat
(firm size)
· start-up
commercializati
on strategy
survey
·

USA

Table A. 1 (continued)
(Fosfuri,
2004)

Determinants
of licensing
feature

(Kollmer and
Dowling,
2004)

Determinants
of licensing
feature

(Arora and
Ceccagnoli,
2006)

Licensing
propensity
+
Patent
propensity

(Nagaoka and
Kwon, 2006)

x-licensing
propensity

(Kim and
Vonortas,
2006)

Determinants
of licensing
feature

· Licensing tradeoff: “revenue
effect” vs. “rent dissipation effect”
· % licensing of a chemical firm
o Quadratic(inverted-U) in # tech
suppliers (competing tech)
o (-) licensor’s market share
o (-) Degree of product
differentiation
· The importance of licensing
decreases with the presence of
alternative commercialization
channels such as marketing and
sales or offered services
· presence of marketing and sales
activities drives licensing non-core
products
· Effectiveness of patent protection :
licensing propensity (+) moderated
by complementary assets
Model:
· DV: lic. Prop. & Pat. Prop.
· IV: pat. Eff.
· CA: R&D & manuf personnel
interact daily
· Controls:
o BU size
o Imp. Of Basic sci
o Imp of Med sci
o % R&D in basic sci
o Tech competition (# rivals)
o Ind fixed eff
· Type org
· # cross-licensing
o Patent > only know-how
· X-lic/lic.
o Firm size(empl, pats, R&D)” (+)
o Symmetric firms: (+)
· # license agreements (all and nonexclusive)
o Current patent stock (+**)
o Prior license (+**)
o Patent intensity of industry (+**)
o Complex industry (-)
· # exclusive license
o Complex industry (-**)
· # cross-license
o Prior license (+**)
o Complex industry (+**)
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chemical

· Large chemical
firms
· 1986-96

USA/ bio

· 70
biopharmaceuti
cal firms
· OLS, t-test

Firm
level

·
·
·
·

Japan
Manufact

· 1144 lic
contracts of 268
firms
· Nikkei EEDS
· FY 1999
· 9310 licensing
agreements in
90s
· Random effects
negative
binomial
estimation

U.S.
public
firms

CMS
1991-93
OLS
GMM

Table A. 1 (continued)
(Gans, Hsu,
and Stern,
2007)

Determinants
of licensing
feature

(Gambardella,
Giuri, and
Luzzi, 2007)

Determinants
of licensing

· Licensing propensity: patent grant
(+)
· The importance of a patent grant
for licensing depends on the
strategic environment in which the
firm operates
o Productivity efficiency effects
(tech cycle)
o reputation
· Willingness to license
o Large and medium firm (-)
o 4 digit IPC (+)
o Knowledge from university (+)
· Actual license
o Large and medium firm (-)

USA

· 7649 licensing
deals in the 90s
· Cox
proportional
hazard rate
models

EU

· PatVal-EU

Table A. 2 Literature about knowledge characteristics and innovation
Author
(Year)
Kogut
and
Zander
(2003)

Nerkar
and
Roberts
(2004)

Industry
General
innovating
firms
(Sweden)

Pharmaceutical

Data/
Technique
Pooled
cross
section/
logit

Longitudi
nal/ firmfixed
effects

Measures of
performance
Knowledge
transferred to wholly
owned subsidiaries
(=1) versus to a third
party (licensed or
joint ventures)
Total sales of a new
product
in its first full year on
the market

Variable Examined

Effect

Codifiability
Teachability
Complexity

-**
-**
+**

1. all products
2. generic
3. novel

# of patents in other
therapeutic areas for the past 10
yrs (distal tech experience)

+
+

total product years of market
experience in the focal
therapeutic area (proximal
market experience)

+
+*
+

total product years of market
experience in other therapeutic
areas (distal market experience)

+***
+***
+***
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(all of these are constructed from
multiple survey questions)
# of patents in the same
therapeutic area as the new
product for the past 10 yrs
(proximal tech experience)

+***
+
+***

Table A. 3 Empirical studies on knowledge sources and firm performance
Author
(Year)
(Cohen and
Levinthal,
1989, 1990)

Industry

(Katila and
Ahuja,
2002)

Global robotics
industry (JP, US,
EU)

Caloghirou,
Kastelli,
and
Tsakanikas
(2004)

Laursen
and Salter
(2006)

General

Food and beverage,
Chemicals (w/o
pharma), radio,
television and
communication
equipment and
apparatus,
Telecommunication
services, Computer
and related
activities
General (U.K.)

Data/
Technique
Yale
survey,
FTC LoB/
Tobit,
GLS

Measures of
performance
Firm R&D intensity

Panel
/GEE
Poisson

Number of new
products

Cross
section/
OLS

Cross
section/
tobit

the percentage of
firms’ sales that can
be attributed to
innovative products
or services

Fraction of firm’s
innovative products
to the world market

Variable Examined
Importance of
knowledge from:
Users
Suppliers
Universities
Governments
Search depth
(repetition ratio of
citation)

++***
-***
+***
+
InvertU**

Search scope (ratio of
new citation)
Patent databases

+*

scientific or
business journals

+**

trade fairs and
conferences

+

reverse engineering

+

the Internet
Breadth: number of
discrete knowledge
sources (1-16)

-/+
InvertU***

Depth: number of
discrete knowledge
sources that are highly
exploited
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Effect

-*

InvertU**

Table A. 4 Literature about knowledge sources and the choice of governance mode
Author
(Year)
Veugelers
and
Cassiman
(1999)

Fontana,
Geuna, and
Matt (2006)

Gambardella,
Giuri, and
Luzzi (2007)

Industry
Manufacturing
(Belgium)

Food and beverage,
Chemicals (w/o
pharma), radio,
television and
communication
equipment and
apparatus,
Telecommunication
services, Computer
and related
activities
Cross-industry

Data/
Technique
Cross
section:
multinomial
logit

Choice of
governance mode
Of upstream
innovation
resources,
1. make only
2. buy only
3. make and buy

Cross
section/
negative
binomial

Propensity to
participate in
R&D
collaboration with
universities or
PROs

Pooled
crosssection/
Probit
(selection)

Willingness to
license
Actual license
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Variable Examined

Effect

Information from
competitors is
important

-***
+***
+

Information from
internal sources is
important
the mean of the
percentage of new
products and
processes introduced
in collaboration with
external partners

-*
-***
+**
+

scientific
and business journals

+**

Knowledge from
public research
organization

+***
+***

APPENDIX B. Data Appendix for Part I
Table A. 5 Correlation matrix for Part I (N=1239)
1 Any commercialization
2 Component familiarity
3
Capital intensity
Dummy for missing
4
capital intensity
5
Large firm
6
Ln(patent stock)
Inventor in
7 manufacturing unit
8 Industrial knowledge
9
Public knowledge
Dummy for
10
collaboration
11 Technological value
12 No immediate demand
13 % Basic R&D (/100)
14
Product invention
15
Man-month
16 Number of inventors
Complexity of
17
technology
18
Number of claims
19
Age of invention
20 Electrical engineering
21
Instruments
22 Chemistry, pharma
23
Process eng
Mechanical eng,
24
machinery
Consumer &
25
Construction

1
2
3
0.00 1.00
-0.14* -0.01 1.00

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1.00
0.08*
0.02*
-0.08*
-0.12*
0.26*
0.05*

1.00
-0.06*
0.00
0.07*
-0.03*
-0.03*

1.00
0.08*
0.04*
-0.07*
-0.02

0.15* -0.03* -0.37* 1.00
-0.10* -0.04* 0.22* -0.55* 1.00
-0.18* 0.01 0.28* -0.67* 0.59* 1.00
0.10* -0.06* -0.03* 0.08* -0.07* -0.10* 1.00
0.14* -0.07* -0.05* 0.09* -0.06* -0.13* 0.05* 1.00
-0.06* 0.11* -0.02* 0.03* -0.07* -0.05* -0.05* 0.42* 1.00
0.11*
0.22*
-0.09*
-0.09*
0.05*
0.05*
0.06*

-0.03*
0.00
0.06*
0.10*
-0.04*
0.01
0.04*

-0.05*
-0.05*
0.01
0.01
-0.12*
0.03*
0.08*

0.13*
0.12*
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.03*
-0.05*

-0.09*
-0.14*
0.01
0.00
0.01
-0.04*
0.04*

-0.17*
-0.16*
0.04*
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.09*

-0.01
0.02
-0.04*
-0.04*
0.01
-0.04*
-0.06*

0.22*
0.15*
-0.04*
0.05*
0.03*
0.14*
0.07*

0.14*
0.21*
0.09*
0.24*
-0.04*
0.25*
0.06*

1.00
0.11*
0.00
0.02
-0.04*
0.11*
0.02*

1.00
0.07*
0.11*
-0.06*
0.20*
0.08*

1.00
0.12*
-0.04*
-0.03*
-0.03*

1.00
-0.10* 1.00
0.06* -0.08* 1.00
0.02* -0.05* 0.27* 1.00

-0.03*
0.00
0.04*
0.00
-0.03*
-0.05*
0.02*

0.02*
-0.06*
-0.01
0.07*
-0.03*
0.14*
-0.07*

0.13*
-0.04*
-0.04*
-0.09*
-0.08*
0.20*
0.02*

-0.02
0.07*
-0.06*
-0.06*
-0.04*
0.04*
-0.01

0.02*
-0.10*
0.04*
0.01
-0.04*
0.01
0.02*

0.00
-0.10*
0.05*
0.09*
-0.01
-0.02*
-0.02*

-0.04*
-0.04*
0.06*
-0.06*
-0.05*
-0.07*
0.06*

0.04*
-0.03*
0.04*
-0.08*
0.03*
0.04*
0.02

0.05*
-0.04*
0.04*
0.03*
0.04*
0.15*
-0.10*

0.00
-0.01
0.01
-0.08*
0.01
-0.01
0.01

0.08*
0.06*
-0.06*
-0.04*
-0.02*
0.08*
0.00

-0.02*
-0.01
-0.03*
0.04*
-0.01
-0.01
-0.03*

0.01
-0.04*
-0.04*
-0.01
-0.05*
0.15*
-0.01

-0.10*
-0.01
0.01
0.03*
0.04*
-0.10*
-0.12*

0.04*
0.01
0.01
-0.12*
0.02*
0.17*
0.00

0.02*
0.09*
-0.01
-0.12*
0.07*
0.11*
0.02*

0.03* -0.13* -0.04* 0.02* 0.03* -0.02 0.14* -0.05* -0.14* 0.06* -0.03* 0.03* -0.08* 0.11* -0.09* -0.08* -0.11* -0.04* -0.04*
0.07* -0.06* -0.06* 0.11* -0.09* -0.09* 0.06* 0.10* -0.06* 0.05* 0.02 -0.07* -0.03* 0.09* 0.01

* denotes 5% significance level
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-0.01 -0.02* 0.05* -0.01

APPENDIX C. Data Appendix for Part II
Table A. 6 Correlation matrix for Part II (restricted sample, N=651)
1 Internal commercialization
Inventor in manufacturing
2
unit
Competence-destroying
3
invention
4
Component familiarity
5
Interaction (4*9)
6
Industrial knowledge
7
Public knowledge
8
Collaboration - vertical
9 Collaboration - horizontal
10
Collaboration - public
11
Large firm
12
Ln(patent stock)
13
Technological value
14
No immediate demand
15
% Basic R&D (/100)
16
Product invention
17
Man-month
18
Number of inventors
19 Complexity of technology
20
Number of claims
21
Age of invention
22
Electrical engineering
23
Instruments
Chemistry,
pharmaceuticals
24
Process eng, special
25
equipment
Mechanical eng,
26
machinery
Consumer goods &
Construction
27

1

2

0.09*

1.00

-0.11*
-0.12*
-0.10*
0.03*
-0.18*
0.05*
-0.11*
-0.10*
0.23*
0.12*
-0.13*
0.01
-0.08*
0.07*
-0.08*
0.01
-0.02
-0.05*
-0.01
-0.04*
-0.02

-0.01
-0.06*
-0.04*
0.02
-0.06*
0.01
-0.04*
-0.02
-0.10*
-0.11*
-0.01
-0.04*
-0.05*
0.01
-0.04*
-0.07*
-0.08*
-0.05*
0.07*
-0.06*
-0.02

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

1.00
0.02
0.05*
0.11*
0.13*
0.09*
0.07*
0.05*
-0.04*
-0.04*
0.12*
-0.06*
0.11*
-0.05*
0.12*
0.02
0.02
0.04*
0.02
0.05*
-0.07*

1.00
0.06*
-0.05*
0.11*
-0.08*
-0.04*
0.04*
-0.04*
0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.04*
-0.04*
-0.02
0.02
0.06*
-0.04*
-0.02
0.10*
-0.03*

1.00
0.06*
0.07*
0.15*
0.71*
0.08*
0.02
-0.03*
-0.02
-0.03*
0.02
-0.03*
0.02
0.00
-0.05*
-0.02
-0.04*
0.00
-0.01

1.00
0.47*
0.28*
0.10*
0.15*
-0.01
-0.11*
0.11*
-0.01
0.11*
0.07*
0.15*
0.06*
0.05*
-0.01
0.09*
-0.09*
0.03*

1.00
0.09*
0.09*
0.38*
-0.07*
-0.05*
0.18*
0.10*
0.26*
-0.04*
0.22*
0.04*
0.10*
-0.07*
0.12*
0.01
0.09*

1.00
0.21*
0.13*
-0.02
-0.14*
0.05*
0.03*
0.01
-0.03
0.07*
-0.05*
0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.09*
0.03*

1.00
0.13*
0.02
-0.06*
0.00
-0.02
0.07*
-0.03*
0.06*
0.02
-0.06*
0.01
-0.05*
-0.02
-0.02

1.00
-0.15*
-0.12*
0.08*
-0.02
0.14*
0.01
0.07*
-0.02
0.05*
0.03
0.02
-0.04*
0.03*

1.00
0.58*
-0.12*
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
-0.02
0.05*
0.01
-0.11*
0.10*
0.05*
-0.06*

1.00
-0.13*
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.04*
0.10*
-0.05*
-0.14*
0.13*
0.14*
-0.03*

1.00
0.10*
0.13*
-0.08*
0.15*
0.05*
0.12*
0.11*
-0.07*
-0.01
0.00

1.00
0.11*
-0.03*
0.00
-0.02
0.00
-0.03*
0.00
0.05*
0.00

1.00
-0.08*
0.07*
0.02
0.10*
-0.02
0.01
0.03*
-0.05*

1.00
-0.07*
-0.04*
-0.09*
-0.05*
-0.03
0.03
0.02

1.00
0.29*
0.01
0.02
0.02
-0.06*
0.07*

1.00
-0.03
0.10*
0.00
-0.08*
0.14*

1.00
0.07*
0.05*
-0.06*
-0.14*

-0.06* -0.08* 0.02
-0.01

0.02

0.14* 0.03* 0.07* 0.17* -0.04* -0.01 0.09*

-0.03 -0.08* 0.01

0.03 -0.05* 0.04*

-0.01 -0.15* 0.04* 0.05* -0.04* 0.03

0.14* 0.14* -0.01 -0.15* -0.04* -0.03* -0.14* 0.08* -0.02 -0.06* 0.01
0.01

0.06* 0.04* -0.07* 0.00

0.08* -0.05* 0.02

0.06*

* denotes 5% significance level
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0.00

20

21

1.00
-0.10* 1.00
-0.01 0.08*
0.03* 0.00

0.15* -0.11* 0.09* 0.05* 0.26* -0.03* -0.04*

-0.01 -0.02 -0.04* -0.02 -0.10* -0.06* -0.01 0.06* -0.01 -0.02
-0.02 -0.01

0.02 -0.11* 0.11* -0.06* -0.10* -0.13* 0.00 -0.04*

0.01 -0.10* -0.09* 0.02 -0.08* -0.04* 0.12*

0.02

-0.02 -0.02 0.05*

0.00

APPENDIX D. Factor Analysis of Knowledge Sources
In order to extract latent factors underlying knowledge sources, we conduct a factor
analysis. First, GT/RIETI survey asks inventors to rate how important each source of
knowledge for 1) suggesting and 2) completing the research that led to the patented
invention, separately. We provides 12 categories of knowledge sources with 6-point
Likert-scale (0: “Did not use”, 1: “Not Important” and 5: “Very Important”). The sources
of knowledge shown in the survey are: “Scientific and technical literature,” “Patent
literature,” “Fair or exhibition,” “Technical conferences and workshops,” “Standard
documents (for example ISO standards or contributions),” “Your firm, excluding coinventors,” “Universities,” “Government research organizations,” “Customers or product
users,” “Suppliers,” “Competitors (for example, by reverse engineering),” and “Other
relevant sources (please specify).” Because our research hypotheses are only relevant to
external sources of knowledge we do not include “Your firm, excluding co-inventors” in
our factor analysis. Also, we examine answers in “Other relevant sources” and reassigned
some of them to the closest of the above-listed categories. The remaining observations in
“Other relevant sources”, whose number is ignorable, are not included in the factor
analysis to reduce complexity in interpretation.69 In addition, we further restrict the
sample to those patented inventions whose inventor belongs to firms (N=1740).

To test the goodness-of-fit of the latent factor structure, we conduct a confirmatory factor
analysis. We use SAS CALIS procedure. The Goodness-of-fit (GFI) index is 0.9965,
Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 0.9979, McDonald’s Centrality Index (MCI)
0.9980, Bentler & Bonnet’s Non-Normed Index(NNI) 0.9958, Bentler & Bonnet’s NFI
0.9914, root mean square of residual (RMR) 0.0140, and root mean squared error of
approximation (RMSEA) 0.0136. All these statistics well exceed the rule-of-thumb cutoff criteria (0.95 for GFI and CFI; 0.90 for MCI; lower than 0.08 for RMR; lower than
0.06 for RMSEA)(Hu and Bentler, 1999). The likelihood ratio chi-square statistic is
28.79 for 22 degrees of freedom with probability 0.1511. This implies that the difference
69

We also conducted a factor analysis including “Your firm.” This item is grouped with “industry sources”
and does not make much difference in the structure of latent factors.
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between the observed and expected matrices is not significant. Therefore, we confirm the
underlying factor structure as hypothesized. The reliability of measures for each factor as
calculated by Cronbach’s a (rightmost column) is close to Nunally’s criterion of 0.7
(Nunnally, 1978). The standardized factor scores and Cronbach’s a are summarized in
Table 13.

Table A. 7 Standardized regression factor scores
Common factors
Sources of external knowledge
(manifest variables)
Patent literature
Fair or exhibition
Standard documents
Customers or product users
Suppliers
Competitors
Scientific and technical literature
Technical conferences and workshops
Universities
Government research organizations

Industrial
Public
knowledge knowledge
0.1317
0.0115
0.3623
0.0579
0.2018
0.0880
0.1398
0.0690
0.1259
0.0524
0.1244
0.0657
0.0248
0.1216
0.0598
0.3813
0.0860
0.1744
0.1094
0.2750
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Cronbach
Coefficient Alpha
(standardized)

0.6772

0.7138

APPENDIX E. Data Appendix for Part III
Table A. 8 Technology characteristics and patenting strategy by 30 subgroups of
technology
Characteristics of Technology

Technological Area
Audiovisual
IT
Optical
Matprocessing/Textile
Telecom
Semiconductors
Motors
Handl/Printing
Electr/Energy
ChemEngineering
Pharmaceuticals/
Cosmetics
Analysis/Measurement
Materials
NuclearTechn
SurfaceTechn
Agric&Food ProcessMac
OrganicChem
Polymers
Transportation
ConstrTechn
PetrolChem/materialsC
MedicalTechn
Environment
Biotechnology
MachineTools
ConsGoods
MechElements
SpaceTech/Weapons
ThermProcesses
Agric&Foods
Total

Patenting Strategy

Complexity
of product
technology
Hi
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Hi
Hi

Importance of
complementary
technology
Hi
Hi
Low
Low
Low
Hi
Low
Low
Low
Low

Importance
of patents
Low
Low
Hi
Low
Low
Hi
Low
Low
Hi
Low

Importance
of short
lead-time
Hi
Low
Low
Low
Low
Hi
Low
Low
Hi
Hi

Low
Hi
Low
Hi
Low

Hi
Low
Low
Low
Hi

Low
Hi
Hi
Low
Low

Hi
Low
Low
Low
Hi

26.1
25.0
24.5
22.2
11.5

13.3
12.5
11.5
11.1
9.6

40.0
34.7
41.2
22.2
39.2

Low
Hi
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Hi
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Low
Low

Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Low
Low
Hi
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Low
Hi
Low
Hi

Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Low
Low
Hi
Low
Low

Hi
Low
Hi
Hi
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Hi
Low
Hi
Low
Low
Low
Hi

18.2
19.6
17.3
10.4
8.3
15.8
14.0
20.0
18.8
7.0
3.2
7.8
0.0
0.0
13.3
24.5

9.1
8.8
8.6
8.3
8.3
7.9
7.8
6.7
6.3
4.7
3.2
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
13.3

45.5
23.1
32.1
37.5
41.7
21.1
36.2
40.0
25.0
27.9
43.3
37.3
20.0
33.3
46.7
30.2
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Crosslicensing
52.8
47.4
44.1
23.0
44.0
41.1
15.6
18.6
22.8
15.4

Player
Fence
strategy Strategy
28.9
15.4
24.7
23.7
22.6
18.8
19.7
33.3
19.0
14.7
16.1
16.1
14.1
28.1
14.0
34.9
13.9
42.0
13.5
28.9

Table A. 9 Share of patents giving a high importance to the reasons of patenting by
the size of firms and by industry
Reasons to
patent

firm
size

EE

Inst

Commercial
exploitation

Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large
Small
&
medium
Large

83.9%

Blocking
(offensive)

Pure defense

Fence strategy

Firm's
reputation

Licensing

Cross-licensing
(negotiation)

Preventing
inventingaround
Player strategy

Inventor's
reputation

Process

Mech

91.3%

Chem
&
Pharm
87.3%

92.3%

93.3%

90.9% 89.1%

74.1%
43.4%

77.9%
50.7%

89.3%
43.4%

81.5%
42.3%

83.0%
44.8%

80.6% 80.8%
36.4% 45.2%

44.4%
48.1%

46.8%
34.3%

45.3%
45.3%

55.4%
46.2%

42.2%
39.3%

48.3% 46.4%
27.3% 41.4%

46.5%
30.9%

51.2%
28.8%

40.7%
25.9%

48.7%
34.6%

41.1%
40.0%

41.4% 45.6%
27.3% 30.6%

24.3%
36.4%

40.8%
31.8%

39.4%
46.4%

40.5%
50.0%

40.5%
26.7%

60.7% 36.5%
36.4% 37.7%

36.4%
40.0%

31.8%
33.8%

23.1%
50.0%

25.4%
50.0%

24.9%
43.3%

20.7% 28.9%
54.5% 42.7%

36.4%
13.2%

22.4%
21.2%

27.1%
28.3%

26.7%
8.0%

18.4%
3.4%

3.6% 26.9%
9.1% 16.9%

45.8%
22.6%

27.6%
18.5%

17.7%
28.8%

20.9%
26.9%

11.4%
17.2%

3.4% 26.4%
18.2% 22.5%

17.3%
11.3%

24.3%
18.2%

20.8%
20.8%

29.2%
4.0%

15.1%
3.4%

31.0% 21.2%
9.1% 13.5%

30.1%
16.7%

18.2%
13.6%

11.4%
13.2%

17.3%
20.0%

9.2%
13.8%

3.4% 18.1%
9.1% 14.7%

18.8%

16.0%

13.9%

9.9%

11.7%

6.9% 14.6%
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Table A. 10 Correlation matrix for Part III (N=1241)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Strategic nonuse (narrow)
Strategic nonuse (broad)
Patent effectiveness (CMS)
Missing patent effectiveness
Appropriability of patents
Capital intensity
Missing capital intensity
Ln(patent stock)
Component familiarity
Fragmentation index
Large firm
Manufacturing unit
Competence-destroying
Complexity of product
Breadth of openness
Collaboration diversity
Technological value
No immediate demand
% Basic R&D
Product invention
Man-month
Number of inventors
# USPC
# backward citations
Number of claims
Age of invention
Semiconductor industry
Electrical engineering
Chemistry, pharma
Process eng.
Mechanical eng,
Consumer & Construction

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

0.77* 1.00
0.03* 0.01

1.00

-0.07* -0.06* 0.00

1.00

0.08* 0.06* 0.11* -0.01

1.00

0.09* 0.11* -0.02* -0.21* 0.05* 1.00
-0.07* -0.07* -0.02* 0.64* 0.10* -0.35* 1.00
0.13* 0.12* -0.07* -0.46* -0.09* 0.24* -0.68* 1.00
-0.04* -0.05* 0.11* -0.01 -0.20* -0.01 -0.05* 0.01

1.00

-0.02* -0.03* -0.01 0.10* -0.01 -0.10* 0.11* -0.15* -0.04* 1.00
0.10* 0.10* -0.06* -0.42* -0.02* 0.22* -0.57* 0.60* -0.05* -0.06* 1.00
-0.02* -0.04* -0.06* 0.04* 0.00 -0.05* 0.08* -0.09* -0.05* -0.01 -0.06* 1.00
-0.06* -0.01 0.07* 0.04* 0.00 -0.04* 0.06* -0.05* 0.02* 0.01 -0.04* -0.03* 1.00
-0.02* -0.01 -0.13* -0.02* -0.45* -0.02* -0.13* 0.14* 0.12* -0.01 0.05* -0.05* -0.02* 1.00
0.01

0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.10* -0.03* 0.05* -0.06* 0.03* 0.06* -0.04* 0.01 0.07* -0.05* 1.00

-0.03* -0.06* 0.05* 0.03* 0.04* -0.03* 0.07* -0.11* -0.04* 0.03* -0.04* 0.01 0.03* -0.08* 0.20* 1.00
-0.13* -0.15* 0.05* 0.14* 0.04* -0.05* 0.13* -0.17* -0.01 0.02* -0.15* 0.03* 0.14* -0.07* 0.15* 0.09* 1.00
0.05* 0.05* -0.07* 0.00 -0.04* 0.03* -0.02* 0.06* 0.04* 0.00 0.04* 0.00 -0.04* 0.03* -0.01
0.05* 0.07* 0.07* 0.01

-0.01

0.01

0.01 0.06* 1.00

-0.01 0.02* 0.10* -0.07* 0.01 -0.05* 0.10* 0.05* 0.11* 0.03* 0.10* 0.05* 1.00

-0.04* -0.05* 0.44* -0.02* 0.00 -0.11* -0.01

0.01 -0.02* 0.03* 0.02

-0.02* -0.04* 0.10* -0.03* 0.05* 0.02* 0.02* 0.00

0.00 0.02* -0.07* 0.02* -0.01 -0.06* -0.08* -0.07* 1.00

0.01 -0.04* -0.02* -0.04* 0.14* -0.05* 0.20* 0.10* 0.17* -0.03* 0.06* -0.06* 1.00

0.02* 0.00 0.08* -0.06* 0.08* 0.05* -0.07* 0.08* 0.05* 0.00 0.05* -0.07* 0.05* 0.01 0.10* 0.00 0.08* -0.03* 0.01 -0.04* 0.27* 1.00
0.03* 0.05* 0.01
0.01

0.00 0.05* 0.09* -0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01 0.03* -0.06* 0.04* -0.12* 0.06* 0.00 0.09* 0.02 0.05* -0.09* 0.04* 0.05* 1.00

-0.01 0.07* 0.03* 0.12* -0.04* 0.07* -0.09* -0.03* 0.37* -0.03* -0.02 0.08* -0.11* 0.03* 0.01 0.03* -0.03* -0.02* -0.01 0.02* 0.11* 0.04* 1.00

0.01

0.01 0.02* 0.11* -0.02* -0.05* 0.09* -0.10* 0.05* 0.13* -0.12* -0.04* 0.01 0.03* 0.00

-0.01 0.05* 0.00 -0.03* -0.04* 0.04* 0.08* 0.07* 0.14* 1.00

0.00

-0.01 -0.03* 0.01 -0.05* -0.02* -0.06* 0.05* 0.02* 0.01 0.04* 0.05* -0.01 0.02* 0.01

-0.01 -0.04* -0.01 -0.03* 0.01

0.00

-0.01 0.02* 0.01 -0.04* 1.00

-0.04* -0.02* -0.18* -0.14* -0.12* 0.06* -0.16* 0.08* 0.03* 0.01 0.09* -0.03* -0.03* 0.20* -0.02* -0.04* -0.06* 0.06* -0.03* 0.01 -0.10* -0.04* -0.01 -0.08* -0.02 0.05* 1.00
-0.07* -0.03* -0.23* 0.01 -0.54* -0.08* -0.09* 0.12* 0.04* 0.08* 0.03* -0.05* -0.01 0.49* -0.05* -0.07* -0.05* 0.06* -0.01 0.02* -0.11* -0.09* -0.06* -0.09* -0.01 0.08* 0.27*
0.04* 0.04* 0.13* -0.03* 0.18* 0.19* 0.03* -0.03* 0.16* -0.21* 0.00 -0.06* 0.10* -0.36* 0.10* -0.03* 0.07* -0.01 0.14* -0.07* 0.18* 0.11* 0.24* -0.04* 0.00 -0.06* -0.13*
-0.01 0.02* 0.00 -0.03* -0.10* 0.04* 0.00 -0.02* -0.07* 0.03* 0.03* 0.06* -0.02* 0.03* -0.03* 0.03* -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.09* 0.00 0.02* 0.05* 0.02* -0.03* -0.02* -0.10*
0.01 -0.04* 0.00

0.02 0.02* -0.04* 0.06* -0.05* -0.12* 0.03* 0.01 0.12* -0.04* -0.28* -0.09* 0.04* -0.01 0.03* -0.08* 0.10* -0.10* -0.10* -0.11* -0.01 -0.04* -0.03* -0.08*

0.01 -0.03* 0.01 0.11* 0.07* -0.05* 0.10* -0.09* -0.05* 0.07* -0.07* 0.04* 0.02* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 0.02* -0.07* -0.03* 0.08* 0.02* 0.00 -0.03* 0.08* 0.03* -0.01 -0.05*

* p<0.05
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